

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

they have available whose capabilities will be known only to them after strikes on our forces. Conflicts would be settled by FRES.

4. Initiative vs retaliatory. Annex I of proposed SIOP discusses missile forces programmed for either initiative or retaliatory sorties. Appears planning has been geared toward initiative plan despite guidance, and agrees with Army analysis of SIOP on this point. We will need provide more detailed guidance for next SIOP.

Pre-emptive, preventative or initiative strikes will not prevent serious damage on United States because first, we do not know where their land-based missile sites are and never will know all of them. And, second, we will not be able to destroy all enemy seagoing ^{MISSILE FORCES} simultaneously before they ^{can} get off their ^{MISSILES} ^{were to}. In addition, manned aircraft are of no use in a pre-emptive war. If we try to coordinate missiles and bombers so that the strikes arrive on target at the same time such tremendous universal effort by United States would be known by Russia several hours before bombers could arrive and ^{RUSSIA} would launch their strikes against us. If we use missiles first, the landing of first missile would cause all bombers and missiles in Russia to be launched and our bombers arriving hours later would be bombing empty sites and empty airfields. It is surprising that Air Force is sponsoring a pre-emptive strike because a pre-emptive strike means an all ballistic missile strike and sounds the death knell of bombers.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

241819Z Nov 60

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DTG

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/58)

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. _____

J.C.S. 2056/194

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

9 December 1960

Pages 1812 - 1824, incl.

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
50 YEARS BY SECDEF MEMO, 20 May 1980
DECLASS AUTHORITY: 1990
REVIEW ON: 1990

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

REVIEW OF THE INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/165
b. J.C.S. 2056/189
c. J.C.S. 2056/191

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No. 1	2041
Case No. 987018	TS-22
Document No. 3	

1. At the meeting of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands in Omaha, Nebraska, on 2 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JCS SIOP-62 and the NSTL. Subsequently, at their meeting on 9 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the report by the J-3 in the Enclosure hereto.

2. The memorandum in Appendix "A" was forwarded as JCSM-560-60, dated 9 December 1960. The message in Appendix "B" was dispatched as JCS 987018, dated 9 December 1960, to the addressees indicated therein.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

921118-62



TOP SECRET CONTROL

~~TOP SECRET~~

E N C L O S U R E
REVIEW OF THE INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) submitted by the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) in compliance with the guidance contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP)* and SM-810-60, dated 19 August 1960.**

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix x "D".

DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see Appendix "E".

CONCLUSIONS

4. While review and analysis of the initial NSTL and SIOP and the conclusions therefrom must follow after receipt of those documents, the nature of the planning efforts evident to date and the extent of participation of the representatives of the unified and specified commands in that planning indicate that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 are satisfactory for the integration of the initial national strategic attack.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62, as submitted by the DSTP should be promulgated to the unified and specified commands and provided to the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures. Promulgation should be in conformance with implementation of established Joint Chiefs of Staff policy on distribution of the NSTL and SIOP.***

* Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165
** On File in the Joint Secretariat
*** JCS 2056/191

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1813 -

Enclosure

921118 -69

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. 1 April 1961 should be established as the effective date of Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62.

5. Review of Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 should continue directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. These would include methods to be followed in preparation, policy guidance (including bringing the NSTAP and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) into consonance), organization and procedures of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), and recommendations derived from wargaming Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62. These recommendations are desired from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, as soon as practicable.)

6. Included in the measures for review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 should be a wargame of the SIOP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by the commanders of unified and specified commands for their respective parts of the SIOP. However, the effective date of the SIOP should not be delayed pending receipt of results of that wargame.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the conclusions contained in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.

b. Dispatch the memorandum at Appendix "A" to the Secretary of Defense.

c. Dispatch message at Appendix "B".

d. Approve the memorandum promulgating the Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62 at Appendix "C".

921118 70

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1814 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified and specified commands.

9. In consonance with the provisions of J.C.S. Memorandum of Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers assigned to NATO activities.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/194

- 1815 -

Enclosure

921118 7/

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62)(U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved Joint Chiefs of Staff National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62) for the integration of the initial national strategic attack. Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 will be promulgated to the commanders of unified and specified commands and provided to the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for their use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures.

2. 1 April 1961 is established as the effective date of Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP-62.

921118 72

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1816 -

Appendix "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36671 (29 Oct 60)

THE SIOP. THE JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVES TABLED A WORKING PAPER ON SUCH A CONCEPT FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE ASSEMBLED REPRESENTATIVES. THIS PAPER PROVIDED A CONCEPT TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE JSTPS FOR THE PREPARATION OF ANY DETAILED ANNEX TO THE SIOP, WHICH MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO COVER THE SUBJECT OF COMMAND, CONTROL AND EXECUTION. VARIOUS CHANGES, MOST OF THEM MINOR, WERE PROPOSED IN THE WORDING OF THE JOINT STAFF PAPER AND MUCH DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE ON THE SUBJECT OF E-HOUR AND H-HOUR. SAC WANTED AN E-HOUR SEPARATED FROM THE RCS H-HOUR BY A PLANNING FACTOR OF 15 MINUTES. JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED THE PLANNING FACTOR OF 15 MINUTES BE INCORPORATED IN THE PLAN AND THAT ONLY ONE BASE TIME (REFERENCE HOUR) BE USED, FROM WHICH ALL TIMING WOULD BE ORIGINATED. OTHER CINC REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT THEY WOULD ~~P~~IVE WITH EITHER SYSTEM. FURTHER DELIDERATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMAND, CONTROL AND EXECUTION TOOK PLACE ON 25 OCTOBER. A WORKING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH WAS AGREED TO BY ALL CONFEREES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE H/E-HOUR QUESTION, WAS TAKEN BACK TO WASHINGTON BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JOINT STAFF FOR USE AS THE BASIS FOR A JCS PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. INFORMAL WORD WAS RECEIVED FROM SAC OPERATIONS ON 27 OCTOBER THAT THEY WERE DRAFTING A MESSAGE FOR DISPATCH TO THE JCS INDICATING THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE SINGLE

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

PAGE 4 OF 5

AFHO FORM 0-309

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36671 (29 Oct 60)

REFERENCE HOUR CONCEPT, WITH THE 15 MINUTE PLANNING FACTOR
ABSORBED IN THE OPTION SHEET. (B) THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE
HANDCARRIED TO JCS IN WASHINGTON ON 27 OCTOBER BY CAPTAIN MOORE:
ONE MAGNETIC TAPE FOR ALERT FORCE DGZ CARDS , ONE MAGNETIC TAPE FOR
ALERT FORCE DGZ PRINT-OUT, ONE MAGNETIC TAPE FOR NSTL DATA BASE. THREE
PRINT -OUTS OF THE ALERT FORCE DGZ WITH COLUMNAR TITLES.

BT

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without
approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

PAGE 5 OF 5

AFHQ FORM 0-309
22 JUN 58

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

DECLASSIFIED

MW P002

RR YFEAMFXS YFHMW YFTUDXP

REL BY ADM BURKE OP-00

DE YFEAMW 01

R 201933Z

1960 NOV 20 21 19

FM GNO

TO CINCLANTFLT

CINCPACFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR

SECTION ONE OF TWO

T O P S E C R E T//EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMS FELT, DENNISON, SMITH AND SIDES FROM BURKE. WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING BRIEFING DATA FROM ARMY SOURCES. THIS IS A PRIVILEGED PAPER. IT IS ALSO A WORKING DRAFT AND MAY BE CHANGED. GENERAL DECKER IS TO BE BRIEFED ON THIS WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. IN GENERAL, IT COINCIDES CLOSELY WITH OUR POSITIONS. WE HOPE TO GET OUT A SIMILAR POSITION AND PLAN OF ACTION WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. PAPER FOLLOWS. QUOTE:

1. NORTHERN BASES. USE OF NORTHERN STAGING BASES BY THE SOVIET BOMBER FLEET INCREASES GREATLY THE SOVIET ATTACK CAPABILITY AGAINST CONUS. IN ORDER TO SECURE THE MAXIMUM SURPRISE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THESE BASES WILL HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH OF AN INITIAL SOVIET MISSILE ATTACK. RAPID US MISSILE ATTACK AGAINST THESE BASES COULD DEGRADE SIGNIFICANTLY THE WEIGHT OF THE INITIAL OR FOLLOW-ON SOVIET BOMBER ATTACK AGAINST CONUS: THE BOMBER ATTACKS NOW PROGRAMMED PROBABLY WOULD NOT.

2. CONSTRAINTS. ALERT FORCE WEAPONS ALONE CREATE AN EXCESSIVE AND INTOLERABLE RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD IN MANY PERIPHERAL AREAS BUT MOST NOTABLY IN SOUTH KOREA. THIS HAZARD WILL INCREASE WHEN FOLLOW-ON FORCES ARE CONSIDERED AND DOES NOT CONSIDER THE EFFECTS ARISING FROM SOVIET WEAPONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE THIS HAZARD TO ACCEPTABLE LEVELS MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO DIVERT UNNEEDED WEAPONS, TO EMPLOY A GREATER PROPORTION OF AIR BURST WEAPONS, TO EMPLOY SMALLER WEAPONS, OR TO FOREGO ATTACK OF TARGETS WHOSE DESTRUCTION IS NOT TRULY ESSENTIAL. HA!

3. ARMED RECONNAISSANCE. THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF SOVIET AIR BASES AND SUSPECTED MISSILE SITES CONSTITUTING POTENTIAL OR POSSIBLE THREATS TO CONUS. SHEER NUMBERS PRECLUDE THE TARGETING OF ALL THESE. UNDER THE SYSTEM OF ASSURANCES USED THERE WILL BE RESIDUAL WEAPONS WHICH WILL BE BURST IN THE CRATERS OF PREVIOUS WEAPONS. DIVERSION OF THESE WEAPONS TO ARMED RECONNAISSANCE, AT PILOT OPTION, COULD BE USED TO ATTACK ADDITIONAL MILITARY TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. NO SUCH PROGRAM OR CAPABILITY IS PROVIDED. B-70

4. INTERDICTION. NEITHER INTERDICTION OF INTERNAL SINO-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS NOR OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORTING PERIPHERAL FORCES IS EMBRACED IN THE NSTAP. AN EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION PROGRAM COULD MARKEDLY REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST PERIPHERAL AREAS AS WELL AS RETARD ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION PROGRAM, BOTH WITHIN THE USSR AND IN SUPPORT OF THEATER FORCES IS A DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE UNNECESSARY INFLATION OF ASSURANCE LEVELS AND ATTACK OF LESS IMPORTANT TARGETS. bro

5. GUIDANCE. THE RELATION OF THE NSTAP TO THE TOTAL GENERAL WAR TASK IS NOT CLEAR. WITHIN THE NSTAP ITSELF, GUIDANCE IS SOMETIMES VAGUE AND CONTRADICTORY. CLARIFICATION OF THE NSTAP IS REQUIRED ALONG WITH CLOSE CORRELATION OF THE NSTAP WITH PARALLEL GUIDANCE IN JSCP AND ELSEWHERE.

6. POINT SYSTEM. THE SAC TARGET POINT WORTH SYSTEM HAS WIDE-SPREAD EFFECTS BOTH IN THE SELECTION OF THE NSTL AND IN THE APPLICATION OF SIOP FORCES. CAREFUL RE-EVALUATION IS NEEDED TO EQUATE THE ARBITRARY POINT VALUES TO THE NSTAP OBJECTIVES.

7. FLEXIBILITY. THE SIOP CONTAINS NO PROVISION FOR DIVERSION OF LATER PROGRAMMED ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS STRUCK SUCCESSFULLY IN THE EARLIER PHASES. THIS LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SIOP CAUSES IT TO FALL SHORT OF THE MOST ECONOMICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE FORCES, AND COMPOUNDS CONSTRAINT PROBLEMS. WITH FLEXIBILITY THE SAME LEVEL OF ASSURANCE AGAINST THE ATTACK BASE COULD BE ATTAINED AT LESS COST IN DELIVERY FORCES.

DE YFEAMW 02

R 201933Z

FM CNO

190101 20 21 50

TO CINCLANTFLT

CINCPACFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

T O P S E C R E T//EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMS FELT, DENNISON, SMITH AND SIDES FROM BURKE.

8. TIMING. THE PROVISIONS OF THE NSTAP LIMITING THE SIOP TO THE INITIAL ATTACK AND YET ACCOMPLISHING UNDER THE SIOP THE STRATEGIC ATTACK NECESSARY TO PUT THE UNITED STATES IN A POSITION FROM WHICH ULTIMATELY TO PREVAIL TEND TO CREATE INFLATED FORCE REQUIREMENTS. AN EXTENSION OF THE SIOP IN TIME WOULD PERMIT USE OF AN ORDERLY TIME-PRIORITY OF ATTACK WITH LESSEENED FORCE REQUIREMENTS. IMPORTANT BUT IMMOBILE TARGETS CONSTITUTING ONLY A LONG-TERM OR INDIRECT THREAT (E.G., URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES.) MIGHT THEN BE ATTACKED ON A DEFERRED BASIS.

9. CRITICAL INDUSTRY. THE NSTAP OBJECTIVE OF DESTRUCTION OF 50 PERCENT OF (INDUSTRIAL) FLOOR SPACE IN MAJOR URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES IS INDISCRIMINATE AND PROBABLY WASTEFUL OF RETALIATORY EFFORT. THE "HORIZONTAL" (INDUSTRIAL) TARGETING IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ATTACK IN DEPTH (VERTICALLY) AGAINST CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL SEGMENTS, A POLICY FOUND TO BE MOST PROFITABLE IN THE POST WORLD WAR II STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT SURVEY.

10. INITIATIVE VS RETALIATORY. THE SIOP IS NEITHER CLEARLY A RETALIATORY PLAN NOR CLEARLY AN INITIATIVE PLAN. COUNTERFORCE RECEIVES HIGHER PRECEDENCE THAN IS WARRANTED FOR A RETALIATORY PLAN AND LESS PRECEDENCE THAN IS WARRANTED FOR AN INITIATIVE PLAN. OPTIONS ARE NEEDED FOR THESE TWO BASIC CONDITIONS.

11. NSTL INCONSISTENT. THE NSTL SUBMITTED IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE NSTAP OBJECTIVES. IT DOES NOT IDENTIFY URBAN-INDUSTRIAL TARGET COMPLEXES; IT OVER EMPHASIZES NON-PRODUCTIVE MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS AIRFIELDS WITH NO CURRENT CAPABILITY, AND AIR LOGISTIC FACILITIES.

12. INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS. SUFFICIENT DATA HAS NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR SEARCHING ANALYSIS OF THE NSTL AND SIOP. INSUFFICIENT TIME REMAINS PRIOR TO PRESENTATION OF THE NSTL AND SIOP TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO PERMIT THOROUGH ANALYSIS EVEN IF THE REQUISITE DATA SHOULD BECOME AVAILABLE. THUS ACTION ON THE NSTL AND SIOP MUST BE CONDITIONAL TO SUBSEQUENT, MORE ADEQUATE REVIEW.

13. NEED TO GAME SIOP. AN OBJECTIVE WAR GAME OF THE SIOP IS REQUIRED TO VALIDATE PENETRATION FACTORS AND TO ESTABLISH AND EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF BASE SURVIVAL CONSIDERATIONS.

14. ASSURANCE NOT GREATER THAN 90 PERCENT. APPLICATION OF FORCES TO ATTAIN ASSURANCES OF 90 PERCENT AND HIGHER IS UN-PRODUCTIVE AND WASTEFUL OF DELIVERY FORCE CAPABILITIES. BETTER USE COULD BE MADE OF FORCES NOW SO COMMITTED BY PROGRAMMING THEM TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRIMARY TARGET HAS BEEN STRUCK AND PERMITTING THEM TO STRIKE ALTERNATE TARGETS.

15. WEATHER FACTOR. THE APPLICATION OF THE WEATHER FACTOR USED BY THE JSTPS IS WASTEFUL OF DELIVERY CAPABILITIES. RIGID APPLICATION OF THIS FACTOR TO NON ALL-WEATHER FORCES DURING THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE APPEARS UNNECESSARY, ESPECIALLY FOR HIGHLY SURVIVABLE MOBILE FORCES.

16. CAPABILITIES PLAN VERSUS MINIMUM NSTL. THE NSTL SUBMITTED BY THE DSTP IS A LIST OF THE TARGETS WHICH COULD BE ATTACKED WITH DESIRED ASSURANCES BY THE FORCES MADE AVAILABLE. IT IS A CAPABILITY LIST DERIVED FROM A CAPABILITY PLAN. IT INCLUDES THEATER TARGETS AND BONUS TARGETS NOT PROPERLY A PART OF THE OBJECTIVE ASSIGNED. THE NSTL INTENDED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE JCS WAS A STRATEGIC RETALIATORY OBJECTIVE. THUS TARGETS NOT A PART OF THE STRATEGIC RETALIATORY OBJECTIVES (NSTL) AND NOT DIRECTLY NECESSARY TO THE ATTACK OF THE NSTL SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SIOP AND INCORPORATED IN RELATED OR SUPPORTING UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND PLANS. BECAUSE OF ITS FIRST PRIORITY NATURE, THE SIOP MIGHT PROPERLY ESTABLISH CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS IN THESE CONCURRENT ATTACKS FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES.

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RELEASED BY <i>Burke</i>	DRAFTED BY ADM BURKE OP-00	EXT NR 55664	COPY NR.
DATE 22 November 1960	TOR 1836Z/22 NOV 60	ROUTED BY DRAFTER	CHECKED BY BJB/ <i>Suddely</i>

22868

221845Z NOV 60

(DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT))

PRECEDENCE

(ACT)	(INFO)
☐ FLASH	☐
☐ EMERGENCY	☐
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	☐
☒ PRIORITY	☐
☐ ROUTINE	☐
☐ DEFERRED	☐

FROM: CNO

TO: CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO

// TOP SECRET //

RADM Blackman

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

Exclusive for Adms Felt, Dennison and Smith from Burke.

Part I. Subject is general plan action NSTL/SIOP discussions Omaha 1-2 Dec.

1. Objectives. We are faced with fact that SecDef will approve NSTL/SIOP in one form or another by 1 Jan 1961. It would be preferable to have this first NSTL/SIOP approved contingent upon incorporation of changes that preliminary spot checks show to be necessary and war gaming to prove validity. I doubt if this can be sold. As best alternative, propose to advocate approval of NSTL/SIOP with provisos that:

(a) JCS review NSTAP and develop more realistic damage criteria, clarify guidance reassurance of delivery at BRL, and size of NSTL. (b) JCS analyze and review plan to insure all aspects of plan are sound. (c) Plan be war gamed under JCS control, and that following these steps guidance be given to Director Joint Strategic Target Planning and that he be directed to come up with a new and revised NSTL/SIOP six months after receipt of such revised guidance. *me*

2. Our approach should be that this NSTL/SIOP is a good first effort but many areas such as damage criteria, point system, assurance levels, constraints need further

DRAFTER: 00 DIST: 00, 09

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

94216(1-6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(When filled in)

221845Z NOV 1960

DTG

Page 1 of 8 Pages

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 1-58)
DEPT. USE ONLY

A Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

221845Z

221845Z

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

examination as does JCS guidance to DSTP and compressed time scale for NSTL/SIOP development and thus hasty planning make revisions and refinements essential.

Part II.

3. My views are as expressed in my 060403Z plus additions as follows:

4. A. Dissents.

(1) On application of weather/darkness factor. Suggest CINCPAC be the one to broach this subject followed by CINCLANT statement of his views on this subject. I will take the position that imposition of weather factor is legitimate but that as far as darkness factor is concerned carrier non-all-weather attacks should be programmed on flexible TOTs. However, reliability of various weapons systems is determined by mathematical formula with factors in formula developed from experience or expected physical conditions. It will be most difficult to object to their formula or their factors unless we can actually disprove their validity or supply other more valid formulae or factors. We have not been able to develop any new mathematical approach and the pseudo mathematical approach used to get the NSTL and SIOP assigned to Omaha in the first place had an impelling fascination for SecDef and was the principal reason for his decision.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60

PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

DTG
TOP SECRET
NCC 22868

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

(2) Assurance levels. Suggest CINCLANT broach this subject with assist from CINGPAC and Army if we can obtain their support. SACEUR may address this subject. Suggest Smith obtain Norstad's views. CNO will cite examples of what appears to be excessive assurance, i.e., Moscow X wpns, Stalingrad X wpns, Kaliningrad X wpns, 202 DGZ with 97% assurance, and draw attention to comparison with President's action on 2009.

(3) Size of NSTL - Number of targets and DGZ being generated in Omaha are constantly being changed and therefore specific analysis is most difficult. Note that in last few days JSTPS has reduced size of list somewhat. Believe now, on further consideration, figures cited in Part II A 1, my 060403Z may be too high. ONI preliminary estimates target list approximately 500 DGZs will get enemy nuclear delivery forces, major military and governmental controls and urban industrial targets to 2009 level. This compares with 750 DGZs for JSTPS minimum NSTL for same categories of targets. Suggest CINCLANT address this one. CNO will cite ONI figures above in support of position NSTL may be too large and complete NSTL (not quote minimum NSTL unquote) exceeds guidance in NSTAP.

B. Other points for discussion.

(1) Constraints. This of particular concern to SACEUR, CINCPAC and Army. *WHY?*

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60

PAGE 3 OF 8 PAGES

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

DTG

TOP SECRET

22868

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

Suggest Smith endeavor stimulate Norstad and Palmer concern this subject. Will prime Army. CNO will be prepared to cite figures on contamination at selected locations based on DASA analyses now being run. Will also raise questions of effects of Soviet bomb fall-out and suggest world-wide contamination be considered. Comments on high percentage of surface burst weapons in plan will be useful.

(2) Joint Intelligence. Under present conditions intelligence support for targeting effort is joint more in name than in fact. CNO will make pitch for joint target intelligence support group in Washington area directly under JCS as opposed to executive agent type arrangement now attempting job but constantly diverted by unilateral pressures and interests. Will try to obtain Army support for this. Contributions by CINCLANT and CINCPAC will be helpful.

(3) Distribution of Plan. CINCPAC is probably best one to address this initially. CNO position is that JCS, CINCs and Service Chiefs must have complete plan. (DJSTPS 191540 pasep to you indicates he will try to fragment plan so that of CINCS, only CINCSAC will have complete plan).

(4) War Gaming. CNO will talk to this item. Expect to be told that SAC has capability now to war game SIOP and nobody else has. Will have outline plan

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60

DTG

PAGE 4 OF 8 PAGES
22868

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

/ TOP SECRET //

available how war game can be conducted in Washington under JCS. We can expect Army support for JCS war gaming. Paper setting up JCS War Games Control Group now before JCS. AF bucking. Hope get resolved prior 1 Dec meeting but doubt if possible.

(5) Command and Control. This is a hot subject in JCS now. I think it would be best not to initiate discussion of this at Omaha on basis that it is a subject for JCS resolution. Air Force may bring up and we think it mandatory that firm control be retained and exercised by JCS. Will attempt to prime Lemnitzer and Decker on this approach.

(6) Damage Criteria. CNO will bring up this subject with recommendation criteria should be examined carefully by JCS and JCS guidance be examined and possibly modified. Intend raise question if fire or radiation effects considered in plan (they are not). May be able get Kistiakowsky and other service support on this one.

(7) Individual Target Effort. CNO will raise question validity high level of effort required hit some targets for example Kharkov where bombers must fly over more than 1500 miles of Russian territory and must be supported by extensive corridor/roll back effort. Few if any targets indispensable to plan.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60
DTG

PAGE 5 OF 8 PAGES

59222

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

(8) Base Survivability. Suggest CINCPAC raise this subject. CNO position is that a clear picture of base survivability is essential to the development of a realistic plan - different bases have different degree of vulnerability - "across the board" solution is not good enough - mobile bases survive longest - this whole subject needs to be war gamed or at least carefully examined.

(9) Alert Force/Follow-on Force. Latest info from Omaha is about 780 aircraft and missiles in alert force which appears adequate do the job on an NSTL of reasonable size. Some follow-on force necessary but programming of all available forces may be too rigid and makes no provision for contingencies and a residual atomic attack capability which ordinary military prudence would indicate essential. This of concern to all but could be highly important to SACEUR and Army. Suggest Smith discuss with Norstad. Will attempt get Decker support.

(10) Bonus effect of misses. CNO will comment on fact that misses will kill a lot of Russians and Chinese even if specified objective is missed, therefore, misses should not be given a zero in the box score of damage achieved.

(11) Reliability Factors of Own and Enemy Weapon Systems. Suggest CINCLANT bring this up with assist from CINCPAC. CNO position is that it is

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60

DTG

PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

NCC 22868

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
OF ONLY

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

unrealistic and leads to inflated force requirements to plan solely on the basis of worst situation for our own forces and the best for the enemy.

(12) Alfa and Bravo Point Systems. Suggest CINCPAC address this subject. CNO position is that system for development of Alfa and Bravo points needs detailed examination. Further that systems are not now compatible for development of optimum mix. Omega points (arbitrary mix of Alfa and Bravo points) also questionable.

(13) SIOP. Copy received in OPNAV, 19 November now under study. Will forward comments soonest.

Part III.

Consider recommendation to SecDef that new NSTL/SIOP be developed earliest should be based on:

- (a) NSTL unnecessarily large.
- (b) Damage criteria are excessively high.
- (c) Assurances excessive - force requirements inflated.
- (d) Constraints criteria probably cannot be observed if damage and assurance criteria are both kept high. *to keep force high*
- (e) Independent war gaming necessary to assess validity of plan.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR CNO

221845Z NOV 60

PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES

DTG

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
DEPT. USE ONLY

TOP SECRETED CC 22868

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

// TOP SECRET //

Part IV.

For your info:

(1) At 23 November briefing of JCS by Power I intend to comment on but not pursue:

- (a) Target list appears excessively large - does it conform to guidance?
- (b) Assurance at BRL appears excessively large.
- (c) Plan does not appear to conform to constraints criteria.

By merely noting these I hope to forestall Power taking the position at 1 Dec meeting that JCS silence at his 23 Nov briefing indicated acquiescence and by not elaborating reduce likelihood Power reorienting 1 Dec briefing and obscuring points to which I object.

- (2) Understand General Palmer will represent Norstad at Omaha meeting.
- (3) We may have more later.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR

CNO

221845Z NOV 60

DTG

PAGE 8 OF 8 PAGES

NCC 22868

OPNAV FORM 210-2A (REV. 8/1/55)
REPT USE ONLY

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RELEASED BY <i>Burke</i>	DRAFTED BY RAIM P.P. BLACKBURN, Jr.	EXT NR 76477	COPY NR.
DATE 24 NOV 60	TOR 1818Z/24 Nov 60	ROUTED BY Drafter	CHECKED BY <i>W. H. Wallis</i>

22954

NO

241819Z Nov 1960

(DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT))

FROM: CNO

TO: CINCLANTFLT
CINCPACFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO:

PRECEDENCE

(ACT)	(INFO)
☐ FLASH	☐
☐ EMERGENCY	☐
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	☐
☐ PRIORITY	☐
☒ ROUTINE	☐
☐ DEFERRED	☐

EXCLUSIVE

Raim Blackburn

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

U.S. NAVY EYES ONLY

U.S. NAVY EYES ONLY

Exclusive for Adms Felt, Dennison, and Smith from Burke.

Following are my comments on parts of my 201933Z not previously covered
my 221845Z. While in general agreement with most Army positions, divergencies in
certain areas exist.

1. Northern Bases. Army position was addressed by CINCAL in Policy

Committee Meeting No. 5. Agree with Army philosophy but present missile reliability,
available geodesy, and lack of detailed intelligence appears to preclude attacks
this area beyond level programmed in this SIOP for manned bombers.

2. Interdiction. Interdiction targets, of course, should be struck but
interdiction targets should not be in NSTL or SIOP. Destruction of interdiction
targets is job of Unified Commanders.

3. Timing. I do not agree with Army position. SIOP should be restricted
only to initial strikes. There is going to be a lot of confusion after initial
strikes and control of subsequent operations must rest in Unified Commanders
and local commanders. They must exercise their initiative and use forces which

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

ORIG: Op-00

DIST: Op-00...09

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 1-58)
DEPT. USE ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

942T6(1-6)file(1)
09(2-3)09(4)sp(5-6)

241819Z Nov 60

DTG

Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(2) These conclusions suggest that the carrier forces should not be assigned H-hour responsibility for any pre-planned strategic targets.

(3) Possibly the carrier forces should be considered as having three primary functions:

One: As a strategic reserve for follow-up attack as required.

Two: As a mobile limited war force.

Three: As an element of a unified commander's forces, when on station, with target responsibilities in support of the local commander's plans -- but not to include any targets on the national strategic target list.

e. With respect to the POLARIS submarine force, I would leave this force under naval control until a proven weapon system has been developed. If the POLARIS submarine force develops a significant combat capability (in terms of reliability and weight of effort which can be delivered on target), we may then find that a Unified Strategic Command is required. Such a command eventually might have subordinate component commands for aircraft, for land-based missiles and for sea-based missiles. If a Unified Strategic Command is not established eventually, as a minimum, the targets to be attacked by POLARIS and the timing of attack should be derived from a single integrated operational plan. I therefore believe that an appropriate nucleus of Naval officers should be assigned at an early date to CINCSAC's operational planning staff. For the immediate future these officers would assist in the development of an integrated operational plan, and they would constitute a nucleus of Naval personnel if later decision were made to establish a Unified Strategic Command.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1155 -

Enclosure

921118-459

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

27. Assuming that for the immediate future we are to take no action on the proposal for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command, but assuming that we do take action to develop a single integrated operational plan, we would then be in a position to do more effective operational analysis and war gaming, and these exercises could be conducted under varying assumptions.

28. War gaming does two principal things:

- a. It provides additional information which tends to validate, invalidate, or modify a target system; and
- b. It indicates the feasibility or infeasibility of the operations plan and the results which could be expected from execution of the plan.

29. The policy direction of this type of war gaming should be above Service or command level. There is no capability within the Joint Staff at the present time for this kind of analysis and war gaming. It has been done in the past by Rand, by SAC, by the Air Staff Plans and Intelligence organization, and by the NESO (which relies heavily for support on the Services and DASA). The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently considering methods by which this type of war gaming could be performed for them. It has been suggested that DASA might perform the function, or that it might be performed by the Air Battle Analysis Division of the Directorate of Plans, Air Staff. Under either solution, the JCS organization should provide the policy guidance and terms of reference for each analytical study or war game which is conducted. The agency making the study for the JCS would not make policy -- but would provide electronic computers and trained personnel for doing the mechanical job of analysis. Wherever this function is assigned, the Joint Chiefs

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1156 -

Enclosure

921118-460

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

of Staff need a war gaming capability which is responsive to Joint Chiefs of Staff policy control. This does not require a large new agency. It does require decision as to what existing agency will do this work.

The Question of Operational Control
of the Strike Forces Involved

30. Up to this point, this memorandum has been focused entirely on resolving the issues associated with the national strategic target system. However, when we get into the question of operational control we must broaden the problem to include an examination of employment of atomic weapons by unified commanders having an area responsibility. These commanders traditionally have insisted that certain strategic targets were of such importance to accomplishment of their local missions that they should have the responsibility for seeing that they were neutralized or destroyed. To eliminate duplication in targeting brought about by this situation the following decision is required: As a general policy, targets on the national strategic target system list will not be included as H-hour objectives of the forces of unified commanders, and forces will not be justified nor programmed for such attack.

31. However, the local area commander has a legitimate concern and responsibility with respect to enemy military forces which cannot strike immediately at the United States, but which have the range and capability to threaten local forces and installations. There may be one or several strategic targets interspersed in the same geographic area. The problem is therefore one of possible mutual interference, not on a single target basis, but on an area basis.

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1157 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

32. Assuming that the series of decisions which I have outlined were taken, the question of operational control of the various strike forces and the problem of avoiding mutual interference would be greatly simplified. They would be greatly simplified because mutual interference resulting from two or more commands targeting the same objective for H-hour attack would be largely eliminated. We would have an approved national strategic target list and a single integrated operational plan for strategic attack. These documents would provide a sound basis for the necessary coordination of the operational plans of local commanders with CINCSAG's plan. Potential conflicts could be worked out between the commanders concerned by analysis of routes to and from target, by agreement on timing, and by transfers of targets between commands as dictated by good judgment. Conflicts not reconcilable between commanders would have to be solved by the Joint Chief of Staff, but this would be a manageable problem against the background of policy decisions which I have discussed.

33. In my judgment, we should resolve the issues which I have discussed as soon as possible. To that end, I am circulating a copy of this memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

/s/ N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1158 -

Enclosure

921118-462

22 December 1959

Pages 1286 - 1313, incl.

SECRET

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
20 YEARS BY SECDEF 10710 28 JAN 1980
DECLASSIFIED ON 28 JAN 1980

*Not Originals
if the enclosed are
being retained to
be sent to Section.*

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 1620/257-4720 (5 Jan 50)
b. J.C.S. 2056/131
c. J.C.S. 2056/134
d. J.C.S. 2056/137

1. Pursuant to agreement at the meeting on 1 December 1959, Enclosure "A" hereto, containing the views of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;* the Chief of Naval Operations;** the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;*** and the Commandant of the Marine Corps,**** on the questions posed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/134, is circulated for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Op60B/ls, serial 000 362P60, subject: "Target Coordination and Associated Problems", dated 30 September 1959, is appended, as Enclosure "B" hereto, at the request** of the Chief of Naval Operations.

H. L. HILLYARD,
J. O. COBB,
Joint Secretariat.

- * CSAM-401-59, dated 15 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- ** Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations, Op-604E/br, serial 000467P60, dated 20 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- *** CSAFM-565-59, dated 15 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- **** Memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, A03B(6)-dw/0003A34859, dated 17 December 1959, subject: "Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)"; on file in Joint Secretariat.

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Twining (O/JCS)
Gen. Lemnitzer (CSA)

SECRET

Gen. Picher (D/JS)

921118-399

Copy No
Case No 92-1542-
T.S. No 92-77-230
Doc No 34

92-1542-399

9

1. Strategic Targeting Policy

2. QUESTION What should be our policy for development of a national strategic target system?

ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

A national strategic target system should be developed.

3. QUESTION What categories of targets should be included in the national strategic target system?

ANSWER

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it

is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System" based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1) Critical components of
- "(2)
- "(3)
- "(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

(NOTE: In arriving at these ideas, consideration was given to CSMR-542-59, dated 1 December 1959, in which the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army suggested consideration be given to substituting, as in certain aspects, an Air Force proposed answer to question 1b of the Chairman's 18 questions. The answer to question 1b was arrived at by the Air Force Committee as an initial and basic step in the consideration of the Chairman's 18 questions. The Chairman's memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which is the basic source of the 18 questions, is in the view of the Chief of Naval Operations that for purposes of consideration of the Chairman's 18 questions, that the answer to question 1b should stand as it was and be given to the Air Force Committee.)

TOP SECRET

Chief of Naval Operations

A national strategic target system should be developed.

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System" based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1) Critical components of
- "(2)
- "(3)
- "(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

A national strategic target system should be developed.

The national strategic target system should include the following elements of the following categories of targets which comprise the Sino-Soviet Bloc (will) and capability to wage war.

(1)

(2)

(3)

Commandant of the Marine Corps

A national strategic target system should be developed.

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System" based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1)
- "(2)
- "(3) War-sustaining resources.
- "(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

(NOTE: This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required

Chief of Naval Operations

(NOTE: This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

As the commander functionally responsible under the Joint Chiefs of Staff for conduct of the strategic offensive on a world wide basis, CINCSAC is uniquely qualified and equipped to develop and maintain the national strategic target list. Since the designation as a specified command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Strategic Air Command has, as a matter of necessity, compiled and collected data from targeting references and other sources which, for all practical purposes, constitute the basis for a national strategic target list.

Should war planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be promulgated in the form of strategic guidance through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, that plan is a mission type directive embodying guidance to commanders on all aspects of atomic employment, including targeting policy, weapon programming, damage criteria and considerations. Within the parameters of this guidance, each commander develops plans designed to accomplish the missions and tasks assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a prerequisite to such plans, each commander develops a target list which will permit accomplishment of his specific missions and tasks. Based upon priorities of tasks within his mission, forces available and operational considerations, each commander then selects targets from his target list which he programs for attack in the Atomic Annex to his war plan.

Just as authority for development of a theater target list upon which to base theater war plans with atomic strike programs is essential to the theater commander for accomplishment of his mission, the authority for development of a national strategic target list as a basis for his war plan is essential to the commander functionally responsible to the Joint

Commandant of the Marine Corps

(NOTE: This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic target policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

mandates of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

7. 1. QUESTION Does the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization need policy control of an agency capable of operational analysis and war gaming of operational plans?

ANSWER

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

8. QUESTION If no, what agency should perform this function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

ANSWER

The Joint Chiefs of Staff need a joint operational analysis capability responsive to their requirements in order to fulfill their responsibilities as the senior operational command echelon in the military establishment. Either DASA or a new Joint Agency could perform this function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff need a joint operational analysis capability responsive to their requirements in order to fulfill their responsibilities as the senior operational command echelon in the military establishment. Either DASA or a new Joint Agency could perform this function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should exercise direction and policy control of operational analyses and war gaming by furnishing terms of reference, including applicable assumptions, for each analysis or game. To assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff and insure continuity of their control in these functions, a new position should be established on the Joint Staff, as a Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff. This officer of general or flag rank would be immediately responsible to the Director of the Joint Staff, and in addition to being charged with the conduct of war gaming, would also be designated as the Executive Director of the JCS Damage Assessment Center.

The new Special Assistant should be advised and assisted in monitoring the conduct of war games and damage assessment studies by a Joint Steering Committee, drawn from the Joint Staff and the Services.

For technical execution of war gaming, operational analyses and damage assessment studies, it would be neither necessary nor economical to divert DASAs attention to this function, which is completely foreign to its primary responsibility to provide technical, training, testing and stockpile management coordination in support of the atomic weapons field.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff need a operational analysis capability responsive to their requirements in order to fulfill their responsibilities as the senior operational command echelon in the military establishment. Either DASA or a new Agency could perform this function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

1. Strategic Targeting Policy

a. QUESTION What should be our policy for development of a national strategic target system?

ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

A national strategic target system should be developed.

Chief of Naval Operations*

A national strategic target system should be developed.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

A national strategic target system should be developed.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

A national strategic target system should be developed.

b. QUESTION What categories of targets should be included in the national strategic target system?

ANSWER

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System" based upon the Chairman's memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

"(1) Critical components of

"(2)

"(3)

"(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purposes of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current NFSC studies.

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System," based upon the Chairman's memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

"(1) Critical components of

"(2)

"(3)

"(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purposes of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current NFSC studies.

The national strategic target system should include the strategic elements of the following categories of targets which comprise the Sino-Soviet Bloc will and capability to wage war.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System," based upon the Chairman's memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

"(1)

"(2)

"(3) War-sustaining resources.

"(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery system," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purposes of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current NFSC studies.

*NOTE: In arriving at these views, consideration was given to CSAFH-542-59, dated 1 December 1959, in which the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force suggested consideration be given to substituting, as an agreed answer, an Air Force proposed answer to question 1b of the Ad Hoc Committee Report** in lieu of the unanimously agreed answer to that question advanced by the Committee. The answer to question 1b was arrived at by the Ad Hoc Committee as an initial and basic step in their consideration of the Chairman's 18 questions. Further, the agreed answer incorporates a definition of "A Strategic Target System" which is based directly on and taken essentially verbatim from the Chairman's memorandum** for the Secretary of Defense, which is the basic source of the 18 questions under consideration. It is the view of the Chief of Naval Operations that for purposes of consideration of the Chairman's 18 questions, that the answer to question 1b should stand as it was originally agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee.

(1) On file in Joint Secretariat
(2) Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131
(3) Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131
(4) Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131
** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required

~~SECRET~~

Chief of Naval Operations

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

As the commander functionally responsible under the Joint Chiefs of Staff for conduct of the strategic offensive on a world wide basis, CINCSAC is uniquely qualified and equipped to develop and maintain the national strategic target list. Since its designation as a specified command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Strategic Air Command has, as a matter of necessity, compiled and collated data from targeting references and other sources which, for all practical purposes, constitute the basis for a national strategic target list.

Atomic war planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is promulgated in the form of strategic guidance through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. That plan is a mission type directive embodying guidance to commanders on all aspects of atomic employment, including targeting policy, weapon programming, damage criteria and constraints. Within the parameters of this guidance, each commander develops plans designed to accomplish the missions and tasks assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a prerequisite to such plans, each commander develops a target list which will permit accomplishment of his specific missions and tasks. Based upon priorities of tasks within his mission, force availability and operational considerations, each commander then selects targets from his total list which he programs for attack in the Atomic Annex to his war plan.

Just as authority for development of a theatre target list upon which to base theatre war plans with atomic annex strike program is essential to the theatre commander for accomplishment of his mission, the authority for development of a national strategic target list as a basis for his war plan is essential to the commander functionally responsible to the Joint

Commandant of the Marine Corps

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required

~~SECRET~~

The first question is not susceptible to a categorical yes or no answer, since the answer would depend on whether or not there is a single commander charged with the operational responsibility of executing the attack on the entire national strategic target system, as well as on the integrated operational plan." For the reasons stated in my answer to question 3b, I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing this mission.

A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. With this interpretation it is therefore considered neither necessary nor desirable to have a single

The first question is not susceptible to a categorical yes or no answer, since the answer would depend on whether or not there is a single commander charged with the operational responsibility of executing the attack on the entire national strategic target system, as well as on the integrated operational plan." For the reasons stated in my answer to question 3b, I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing this mission.

A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. With this interpretation it is therefore considered

ANSWER:

b. QUESTION:

c. QUESTION:

2. Integrated Operational Plan
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANSWER:

d. QUESTION:

What agency should review the national strategic target system for consistency with policy and approve it as a basis for further analysis?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Do we need a single integrated operational plan for attack of the national strategic target system?

If we do need a single integrated operational plan for strategic attack, what agency should develop this plan? What agencies should review it and approve it?

Definition of such a target list is a product of careful review of intelligence and operational knowledge and experience, evaluated on the basis of mission and task assignment as well as other conceptual guidance provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In keeping with these considerations, it is appropriate that CINCPAC be assigned responsibility for development of the National Strategic Target List on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for review and approval by them, and without prejudice as to the forces to be employed to accomplish attacks against these targets.

Yes, we need a single integrated operational plan. The joint chiefs of staff currently produce a single strategic plan which omittutes the basis for the preparation of implementing operational plans by the commanders of the unified and specified commands, as appropriate to the plan, implementing the single strategic plan. It is required specifically to direct attack of the targets included on the national strategic target list because:

2. Successful attack of these targets is of crucial importance in general war and demands positive control of planning and coordinated unity in execution.

A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. This interpretation is therefore considered neither necessary nor desirable to have integrated operational plan. However,

Chief of Staff, U S Army

Since the USSR has the capability to launch a nuclear attack against us without warning at any time of their choosing, our nuclear retaliatory forces should be composed of weapons systems which have a reasonable assurance of surviving a surprise Soviet attack, rapidly launching their own attack, penetrating Soviet defenses and delivering their nuclear warheads accurately. For this reason, only all-weather capable delivery means should be assigned to pre-planned attacks against targets, on the approved national strategic target list, which must be destroyed in the immediate reaction to the hostile attack. Other nuclear capable delivery forces should be employed primarily in backup, re-strike or follow-up attacks as required and feasible in light of their capabilities and their other missions.

Chief of Naval Operations

Since the USSR at all times has the option of launching a nuclear attack against us without warning, it is desirable that the retaliatory weapon systems of the United States possess these characteristics:

(a) Invulnerability to such enemy attack, (b) A capability to penetrate the enemy defense system, (c) Speed of reaction, (d) An all-weather capability, (e) Permit the selection of diversified attack patterns. No force should be categorically disqualified from any mission because it does not possess to the optimum degree, one or more of these desirable characteristics. It would be inappropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to circumscribe the prerogatives of the commanders in the field by imposing tactical limitations to the extent of saying "no" to this question. Conditions within the areas of the various commanders vary as to forces available, geography, weather, targets etc. The commanders should be permitted freedom of action in the tactical employment of their forces to carry out their assigned mission.

In substance, this is a question of tactical detail that we can depend upon the operational commanders for a proper decision that will apply to their respective areas of operations.

Chief of Staff, U S Air Force

No. Inability to pre-determine the conditions under which U.S. offensive forces may have to be employed necessitates that they be capable constantly of immediate offensive action regardless of time or weather. Employment of forces having less than all-weather capability may be appropriate in a backup, support or subsequent phase role if circumstances permit, but not for assured coverage of priority preplanned strategic targets 24 hours every day.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Since the USSR at all times has the launching a nuclear attack against us without warning, it is desirable that the weapon systems of the United States possess these characteristics: (a) Invulnerability to such enemy attack, (b) A capability to penetrate the enemy defense system, or reaction, (c) An all-weather capability, (d) Permit the selection of diversified patterns. No force should be categorically disqualified from any mission because it does not possess to the optimum degree, one or more of these desirable characteristics. It would be inappropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to circumscribe the prerogatives of the commanders in the field by imposing tactical limitations to the extent of saying "no" to this question. Conditions within the areas of the various commanders vary as to forces available, geography, weather, targets, etc. The commanders should be permitted freedom of action in the tactical employment of their forces to carry out their assigned mission.

In substance, this is a question of tactical detail that we can depend upon the operational commanders for a proper decision that will apply to their respective areas of operations.

2.4 QUESTION Should our aircraft carrier forces be relieved of responsibility for 24-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list?

ANSWER

Unless the capabilities of carriers permit their remaining on station and launching an immediate strike in any weather 24 hours a day, carrier aircraft should not have responsibility for 24-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list.

No. The commanders of unified commands are assigned missions to be accomplished throughout the full spectrum of war -- cold, limited and general. They are assigned a variety of forces to accomplish these missions. In order to effect maximum

Unless the capabilities of carrier permit their remaining on station and launching an immediate strike in any weather 24 hours a day, carrier aircraft should not have responsibility for 24-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list.

No. The commanders of unified commands are assigned missions to be accomplished throughout the full spectrum of war -- cold, limited and general. They are assigned a variety of forces to accomplish these missions. In order to effect maximum economy of force, and

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

economy of force, and to save the enemy with a diversity of threats, the commanders of unified commands should be permitted maximum freedom of action in the use of their forces. They should not only be permitted, but encouraged to exploit the multiple characteristics (possessed in varying degrees) of these multiple forces. When these multiple characteristics are exploited, the force level of multiple purpose forces would have to be increased to cover this extension.

The theaters of three command unified commands (CINCINN, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC) contain large ocean areas from which Soviet Renewal war targets can be hit by carrier based aircraft. In two of the areas, the Mediterranean and the West Pacific, we keep carrier task forces deployed. In view of their effectiveness in conditions short of general war, they would be so deployed even if they possessed no general war nuclear delivery capability. But they do have such a capability that has progressively increased over the years. Their normal operational areas are within range of enemy targets, and are frequently between bases of our land based bombers and enemy targets.

Carrier task forces provide the nation with a potent dispersed and alert force of nuclear capable bombers operating from mobile airfields within the prospective theater of operations. These are valuable characteristics that will become increasingly important in the missile age.

In the interest of economy of force and military effectiveness, we should exploit the full potential of carrier striking power by pre-planned strikes against targets on the national strategic target list. If this requires revision of current operating procedures the revisions should be made.

The enemy with a diversity of threats and commanders of unified commands should be permitted maximum freedom of action in the use of their forces. They should not only be permitted, but encouraged to exploit the multiple characteristics (possessed in varying degrees) of these forces. When these multiple characteristics are exploited, the force level of multiple purpose forces would have to be increased to cover this extension.

The theaters of three command unified commands (CINCINN, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC) contain large ocean areas from which Soviet Renewal war targets can be hit by carrier based aircraft. In two of the areas, the Mediterranean and the West Pacific, we keep carrier task forces deployed. In view of their effectiveness in conditions short of general war, they would be so deployed even if they possessed no general war nuclear delivery capability. But they do have such a capability that has progressively increased over the years. Their normal operational areas are within range of enemy targets, and are frequently between bases of our land based bombers and enemy targets.

Carrier task forces provide the nation with a potent dispersed and alert force of nuclear capable bombers operating from mobile airfields within the prospective theater of operations. These are valuable characteristics that will become increasingly important in the missile age.

In the interest of economy of force and military effectiveness, we should exploit the full potential of carrier striking power by pre-planned strikes against targets on the national strategic target list. If this requires revision of current operating procedures the revisions should be made.

The nuclear attack mission of aircraft carrier forces should be stated as "In general war, attack carrier forces should be responsible for attack of those targets allocated to them in the emergency plan of the commanders of the unified or specified command to whom they are assigned, with emphasis, within their capabilities, on their anti-submarine warfare role. They should constitute a reserve striking force to execute restrike and follow-on nuclear strikes against strategic targets as feasible and as required"

f. QUESTION Is there an immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command?

g. QUESTION If the answer to the above question is negative, is a Unified Strategic Command viewed as desirable for the more distant future?

h. QUESTION If a Unified Strategic Command is not established in the proximate future, is there a requirement for the integration of operational plans for the employment of POLARIS submarines with CINCSAC's operational plan?

i. QUESTION If so, how should this be accomplished?

ANSWER

For the reasons stated in the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army view in JCSM-171-59* there is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command. As also stated in that memorandum, the ultimate command structure should be determined after POLARIS has been tried and proven.

POLARIS submarines initially assigned to commanders of unified and specified commands exercising operational command of major naval forces can be readily employed in accordance with the concepts for coordination presented in the answers to questions 2 a and b, and 3 a and c.

Not applicable in view of answer to 2 d above

1. There is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command and the desirability of such a command for the more distant future is not foreseen. Such assignment of the full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections

a. It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

b. It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

c. It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

d. It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would

The nuclear attack mission of aircraft carrier forces should be stated as "In general war, attack carrier forces should be responsible for attack of those targets allocated to them in the emergency plan of the commanders of the unified or specified command to whom they are assigned, with emphasis, within their capabilities, on their anti-submarine warfare role. They should constitute a reserve striking force to execute restrike and follow-on nuclear strikes against strategic targets as feasible and as required".

There will be a need for a Unified Strategic Command which is operationally capable and functioning by the time that the first POLARIS-equipped vessel is available for operational deployment. Accordingly, preparatory steps leading to activation of such a command should be taken at an early date.

If the Unified Strategic Command is not established in the proximate future, there remains a requirement for integration of operational efforts. A single operational plan for attack of strategic targets would seem to be the essential basis for such integration in any case.

Not applicable in view of the answer to 2 d above

1. There is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command. Is there any indication that such a command will be desirable in the more distant future? The assigning of full responsibility for attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

a. It would, in effect, establish a superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

b. It would, therefore, interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

c. It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

d. It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

2. The specific integration of operational

* Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 1720/257

2. The POLARIS submarine weapons system will be one of several weapon systems assigned to the commanders of unified and specified commands. There will be a requirement for coordination of the operational plans for POLARIS as for other systems. Such coordination, to be effective, does not require integration of operational plans into a single operational plan. The answer to questions 2 a and b above set forth the reasons why integration of operational plans is neither necessary nor desirable. The measures which should be taken to improve present coordination of planning are:

1. There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the joint chiefs of staff.

2. A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the joint chiefs of staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage estimate guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JCR and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographical areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JCR as least six months prior to its effective date.

TOP SECRET

1. The POLARIS submarine weapons system will be one of several weapon systems assigned to the commanders of unified and specified commands. There will be a requirement for coordination of the operational plans for POLARIS as for other systems. Such coordination, to be effective, does not require integration of operational plans into a single operational plan. The answer to questions 2 a and b above set forth the reasons why integration of operational plans is neither necessary nor desirable. The measures which should be taken to improve present coordination of planning are:

1. There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the joint chiefs of staff.

2. A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the joint chiefs of staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage estimate guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JCR and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographical areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JCR as least six months prior to its effective date.

~~TOP SECRET~~



NO OJCS OBJECTION TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECLASSIFICATION DATE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DO NOT DECLASSIFY UNTIL
CONCURRENCE IS RECEIVED

CM-500-60

19 February 1960

BY NSC
OJCS 381 (Net Evaluation)
(19 Feb 60)

Copy no 1 4210 JS
Copy no 2 NSC File
Copy no 3 File - C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

**SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts**

1. Reference is made to NSC Action 2009 and the study, subject as above, which was prepared by the NESCS staff.
2. I have been directed by higher authority to exercise the utmost care in processing and utilizing subject study in order to guard against leaks or security violations. Accordingly, this memorandum provides administrative instructions for handling the study.
3. This memorandum (CM-500-60) will be accompanied "in the green" by two attachments:
 - a. Attachment number 1, Memorandum for the President from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject as above, dated 12 February 1960, is the statement which I made to the National Security Council at the special meeting held on 12 February 1960. This statement was made immediately following the oral presentation of the study to the National Security Council.
 - b. Attachment number 2, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, subject as above, dated 17 February 1960, constitutes the decision on the subject matter.
4. This memorandum (CM-500-60) and its two attachments will be reproduced "in the green" in 15 copies only. Three copies will be provided to each Service and 3 copies will be provided to the Director, Joint Staff. Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff will determine circulation on the basis of "need to know."

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec 3 G

000941182
By MR 10 Date 9/9/96

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 3 of 3 Copies

Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~SECRET~~

3. Operational Control of Atomic Strike Force

2. QUESTION: As a general policy, should unified commanders having an area responsibility be responsible for H-hour attack of targets on the national strategic target list?

ANSWER:

Commanders of unified commands having an area responsibility should be responsible for pre-planned attacks of targets on the national strategic target list as feasible in light of their capabilities and other missions.

There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue

Commanders of unified commands having an area responsibility should be responsible for pre-planned attacks of targets on the national strategic target list as feasible in light of their capabilities and other missions.

There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue

A Joint Analysis Group composed of detachments representing existing Service capabilities in the field of war planning and damage assessment should be established. In view of the desirability of early achievement of a DOD damage assessment capability, this group could begin operation immediately, and would function within existing facilities until such time as it became possible to move into the AFSC.

War games and operational analyses, as planning tools, are the direct responsibility of the Joint Staff with personnel from J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and the Services participating. The organization proposed above allows for immediate and effective participation by personnel from those organizations, under close and continued policy direction and control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff without the highly undesirable division of responsibility which would result from an attempt to separate war games from its inherent and associated function of damage assessment.

Generally speaking, no, because the forces assigned to the commander of unified commands having an area responsibility are provided for the primary mission of accomplishing theater objectives as opposed to accomplishing destruction of strategic targets on the national strategic target list. Recognizing, however, that certain targets constituting a direct threat to the theater may be included on the national strategic target list, available theater forces capable of providing

Commanders of unified commands having an area responsibility should be responsible for pre-planned attacks of targets on the national strategic target list as feasible in light of their capabilities and other missions.

There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue

to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Assignment of areas of primary responsibility to the commanders of unified and specified commands would not preclude the striking of strategic targets by one commander in the area of another commander, rather, it would involve assigning primary responsibility for operational coordination of the strike forces entering each area. Areas of coordination responsibility should be based on such factors as the availability and capability of the forces assigned to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, assigned missions, security of their forces, and the characteristics of the area. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

TOP SECRET

to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Assignment of areas of primary responsibility to the commanders of unified and specified commands would not preclude the striking of strategic targets by one commander in the area of another commander, rather, it would involve assigning primary responsibility for operational coordination of the strike forces entering each area. Areas of coordination responsibility should be based on such factors as the availability and capability of the forces assigned to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, assigned missions, security of their forces, and the characteristics of the area. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

acceptable all-weather assurance of effectiveness against such targets on a pre-planned basis, may be assigned to attack them. This assignment would be reflected in both the strategic operational plan and in the appropriate theater operational plan.

Commanding of the Marine Corps

to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Assignment of areas of primary responsibility to the commanders of unified and specified commands would not preclude the striking of strategic targets by one commander in the area of another commander, rather, it would involve assigning primary responsibility for operational coordination of the strike forces entering each area. Areas of coordination responsibility should be based on such factors as the availability and capability of the forces assigned to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, assigned missions, security of their forces, and the characteristics of the area. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Yes

QUESTION Should any additional measures be taken to improve the coordination of forces operating under the operational control of the various commanders?

ANSWER

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic target system.

(1) A single "strategic" air opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

Chief of Naval Operations

Yes

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic target system.

A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Yes

There are measures in addition to those discussed above which would improve coordination between commands. Since a number of such measures are already being addressed in other joint and inter-command actions, and since the measures discussed in the responses to the foregoing questions are already of priority importance, it is not deemed advisable to further enlarge the scope or detail of the present actions.

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic system.

A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which would be a mission type directive, would be more specific the targeting and damage criteria now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Yes

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic system.

A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which would be a mission type directive, would be more specific the targeting and damage criteria now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Op-60B/1a
Ser 000362P60

30 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems

Reference: (a) CM 380-59* of 17 August 1959

1. Reference (a)* is a comprehensive coverage of controversial issues related to atomic strike plans, targeting, force adequacy, and the operational control of strike forces. These issues are basic. I agree that their resolution calls for command decisions. The decisions reached will have a profound effect upon our national security and economic welfare. The issues, therefore, deserve the most careful analysis, and with the nation's interests always paramount. Individual Service capabilities, both current and potential, must of course receive due consideration, but only to the extent that they can best contribute to national interests.

Recent and imminent improvements in weapons and their delivery means, and other scientific developments, may well dictate radical departures from some of the concepts, and their implementing measures, that were evolved when the relative combat power of the U.S. and the USSR was of a different order of magnitude. Continued rapid progress in weapon technology is probable. Changes in international relations are inevitable, and may be of a nature that will influence our military posture. Accordingly, it would appear unwise to commit ourselves, unnecessarily, to any course of action that would be too costly or difficult to alter should such progress and changes so dictate. Freedom of maneuver in our military policy and strategy must be assured.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

- 1299 -

Enclosure "B"

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. It is within the broad context of paragraph 1 above that I have formulated the views set forth below on the following items that were covered, directly or indirectly, in the referenced memorandum.

Targeting philosophy.

The development of atomic strike plans.

Targeting coordination.

Force adequacy (i.e., nuclear striking forces).

The operational control of strike forces.

3. Targeting philosophy.

NA In paragraphs 17 and 18 of reference (a)* the Chairman outlines two extremes of targeting philosophy. [First, a target system of [redacted] designed under the assumption that we would never strike the first blow. Second, a target system consisting primarily of all Soviet [redacted]

[redacted] Apparently, this latter system would be designed on the assumption that we would know the location of [redacted]

[redacted] I do not believe that we are restricted to the choice of either of these two extremes. [The rationale for this conclusion is set forth below.

Today the primary Soviet [redacted] against the U.S., our European allies, and our overseas bases is the [redacted]

As long as we are faced with the [redacted] threat, I believe we should target [redacted] against the United States or our overseas bases. These should constitute the primary element of our target lists should we be concerned that the USSR is [redacted]

Our primary objective here is to destroy the enemy's known

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

- 1300 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

412

US FS —
SU attack
on Europe?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] in order to minimize damage to the United States. But even under these conditions our target lists should include [REDACTED]

W8' (0-1)

[REDACTED] They must be destroyed too, and we have the capacity to do it under these circumstances.

On the other hand, we might receive a surprise nuclear attack. We must plan for this too. In this case we could expect heavy damage to our fixed bases, and the loss of a major portion of our land based bombers. The probability of such losses becomes greater as the threat shifts to the ballistic missile launched from unknown positions. The Soviets will know where our airbases and land missile sites are. The tactical warning time will be much shorter. In a surprise attack it is not inevitable that enemy missiles will land before our weapons are launched, but the chances are great that they will. Under these conditions, it would be injudicious to launch the remainder of our greatly depleted forces against a primary target system of empty bases and missile sites, even though we should know their locations, which we probably won't. On the contrary, the primary target list then should consist of [REDACTED]

0-2: 800

W8?

As the major delivery means shift to missiles the counter-force targeting concept will be less valid than now, even in a pre-emptive attack, if the location of a substantial portion of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are some practical means of degrading our intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

- 1301 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118 ~~277~~ 413

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. The development of atomic strike plans.

As I interpret the first sentence of paragraph 22 of the referenced memorandum,* it is apparently assumed that a single commander will be responsible for "the strategic mission". Presumably, this refers to a single all-inclusive national strategic mission. I cannot agree that such a mission should be isolated as a separate entity within the national strategy and executed by a single commander. The military strategy of the United States covers the world, and its direct application to the Sino-Soviet Bloc will be applied throughout the entire perimeter of the bloc. In addition to CINCSAC forces those of CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCPAC will participate extensively in the application of United States power. The simultaneous application of this power from a diversity of sources, directions, ranges, delivery means, and commands adds greatly to the threat facing the Soviets. It is my view that we should retain this diversified threat.

based on official

yes

Accordingly, I believe that the Unified Commanders in a position to do so should participate in the nuclear strikes on strategic targets on a pre-planned national list. The optimum procedure is for each to develop his own strike plan, but in close coordination with the other Unified and Specified Commanders.

I agree with the Chairman that improvements in our nuclear strike planning procedures must be made. The requisite improvements are feasible. They require more detailed and earlier planning; coordination under more positive control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The discussion that follows gives the reasons for this thesis.

Basic to sound atomic strike planning is the development of target lists. The target lists adopted, and the damage criteria to be applied, are of such major import and are so fundamental to the execution of our military strategy that the Joint Chiefs

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

~~SECRET~~ 302 -

Enclosure "B"

921118 ~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of Staff cannot divorce themselves from their formulation. Broad policy guidance is necessary but is not, by itself, sufficient. After target nominations are made by the Unified and Specified Commanders concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should subject the combined list to the required analysis by any appropriate agency, such as DASA. The final result would be a target list developed in a logical, systematic and analytical manner, and finally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because of the importance of the target list in its relation to national policy I do not see how the Joint Chiefs of Staff can divorce themselves from its development, in view of their responsibility for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

Following the development of a national strategic target list the commanders concerned would then be assigned targets for their respective nuclear strikes. Their detailed plans would be developed and coordinated with the other commanders concerned.

By this procedure the Joint Chiefs of Staff retain in their hands an authority and responsibility that I do not believe can be delegated to others, without abrogating the JCS responsibilities.

It should be noted that after the initial target list is developed, future modification to it would be comparatively simple.

In several places in his memorandum* the Chairman mentions the complexity that stems from the fact that various commands have operational plans for nuclear strikes. He points out the difficulty of war gaming several plans, and concludes from this that we should have a single integrated operational plan for the "strategic attack", and that CINCSAC should develop this plan.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143 -

- 1303 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

415

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

I would strongly emphasize that our objective in war planning is not simplicity but effectiveness. A single integrated operational plan for the nuclear strikes, drawn up by a single commander, would facilitate war gaming. However, we must ensure that the enemy is faced with a diversity of threats from many directions and many sources. To place the total responsibility for destruction of all pre-planned targets in the hands of a single commander carries with it a danger that we should not, and need not accept. We do not know how much of that commander's force will be left if we are hit first, and we do not know what the status of his communications and control will be. This would be placing an undue reliance upon a single strategic concept that may be successful only if executed according to a pre-conceived plan. (Seldom is such a plan so executed). We would forfeit the flexibility that is inherent in the decentralized execution of strike plans by several unified commanders. The military logic of retaining this flexibility is overwhelming. In preparation for World War II France had a single pre-conceived plan that she thought was foolproof, but it was virtually worthless.

Henry, WWI

I agree in general with the Chairman's discussion of damage criteria outlined in paragraph 23 of his memorandum. I also agree that we should subject the target lists and damage criteria to analysis by machine and mathematical techniques. A major objective of this analysis would be to arrive at an estimate of "how much is enough". This is an item that requires much more attention by the JCS. Decisions thereon have far-reaching effects upon types and yields of weapons, the national stockpile, and delivery force types and levels. Decisions thereon are fundamental to the JCS responsibility for strategic direction of the Armed Forces. An example of why this responsibility should not be delegated is pertinent here. There is a great difference between various commanders' conclusions as to weapons necessary

and
(cis
cor)
we
work?
allis-

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

~~SECRET~~

- 1304 -

921118

Enclosure "B"

4/6

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X
for destruction of a target. For example, on [redacted] important targets planned for attack by both CINCSAC and Unified Commanders, the latter are programming approximately [redacted] for target destruction. CINCSAC is programming approximately [redacted] as much yield. The conclusions were reached from the same basic damage criteria of 90% structural collapse. Comparable differences between estimated yields required exist throughout the full spectrum of the plans for attack of the strategic targets system.

10X ?

Without expressing an opinion as to which commander is right, it is obvious that the differences between the conclusions reached are so great as to indicate a gross miscalculation on the part of some. The JCS should not accept either estimate without close analysis. This should be followed by positive decisions and guidance, and positive follow-through to ensure that their guidance is followed. We can accept neither a gross under-estimate nor over-estimate of the effort required. In the one case we would run the great risk that the enemy could continue the war effectively. Accepting the other would result in a needlessly high number of weapons and delivery forces; with the attendant high cost, and at the expense of desperately needed forces for other types of war. Instead of further delegating responsibility for such major decisions the JCS should repossess some of their prerogatives that have gone by default, with the resultant greatly differing conclusions reflected in current strike plans.

The factors discussed above are some of the reasons why I think that each Unified and Specified Commander with the requisite forces should develop a nuclear strike plan for general war. As a less desirable alternative I could agree to the development of a single integrated strike plan provided:

The JCS provide the terms of reference and approve the final plan.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

~~SECRET~~
- 1305 -

921118

Enclosure "B"

417

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Its development is participated in by all Unified and Specified Commanders concerned.

That all Unified and Specified Commanders with nuclear capable strategic delivery forces participate in its execution.

5. Targeting coordination.

One serious error that we can make is to permit the complexity of target coordination to govern our planning procedure. I would emphasize here that, while simplicity is commendable, it is not an end in itself, but should influence plans only as it contributes to their effectiveness. Instead of considering target coordination first, we should start at the other end of the spectrum by determining the objectives of our nuclear strikes, and then design the most effective plans to attain those objectives. Target coordination would then be tailored to those plans. We have not lost our repeatedly demonstrated ability to plan for and execute highly complex military operations.

I do not attach to the coordinating procedure the degree of complexity that the Chairman does. I agree that what is involved here is the pre-planning for targets to be struck at H-hour. This will have to be done regardless of what forces strike the targets, whether the forces come from several commands or only one. This pre-planning and coordination are relatively simple when compared to the post-strike coordination *Re* that will be required by the commanders in subsequent operations of many categories. I am sure we can do it. What is needed is more positive control and direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have the necessary agencies and facilities available.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

- 1306 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-~~27~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. Force adequacy.

It is imperative that our nuclear delivery forces be of a size and type to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy even though he should strike first. With such a residual capability the capacity for a pre-emptive attack will be more than enough if we know the location of the enemy's missile sites. If we don't, a further increase in the size of our nuclear strike forces will not compensate for this deficiency.

By - Example'

I agree with the Chairman that the necessity for prevailing in general war is of such vital importance that any error in judgment as to the size of our nuclear strike forces should be on the safe side. The Chairman states that the Soviet's military doctrine is based on the principle of "mass". Our nuclear delivery forces have been based upon the same principle. As we move into the missile age we cannot depend to the same extent upon this principle. Because of the vulnerability of our fixed bases to a surprise attack we must ensure inevitable concentration of firepower by shifting to dispersed, concealed, mobile and far less vulnerable delivery systems. We can no longer place major reliance upon planes operating from fixed bases. The warning time is too short. Likewise, fixed missile sites, even though hardened, will be vulnerable to ballistic missiles of the small CEP that we can expect the Soviets and ourselves to have within the next decade.

AJW' "Second
Strike cap."
(with notes for
USAF; for now, yes!)

RE-11: (2009)

For the missile era the criteria for determining the size of our nuclear strike force will change. In the past this size has been determined largely by the anticipated size of the Soviet's intercontinental bomber force. This has resulted in numbers of United States nuclear delivery vehicles of such magnitude that we could lose a substantial portion and still have enough left to devastate the U.S.S.R. The basic thesis of

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

- 1307 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1959
having enough left after being hit was sound, but the result has been progressively increasing numbers to offset a growing vulnerability of our own forces, together with an estimate of Soviet capability that has continuously turned out to be much too high. This process cannot be continued indefinitely without either imposing an unacceptable economic burden upon the United States, or by degrading our limited war capabilities to an unacceptable degree, or both. Fortunately, it is not necessary to continue the process.

The nature or characteristics of the forces, rather than size alone, will assume more importance in determining future force levels. Here are some of the reasons why:

AW

1. We will have an increasingly diverse delivery means, e.g., land based bombers, carrier based bombers, land based ICBM and IRBM, and sea based FBM.

2. The ballistic missile threat to aircraft carriers at sea, and to sea based missiles is so small that it can be disregarded.

3. There are no means now foreseen by which the Soviets can eliminate the threat of the submarine ballistic missile.

yes!

4. It may be feasible to make some land based missiles movable by barge, road, or rail.

5. No way is now foreseen for determining the number of Soviet missiles ready for launching. Among other means dummy sites could be used freely.

6. It is unlikely that we will know the location of most of their missile sites. Therefore, a pre-emptive attack would not eliminate the threat of unacceptable damage to the United States.

? NO

7. With an open ended ICBM missile race it is probable that large numbers would be based in the United States, which will draw additional enemy missiles to our soil.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

-1308 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

420

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The security of our nuclear striking forces against a surprise attack by any enemy having the privilege of striking first is a primary consideration. Unless a retaliatory force stays alive it is useless. In the Polaris submarine we have a missile system now nearing fruition that can, above all others, stay alive. We must not sacrifice the lead that we now hold in this field by failing to exploit the many advantages of using the sea as a base for launching nuclear attacks.

If the Soviets are to be deterred from initiating general war the diversity of the threat that resides in a combination of the above systems, with decentralized control of those systems, provides the requisite deterrent. If they are not to be deterred, then this diversity of weapon systems, without astronomical force levels, will ensure the enemy's destruction.

7. Operational control of strike forces.

The philosophy that I have outlined throughout this paper, including targeting, world-wide operations, flexibility, decentralized execution, and other related factors, dictates that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who are in a position to strike the strategic targets on the national list. It is impossible to disassociate these targets from so called tactical targets of immediate interest to the forces of the [REDACTED]

The two are frequently collocated, and economy of force should dictate that targets of both categories be destroyed by the forces of [REDACTED]. Furthermore, many of the H-hour targets could be hit quicker by [REDACTED]

curious!

With respect to the Polaris submarine force I agree with the Chairman that this force should remain under Naval control

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOS 2056/143

- 1309 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

421

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

until the weapon system has been developed and proven. Inclusion of this last phrase is not intended to imply that the system should ultimately be removed from Naval control.

I agree with the Chairman that an appropriate nucleus of Naval officers be assigned to CINCSAC's operational planning staff, provided that Air Force officers intimately familiar with CINCSAC's operational plans and planning procedures be attached to the staffs of Unified Commanders having nuclear delivery forces. Officers of both Services so assigned should participate actively in all phases of planning by the staff of which they are a part. I concur in this procedure in the interest of improved planning, and not for the purpose of preparing for an eventual Unified Strategic Command.

The question of assigning H-hour targets to be hit by carrier aircraft will be answered briefly. The nation has in these carriers an alert force on station, with movable airfields. Today, and even more in the future, these are precious characteristics that cannot be realized by any other force, regardless of cost. The Navy has proved repeatedly its ability to exploit these characteristics in many types of operations. When the chips are down the Naval forces are in position and ready. These Naval forces will hit their assigned targets, usually before other forces can hit their targets. It is recognized that the percentage of strike planes in our carrier forces is small when compared to the total number of delivery vehicles in the nation's inventory. This percentage, however, may well rise to substantial proportions if we receive a surprise attack. A pre-emptive attack would be pre-planned, with even an increased number of carriers on station. It is inconceivable that the nation, under either condition, would deny itself the use of this striking power by failing to assign it H-hour targets.

FS/FU

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

- 1310 -

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure "B"

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

422

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Chairman, in paragraph 32 of his memorandum, states that if the series of decisions which he had outlined were taken, the question of operational control of the various strike forces and problem of mutual interference would be greatly simplified because mutual interference, resulting from two or more commands targeting the same objective for H-hour attack would be largely eliminated. He would degrade

of the Sino-Soviet

Bloc.

I have pointed out the undesirability of assigning to a single commander the responsibility for planning and executing a single national nuclear strike plan. It would appear safer and far more logical to achieve the sought for simplicity and interference reduction by assigning all overseas strategic strike forces to the Unified Commanders in whose areas they are based, and within whose areas they would conduct their strikes. If we are seeking simplicity in planning, with safety in execution, this would be a major step forward.

SAC

8. There are other factors that are pertinent to these discussions, and which were not covered specifically in the Chairman's memorandum.* One of these relates to changes in military strategy to keep pace with changes in related fields. Change is one of the constants of warfare. Historically, weapon characteristics and the nature of the enemy have heavily

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

- 1311 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

423

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

influenced strategy. Some wars have been fought almost entirely on land, others predominately on the sea, and still others in a combination of the two. In recent history the air has become the third medium of combat, and air power has played a role of tremendous importance. We are now witnessing the emergence of the missile age which will probably result in a decreased emphasis on some categories of air power, particularly the long range bomber and tactical aircraft for troop support. In essence, we are returning to an artillery concept wherein the explosive is launched from the earth's surface or sub-surface. However, there is one very important difference. The artillery battleground will be expanded to include the homeland of the belligerents. This means that, if we use United States soil as the artillery base, we will receive on United States soil large numbers of enemy missiles aimed at eliminating our own missile launching sites. If there were no alternatives we should pursue this strategy. Fortunately, there are alternatives, and good ones. Technology provides us with the means for using the oceans as the artillery base. Regardless of any ultimate decision as to the control of forces, the development of strategic plans, or the detailed tactics used, this nation should exploit every possible means of using the oceans as a base for the delivery of nuclear weapons, because of the relative invulnerability and greater effectiveness assured thereby, as well as the significant economies possible to achieve.

Major evolutions such as the above must be recognized and appropriately reflected in all phases of our planning. Where necessary, we must be willing to break away from procedures and systems conceived and implemented in an era of nuclear deficiency on our part and no nuclear capability of the part of the U.S.S.R. Progress has provided the Soviets with a

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/143

- 1312 -

Enclosure "B"

~~SECRET~~

921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

424

~~TOP SECRET~~

substantial capability that is growing in size and versatility. Likewise, our nuclear power has grown many-fold. We have made some notable adjustments to these developments. Among other things we have placed diversified delivery means in the hands of Unified Commanders immediately adjacent to Communist Bloc territory. This has broadened greatly the base of our military posture. To withdraw from these commanders this capability that has been developed so assiduously over the years, and centralize it in the hands of a single commander would narrow that base. We would thereby forfeit strength that comes from versatile forces and a decentralized control that is so well adapted to our force structure and the strategic positions that we hold around the major portion of the Communist Bloc perimeter.

Another factor that should be fully recognized is that the military strategy and force structure suitable for an aggressor nation will normally be unsuitable for the non-aggressor. The aggressor can be more specific in his planning, both as to timing and as to types of attacks. We may be sure that he will explore every possible indication of our weakness in any area, and will exploit that weakness in his aggressive moves. We, on the other hand, must be more flexible to be able to meet a variety of thrusts. Consequently, our force and command structure must be such that we can withstand reverses in some areas without danger of the whole structure toppling.

9. I appreciate the Chairman's providing the Joint Chiefs of Staff copies of his memorandum.* I agree with him that we should resolve the issues discussed,

10. In paralleling the distribution of reference (a)* I am providing copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

~~SECRET~~
/s/ ARLEIGH BURKE

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/143

- 1313 -

921118 - 425

~~TOP SECRET~~
Enclosure "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~



NO OJCS OBJECTION TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECLASSIFICATION DATE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DO NOT DECLASSIFY UNTIL
CONCURRENCE IS RECEIVED

CM-500-60

19 February 1960

BY NSC
OJCS 381 (Net Evaluation)
(19 Feb 60)

Copy no 1 k2in JS
Copy no 2 NSC File
Copy no 3 File-C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

1. Reference is made to NSC Action 2009 and the study, subject as above, which was prepared by the NESCS staff.
2. I have been directed by higher authority to exercise the utmost care in processing and utilizing subject study in order to guard against leaks or security violations. Accordingly, this memorandum provides administrative instructions for handling the study.
3. This memorandum (CM-500-60) will be accompanied "in the green" by two attachments:
 - a. Attachment number 1, Memorandum for the President from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject as above, dated 12 February 1960, is the statement which I made to the National Security Council at the special meeting held on 12 February 1960. This statement was made immediately following the oral presentation of the study to the National Security Council.
 - b. Attachment number 2, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, subject as above, dated 17 February 1960, constitutes the decision on the subject matter.
4. This memorandum (CM-500-60) and its two attachments will be reproduced "in the green" in 15 copies only. Three copies will be provided to each Service and 3 copies will be provided to the Director, Joint Staff. Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff will determine circulation on the basis of "need to know."

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec 3.0

000 941182
By MB/BJ Date 9/9/96

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 3 of 3 Copies
Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. One copy of the study itself will be provided to each Service and to the Chairman's office. No other copies are available from General Hickey's office. Accordingly, Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff are authorized to reproduce not more than two copies of the study for use by planning agencies. The Joint Staff will have access to the two copies reproduced by the Director and to the Chairman's copy as required. Access to the study will be determined by Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff on a "need to know" basis.

6. Each Service and the Chairman's office were previously provided with one copy of the presentation which was given orally by the Director, NESC Staff. Reproduction and dissemination of the "oral presentation" will be handled in the same manner as the study itself.

7. The mass of cards and documents which comprise the detailed technical backup to the study will not be reproduced. These records will be kept in General Hickey's office and are available to personnel properly designated by Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff.

8. Hereafter this study will not be referred to or identified by use of the name of any individual. If a short title is required, it will be referred to as "Study No. 2009."

9. It is requested that you arrange, as necessary; with the Secretary, JCS for handling of the study in consonance with the above guidance.

(Sgd) N. F. Twining
N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments (2)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Sec. Gates

CM-449-60
12 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Hickey study and have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense on several occasions.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the concept of the "optimum mix" target system is sound, and that the order of magnitude of the target system appears to be reasonable, within the scope and time frame of the study.
3. However, the Service Chiefs have requested that I briefly mention certain observations which they have on the conclusions of the study.
4. General Lemnitzer has made the following major observations:
 - a. The conclusions of the study are predicated on the assumption that our defenses will be capable of containing a Soviet attack on the Continental United States to the extent that we will survive as a viable nation. An adequate air and missile defense, both active and passive, is therefore absolutely essential in order that we may have the residual relative superiority necessary to prevail if the deterrent fails.
 - b. The problem of locating and destroying enemy ICBM sites is a major factor bearing on the conclusions. This problem requires further study.
 - c. The relatively small number of bomb release line high-yield weapons required to attack "optimum mix" target system indicates that we have reached, if not surpassed, the leveling off point for these weapons in our stockpile.

20 MT?
24 MT?

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 3 of 10 Copies

Page 1 of 4 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Admiral Burke has made the following major observations:

a. The study indicates that our current stockpile of high-yield weapons is adequate or even excessive if less vulnerable delivery systems were to be used.

b. For destruction of the basic target systems by bomber delivery, the percentage of aircraft in the national inventory that arrives on target is apparently only about 15%. This is of such concern as to suggest acceleration of programs for less vulnerable delivery systems.

yes! c. The deterrent effect of forces required only for attack of the urban-industrial system is underrated.

d. The study concerned itself with a mix of targets but did not explore extensively a mix of weapons on targets. This requires further study.

e. With the exception of the POLARIS, the nuclear capable theater forces of CINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCLANT were not employed in the wargaming attack of the "optimum mix" strategic target system. Employment of these forces would change the retaliatory force level required. Further studies on this aspect of the problem are required.

6. General White has made the following major observations:

a. The potential benefits of this valuable appraisal could be forfeited unless the term "optimum mix" is given the same meaning in our planning as it was given in the study. The study developed a target system consisting of a mix of vital military and important urban-industrial targets, including all vital strategic elements of the enemy's known nuclear offensive capability.

b. While General White has also expressed certain reservations regarding the specifics of the study, and does not share the reservations noted by General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke, he has requested that they not be outlined here, since, in his opinion, none of these reservations has significant effect upon the major conclusions of the report, or upon the agreed Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations with which I shall conclude my remarks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. Having summarized the major reservations and observations on this report, I would like to present my own views. It is my opinion that the appraisal is a commendably thorough and objective study. It was prepared by a qualified joint group which expended much time and effort to insure the accuracy or reasonableness of the factors which were used and the methodology which was employed. The study constitutes the best objective joint appraisal of strategic targeting and force requirements available at this time. I am confident that we can make significant progress in our planning if we use General Hickey's study until something better is developed. We have in this study a sound point of departure and we should accept its conclusions as a guide for present planning until it is superseded by an equally thorough and objective effort.

8. The most significant conclusions to be drawn from the study, in my judgment, are as follows:

One: A retaliatory force structure based on the destruction of an urban target system would not provide an adequate military posture. for det
yes!

Two: The strategic force level which we have developed is in the right ball park and does not appear excessive. Naturally, the composition of this force must change as the enemy's military target system changes and as our own technology provides improved methods of delivery. The appraisal reveals that strategic forces now programmed for 1963 will be more than adequate to attack an "optimum mix" target system of minimum size with a 75% assurance of one weapon arriving at each ground zero, but will be inadequate to provide a 90% assurance of one weapon on each ground zero.

Three: The present and planned composition of the atomic stockpile, particularly with respect to high-yield weapons, is also about right; and

Four: The study was reassuring to me in that this independent analysis generally substantiates current national planning with respect to targeting, the nuclear stockpile composition, and the level of strategic offensive forces required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Taking note of the views of all concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached agreement on certain recommendations. You will recall, Mr. President, that in NSC Action 2009 you directed Mr. Gray, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to arrange for the conduct of this study. We concur in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are as follows:

a. That the concept of the "optimum mix" target system be approved.

b. That the study be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.

c. That they be authorized to release a limited number of copies of the study to the Joint Staff and to the Service Planners.

N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

REFERENCES: A. NSC Action No. 2009
B. Study by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff,
same subject, dated November 6, 1959
C. Memorandum for the President from the Chairman,
JCS, same subject, dated February 12, 1960

The National Security Council, at a Special Meeting held on Friday, February 12, 1960:

* * * * *

3. Noted the President's approval of the concept of the "optimum mix" target system for a minimum of 75% assurance of delivering a weapon at each bomb release line, as described in the reference Study.
4. Noted the President's referral of the reference Study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.
5. Noted the President's authorization to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to release a limited number of copies of the reference Study to the Joint Staff and to the Service Planners under strict security controls.
6. Noted that the further studies suggested in the reference Study and in the comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 12) would, as appropriate, be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* * * * *

The above actions, as approved this date by the President, are transmitted herewith to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appropriate action.

Copy 3 of 3 copies each
of 2 pages series B

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

This memorandum is being transmitted on an "EYES ONLY" basis for handling in accordance with the President's directive that information relating to the reference Study should be handled with special security precautions and restricted to those having a valid need to know.

/s/ James S. Lay, Jr.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Copy 3 of 3 copies each
of 2 pages series B

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ALL INFORMATION~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. One copy of the study itself will be provided to each Service and to the Chairman's office. No other copies are available from General Hickey's office. Accordingly, Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff are authorized to reproduce not more than two copies of the study for use by planning agencies. The Joint Staff will have access to the two copies reproduced by the Director and to the Chairman's copy as required. Access to the study will be determined by Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff on a "need to know" basis.

6. Each Service and the Chairman's office were previously provided with one copy of the presentation which was given orally by the Director, NESC Staff. Reproduction and dissemination of the "oral presentation" will be handled in the same manner as the study itself.

7. The mass of cards and documents which comprise the detailed technical backup to the study will not be reproduced. These records will be kept in General Hickey's office and are available to personnel properly designated by Service Chiefs and the Director, Joint Staff.

8. Hereafter this study will not be referred to or identified by use of the name of any individual. If a short title is required, it will be referred to as "Study No. 2009."

9. It is requested that you arrange, as necessary; with the Secretary, JCS for handling of the study in consonance with the above guidance.

(Sgd) N. F. Twining
N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments (2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Sec. Gates

CM-449-60
12 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Hickey study and have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense on several occasions.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the concept of the "optimum mix" target system is sound, and that the order of magnitude of the target system appears to be reasonable, within the scope and time frame of the study.
3. However, the Service Chiefs have requested that I briefly mention certain observations which they have on the conclusions of the study.
4. General Lemnitzer has made the following major observations:
 - a. The conclusions of the study are predicated on the assumption that our defenses will be capable of containing a Soviet attack on the Continental United States to the extent that we will survive as a viable nation. An adequate air and missile defense, both active and passive, is therefore absolutely essential in order that we may have the residual relative superiority necessary to prevail if the deterrent fails.
 - b. The problem of locating and destroying enemy ICBM sites is a major factor bearing on the conclusions. This problem requires further study.
 - c. The relatively small number of bomb release line high-yield weapons required to attack "optimum mix" target system indicates that we have reached, if not surpassed, the leveling off point for these weapons in our stockpile.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Admiral Burke has made the following major observations:

a. The study indicates that our current stockpile of high-yield weapons is adequate or even excessive if less vulnerable delivery systems were to be used.

b. For destruction of the basic target systems by bomber delivery, the percentage of aircraft in the national inventory that arrives on target is apparently only about 15%. This is of such concern as to suggest acceleration of programs for less vulnerable delivery systems.

c. The deterrent effect of forces required only for attack of the urban-industrial system is underrated.

d. The study concerned itself with a mix of targets but did not explore extensively a mix of weapons on targets. This requires further study.

e. With the exception of the POLARIS, the nuclear capable theater forces of CINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCLANT were not employed in the wargaming attack of the "optimum mix" strategic target system. Employment of these forces would change the retaliatory force level required. Further studies on this aspect of the problem are required.

6. General White has made the following major observations:

a. The potential benefits of this valuable appraisal could be forfeited unless the term "optimum mix" is given the same meaning in our planning as it was given in the study. The study developed a target system consisting of a mix of vital military and important urban-industrial targets, including all vital strategic elements of the enemy's known nuclear offensive capability.

b. While General White has also expressed certain reservations regarding the specifics of the study, and does not share the reservations noted by General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke, he has requested that they not be outlined here, since, in his opinion, none of these reservations has significant effect upon the major conclusions of the report, or upon the agreed Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations with which I shall conclude my remarks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. Having summarized the major reservations and observations on this report, I would like to present my own views. It is my opinion that the appraisal is a commendably thorough and objective study. It was prepared by a qualified joint group which expended much time and effort to insure the accuracy or reasonableness of the factors which were used and the methodology which was employed. The study constitutes the best objective joint appraisal of strategic targeting and force requirements available at this time. I am confident that we can make significant progress in our planning if we use General Hickey's study until something better is developed. We have in this study a sound point of departure and we should accept its conclusions as a guide for present planning until it is superseded by an equally thorough and objective effort.

8. The most significant conclusions to be drawn from the study, in my judgment, are as follows:

One: A retaliatory force structure based on the destruction of an urban target system would not provide an adequate military posture.

Two: The strategic force level which we have developed is in the right ball park and does not appear excessive. Naturally, the composition of this force must change as the enemy's military target system changes and as our own technology provides improved methods of delivery. The appraisal reveals that strategic forces now programmed for 1963 will be more than adequate to attack an "optimum mix" target system of minimum size with a 75% assurance of one weapon arriving at each ground zero, but will be inadequate to provide a 90% assurance of one weapon on each ground zero.

Three: The present and planned composition of the atomic stockpile, particularly with respect to high-yield weapons, is also about right; and

Four: The study was reassuring to me in that this independent analysis generally substantiates current national planning with respect to targeting, the nuclear stockpile composition, and the level of strategic offensive forces required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Taking note of the views of all concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached agreement on certain recommendations. You will recall, Mr. President, that in NSC Action 2009 you directed Mr. Gray, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to arrange for the conduct of this study. We concur in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are as follows:

a. That the concept of the "optimum mix" target system be approved.

b. That the study be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.

c. That they be authorized to release a limited number of copies of the study to the Joint Staff and to the Service Planners.

N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of
Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

REFERENCES: A. NSC Action No. 2009
B. Study by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff,
same subject, dated November 6, 1959
C. Memorandum for the President from the Chairman,
JCS, same subject, dated February 12, 1960

The National Security Council, at a Special Meeting held on Friday, February 12, 1960:

* * * * *

3. Noted the President's approval of the concept of the "optimum mix" target system for a minimum of 75% assurance of delivering a weapon at each bomb release line, as described in the reference Study.
4. Noted the President's referral of the reference Study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.
5. Noted the President's authorization to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to release a limited number of copies of the reference Study to the Joint Staff and to the Service Planners under strict security controls.
6. Noted that the further studies suggested in the reference Study and in the comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 12) would, as appropriate, be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* * * * *

The above actions, as approved this date by the President, are transmitted herewith to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appropriate action.

Copy 3 of 3 copies each
of 2 pages series B

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

This memorandum is being transmitted on an "EYES ONLY" basis for handling in accordance with the President's directive that information relating to the reference Study should be handled with special security precautions and restricted to those having a valid need to know.

/s/ James S. Lay, Jr.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Copy 3 of 3 copies each
of 2 pages serials B

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 26

J.C.S. 2056/149

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "I")

26 April 1960

Pages 1356 - 1362, incl.

MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS (U)

Reference: J.C.S. 2056/145 - *Hot Box*

1. Reference is made to SM-340-60, a memorandum for the
Director, Joint Staff, dated 11 April 1960, subject as above, in
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the Joint Staff
develop, as a matter of priority, a proposed policy upon which a
strategic target system can be based,

2. Accordingly, a proposed statement of policy has been prepared
for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is attached as
Enclosure "A" hereto.

3. The attached policy is completely consistent with and is in
the nature of implementation of the decision on Study No. 2009.*
Its approval is considered to be an essential prerequisite to the
solution to many of the problems now confronting the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

* Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 2056/145


DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Twining (C/JCS)
Gen. Lemnitzer (CSA)
Adm. Burke (ONO)
Gen. White (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)
Gen. Oakes (DC/S, OFS)
Adm. Austin (DCNO-P&P)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S, F&P)
Gen. Wieseman (DC/S-P, MC)

Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)
Adm. Wellings (DD/JS)
Gen. Campbell (NSC Rep)
Gen. Hillyard (S/JCS)
Capt. Blouin (DS/JCS)
Secys, JSSC
Secys, J-2
Secys, J-3
Secys, J-5

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/149

*Superseded by JCS 2056/162, withdrawn.
Per [signature] to [signature] - 1356 -*



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS R&RA BR RM 20034

921118-589

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Contingent upon approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 1
policy set forth in Enclosure "A", timely implementation thereof 2
requires that the next step be established and approved by the 3
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4

5. Accordingly, I recommend: 5

a. That the proposed policy in Enclosure "A" be approved. 6

b. That the policy in Enclosure "A" be incorporated in the 7
forthcoming Atomic Annex to the JSCP. 8

c. That Enclosure "B" be approved. 9

6. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded 10
to commanders of unified or specified commands. 11

7. In consonance with the provisions of J.C.S. Memorandum of 12
Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT 13
be forwarded to U.S. officers in NATO activities. 14

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/149

- 1357 -

921118-590

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGETING POLICY

of

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. Intent. The basic intent is to translate the guidance of Study 2009, and the President's decision thereon, into policy guidance at the national level for the development and attack of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL).

2. Concept. The National Strategic Target List shall consist of an optimum-mix of [REDACTED] in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The effective attack of the targets on this list will provide sufficient destruction to achieve military impotency and economic paralysis which would preclude organized war effort on the part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that, when coupled with the results of other essential military operations, will enable the Free World to prevail. "If not fails"

3. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to establish an over-all minimum task to be accomplished regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated. The attack of the National Strategic Target List is considered to be a task, the accomplishment of which is of prime importance to our national survival. Specific objectives of the attack of the National Strategic Target List are to destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/149

- 1358 -

Enclosure "A"

(Page revised by 2nd Corrigendum - 27 June 1960)

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-591

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

centers of the [Sino-Soviet Bloc] to the extent that, when coupled 1
with other essential military operations, it will paralyze the 2
economy and render the [Sino-Soviet Bloc] incapable of continuing 3
the war. 4

4. Strike Priorities. For the accomplishment of the attacks 5
of the targets of the National Strategic Target List strike 6
priorities will be as follows: 7

a. [First priority will be accorded to the destruction of 8
Sino-Soviet Bloc 9

[REDACTED] 10
[REDACTED] 11
[REDACTED] within the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent 12
necessary to eliminate the threat of nuclear attacks on U.S. 13
and Allied forces and territories. 14

b. Second priority will be accorded to the [REDACTED] 15
[REDACTED] 16
to prevent over-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied 17
territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essen- 18
tial sea areas and the protection of vital communications. 19

c. Third priority will be accorded to denying the use of 20
[REDACTED] which can immediately 21
and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct 22
initial military operations. 23

5. Supporting Targets. It is recognized that the successful 24
execution of attacks on the National Strategic Target List will 25
require the concurrent attack by the commanders of certain addi- 26
tional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the 27
accomplishment of the attacks of targets of the National Stra- 28
tegic Target List. Such targets are called Supporting Targets. 29

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/149

- 1359 -

Enclosure "A"

(Page revised by 3d Corrigendum - 28 June 1960)

921118-592

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the National Strategic Target List will be based upon the damage criteria set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects.

a. Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [REDACTED]

b. Ninety percent probability of moderate damage to [REDACTED]

c. Ninety percent probability of destruction of 50 percent of industrial floor space [REDACTED]

d. For other installations associated with National Strategic Target List the damage criteria are the prerogative of operational commanders, but will be no higher than 90 percent probability of severe damage.

7. Assurance. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and requirements will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the National Strategic Target List.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/149

- 1360 -

Enclosure "A"

(Page revised by 2nd Corrigendum - 27 June 1960)

~~TOP SECRET~~

091118-593

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Implementation of Targeting Policy

1. In consonance with the policy set forth in Enclosure 1
"A" to J.C.S. 2056/149, the Joint Staff, with such assistance 2
from the unified and specified commands, the Services, and 3
other agencies as may be necessary, will, as a matter of 4
priority, select for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of 5
Staff, a proposed list of targets to be included in the 6
National Strategic Target List. 7
2. Utilizing the targets selected in Annex "G" to Study 8
2009 as a basic starting point and modifying them as may be 9
appropriate in the light of the most current intelligence 10
available, a minimum number of targets will be selected for 11
inclusion in the National Strategic Target List, which, if 12
subjected to the damage levels envisaged in paragraph 6 of 13
Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/149 (Damage Criteria) would 14
result in over-all damage to the Sino-Soviet Bloc war 15
potential approximating that indicated in Annex "G" to Study 16
2009. 17
3. The list of targets selected will be submitted in such 18
a manner as to indicate the proportions of the various elements 19
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential which are at 20
risk in each target selected. These targets should be grouped 21
geographically to facilitate target analysis and attack as 22
complexes. Targets, the attack of which is necessary pri- 23
marily for defense suppression and to facilitate penetration 24
will not be included in the National Strategic Target List. 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/149

- 1361 -

Enclosure "B"

(Page revised by 2nd Corrig. - 27 June 1960)

921118-594

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. In addition, the Joint Staff will present to the Joint 1
Chiefs of Staff for approval, an appropriate system for accom- 2
plishing additions, deletions, or other changes to the 3
National Strategic Target List which may be necessary in 4
light of current intelligence. 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/149

- 1362 -

Enclosure "B"

(Page further revised by 2nd Corrig. - 27 June 1960)

921118-595

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

AFXPD-DD, Col. Yudkin/bmh/75424/10 Jun 60

10 JUN 1960

Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr.
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary

When we talked on 25 May 1960, I cited two areas of Service controversy on which I hold strong views and which were the basis for my requesting an interview. In an effort to be helpful, I offered some suggestions which are outlined herewith.

In respect to control and operation of space systems, I believe that since the issue has again been raised, it is necessary that the decision previously made on this issue be affirmed. In effect, this would restate that a separate organization to command and employ space systems is not to be established. Since the 18 September directive refers specifically to departmental interests, it would be helpful were your decision to provide for the exercise of appropriate operational authority by the unified or specified commanders responsible for the functional area concerned.

As you know, I continue to believe that the optimum solution of the problem of control and employment of strategic forces lies in the organization of a United States Strategic Command, this to include Navy (Polaris equipped vessels) and Air Force (SAC) component commands. Recognizing that a lesser solution may be called for, designating CINCSAC the Strategic Targeting Authority, as amplified in the attached outline, would eliminate much of the ineffectiveness of the present coordination system and would accomplish many of the objectives associated with establishment of the United States Strategic Command.

Sincerely

Signed
THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff

- 2 Atchs
1. Outline - Orgn and Asgmt of Hesp for Space Systems
 2. Outline - Strategic Targeting Authority

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10-1

Ofc of Sig
Col Yudkin's Chron
File
Case File - AFXPD-RA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-40
MARS, DOD

CVCTS 126-60

XPD 0646 60

~~TOP SECRET~~

If inclosure No. 2 is withdrawn
classification of this correspondence
will be downgraded to Secret
in accordance with E.O. 12065, AFR 205-1.

STRATEGIC TARGETING AUTHORITY

Purpose of Targeting Authority - provides a basis for:

- An effective, fully integrated and mutually supporting strategic operational plan for general war.
- Achieving optimum distribution of atomic weapons across the national strategic target list.

Essential Elements of Targeting Authority -

- Definition - The commander empowered to exercise jurisdiction over strategic targeting, strike timing and force application for all U.S. atomic forces committed to the strategic offensive in general war.
- Directive to produce a national strategic target list (NSTL) which
 - Reflects JCS guidance.
 - Documents installations and complexes which constitute a measure of strategic significance.
 - Documents specific strategic targets as destruction objectives for use in preparing operational plan.
- Directive to produce a single integrated operational plan, which
 - Determines specific BQZ's and targets to be attacked by atomic capable forces identified by commanders as having 24 hour/day capability.
 - Includes target assignments which maximize destruction of target list (NSTL).
 - Determines and programs weight of effort.
 - Establishes strike timing (TOT) based on common H-hour.
 - Establishes readiness conditions.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10

JCS will review and approve the NSTL and the single integrated operational plan.

Required JCS guidance to targeting authority

- Overall strategy issued through the basic war plan.

XPD 0646 60

CVCTS 126--'60

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
BY *mg* NARS, Date *6/11/81*

(Copy No. 2 of 4 copies,
Consisting of 2 pages.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Policy guidance for categories of targets to be included on NSTL.

- Definition of NSTL

"A list of specific vital enemy targets, programmed for attack through the air (including space), which constitute the primary source of strength that could be used by the enemy to project devastating blows against the United States and its allies. Destruction or neutralization of these targets would either destroy the will and ability of the enemy to wage war or provide a relative advantage sufficient to assure victory for the United States and its allies.

Its categories include (in order of priority):

(1) Enemy nuclear delivery capability and its critical supporting elements.

(2) Governmental and military control centers.

(3) Enemy war sustaining resources, including urban industrial areas."

- General damage criteria.

- Constraints policy.

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUDED - DECLASSIFIED

NO COPY TO BE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

BY The Joint Staff

DATE Sept. 30, 2002

JCSM-273-60

29 JUN 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

1. As agreed at their last meeting with you on 15 June 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared the enclosed paper which delineates more clearly their different views on the above subject, particularly in the areas of Policy, Selection of Targets, and Planning and Coordination.

2. You will note that Enclosure "A", on Policy, is merely an outline. Inasmuch as a draft policy is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration, it is felt that it would be inappropriate to burden this paper with other than an outline at this time.

3. It is requested that the Secretary of Defense read this paper prior to meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Thursday, 30 June 1960, in order that he may be aware of the various views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subjects covered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
25 YEARS BY SECDEF MEMO 28 JUN 1980
DECLASSIFY ON: 1990
REVIEW ON: 1990

SIGNED

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (26 pages)

Distr

Chairman JCS (2)

CAC

DCSCPS

Spec. C. C. (CS)

Director / F. S. F.

MarCom - L/O

Director T/S

JSSC (4)

T 2

T 3

J-1

5

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	2
Case No.	92-75-241
T.S. No.	72-75-230
Document No.	32

7-1

001118-596

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

POLICY

1. General. A basic policy* is needed to translate the guidance of Study 2009 and the President's decision thereon into pertinent and sufficiently complete instructions to commanders of unified and specified commands and to provide guidance for the selection of targets for the NSTL.

2. Outline of Policy.

- a. Purpose.
- b. Concept.
- c. Intent.
- d. Objectives.
- e. Strike priorities.
- f. Supporting targets.
- g. Damage Criteria.
- n. Assurance.

* In accordance with Secretary of Defense discussion on 15 June 1960, Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for establishing this policy.

~~SECRET~~

W-273-60

921118-597

Enclosure "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

SELECTION OF TARGETS

1. General. A basic method or procedure is required to provide for the selection of targets which are to be included on the NSTL regardless of the agency which prepares the list. The following paragraphs discuss the basic considerations and explain various methods of accomplishment of the preparation of the NSTL by different agencies.

2. Preparation, Coordination, and Approval of the NSTL.

a. Policy Guidance.

(1) The agency designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the NSTL will prepare that list in consonance with the policy guidance to be developed from the outline in Enclosure "A" hereto.

(2) The following is an appropriate directive to the agency designated to prepare the NSTL:

"In consonance with the policy set forth in _____, * select a minimum number of targets for inclusion in the National Strategic Target List (NSTL).

"The list of targets selected will be submitted in such a manner as to indicate the proportions of the various elements of the [Sino-Soviet Bloc] war-making potential which are at risk in each target selected. These targets should be grouped geographically to

* Will refer to JCS Targeting Policy now outlined in Enclosure "A" hereto.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCSM-273-60

- 2 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-588

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

facilitate target analyses and attack as complexes. Targets, the attack of which is necessary primarily for defense suppression and to facilitate penetration of friendly forces, will not be included in the NSTL.

"In the accomplishment of this task, you are authorized to request assistance as may be necessary from the Military Services and from commands and agencies responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

b. Basic Inputs

(1) The basic intelligence data required for the selection of a list of targets is contained in the Target Data Inventory (TDI). The TDI contains all known essential information concerning targets of significance which are known to be within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The TDI is published by the Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC), which organization is within the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, is jointly manned and operates under the terms of "The Joint Targeting Arrangement," and for joint matters is under the monitorship of the J-2 in compliance with a directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among others, the Services, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff are holders of the TDI.

(2) Source material for the TDI is received from all intelligence agencies within the government. The AFIC further evaluates the intelligence data received, and translates this evaluated data into a standardized format (TDI) suitable for preliminary target selection purposes.

(3) In addition to the TDI, the agency selected to prepare the target list should have access to the

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCSM-273-60

Enclosure "B"

- 3 -

921118-599

~~TOP SECRET~~

J. D. P. L. C. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

information contained in the Optimum-Mix Target List of Study 2009.

c. Preparation, Review and Coordination.

(1) The initial step in the preparation of a NSTL is the selection of a list of targets from the TDI by operations and plans personnel, assisted and advised by intelligence personnel.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Delete.

Air Force View

Upon completion of the selection of a tentative list of targets, it is evaluated, reviewed and translated into a final recommended NSTL in light of operational and planning considerations. The evaluation includes verification that the list will achieve the prescribed percent damage levels to the basic strengths of the enemy.

(2) Review and evaluation of the NSTL, prior to its consideration and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be by appropriate directorates of the Joint Staff. The NSTL would be processed through established channels and would be subject to Service coordination and review prior to being presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 4 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-600

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. Procedure for Keeping NSTL up-to-date.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

before JSCP
The NSTL would be sub-
jected to a major review
each year by the designated
agency and approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in sufficient
time for changes to be reflected
in the instructions to the appro-
priate commander(s) in the JSCP.
In addition, the NSTL should be
kept under continuous review and
changes made in the light of
current intelligence. The speci-
fic details of accomplishing
this task will vary somewhat
depending on which agency is
assigned the task. However,
variations in procedures are
not expected to be significant.

Air Force View

The guidance upon which the
NSTL is based would be review-
ed and approved annually by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurrently with their
review and approval of the
basic JSCP. The NSTL itself
would be subject to day-to-
day updating according to
procedures established by
the responsible agency in
light of changing intelli-
gence and other factors;
however, any deviation from
the prescribed damage levels
of basic enemy strength
would require approval of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

for lead of June 60

e. Agency to Prepare NSTL. The information to be pre-
sented here will deal with the method and capability for
accomplishment of the preparation of the NSTL. It should
be pointed out that the methods of accomplishment stated
herein are representative only and do not necessarily state
the exact method which either of the three agencies under
discussion would follow if assigned the task. Further,
there may be additional steps in the procedures outlined
or certain of the procedures could be accomplished con-
currently.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCSM-273-60

- 5 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-501

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

(1) Capability of Accomplishment. There are three elements associated with the capability of any agency to accomplish the selections of targets to be included on the NSTL. These are:

(a) Intelligence Information - As explained in paragraph 2 b (1) and (2) above, the basic intelligence input is the Target Data Inventory (TDI). The TDI would be available to the agency selected to prepare the target list.

(b) Availability of Facilities and Equipment - The agency selected to prepare the target list should have, or have access to electronic computing machines to facilitate the selection and analysis of targets. In addition, the designated agency should have secure working spaces and the necessary reproduction equipment.

Air Force View

(1) Capability of Accomplishment. There are four elements associated with the capability of any agency to accomplish the selections of targets to be included on the NSTL. These are:

(a) Intelligence Information - As explained in paragraph 1 b (1) and (2) above, the basic intelligence input is the Target Data Inventory (TDI).

(b) Operational Information - As indicated in paragraph 1 c above, planning and operational considerations must be applied to target selection. Among other considerations, this must include the capabilities and limitations of delivery forces and weapons, and operational procedures and techniques.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 6 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-602

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Air Force View

(c) Availability of
Facilities and Equipment -

The agency selected to prepare the target list must have immediately available electronic computing machines of considerable capacity and the trained computer personnel to facilitate the selection and continuing analysis of targets due to the dynamic nature of targeting.

(c) Personnel - The personnel talents required are experience in intelligence, plans, and operations.

(2) Accomplishment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a directive to the Director, Joint Staff, charging him with the responsibility of preparing the NSTL. (See paragraph 2 a above.)

(b) The Director, J-3, assisted by J-5 and J-2, prepares a list of targets utilizing the TDI, the "Optimum-Mix" Target List from Study 2009 and such assistance and coordination as is necessary from the Services, the unified and specified commands, and other appropriate agencies.

(c) The Director, J-5, in coordination with the Director, J-3, reviews and evaluates the list of targets from a plans and operations point of view. At

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 7 -

Enclosure "B"

321118-503

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

this point, machine evaluations as appropriate will be made utilizing the facilities of an agency such as DASA or AFIC.

(d) The Director, J-3, coordinates the target list with the Services within established procedures and submits the target list to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

(e) The capability exists within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish this task without augmentation through the effective utilization of existing agencies such as AFIC, DASA, etc.

Air Force View

(e) Without major augmentation and reorganization within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the capability does not exist to accomplish this task even with the effective utilization of existing external agencies.

(3) Accomplishment by the Strategic Air Command.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a directive to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, charging him with the responsibility of preparing the NSTL.

(See paragraph 2 a above).

(b) The SAC staff, with the participation of Intelligence, Operations, and Plans personnel, prepares a list of targets utilizing the TDI, the guidance in Enclosure "A" and such assistance and coordination as is considered necessary from the Services, the unified commands, and other appropriate agencies.

(c) The list of targets is reviewed and evaluated by appropriate SAC staff directorates from a planning and operational point of view. Machine evaluation as

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCSM-273-60

- 8 -

Enclosure "B"

921118-604

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

appropriate will be made utilizing SAC equipment and facilities.

(d) The target list is processed in normal staff procedure, approved by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) The appropriate Joint Staff directorates review and evaluate the target list as submitted by CINCOSAC.

(f) The Director, J-3, coordinates the target list with the Services within established procedures and submits the target list to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval.

(g) The capability exists within the Strategic Air Command to accomplish this task utilizing existing resources.

(4) Accomplishment by a Unified Strategic Command.

Since such a command is not now in existence, specific details are not available. However, the method of accomplishment would be similar to that outlined for CINCOSAC in paragraph 2 g (3) above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 9 -

Enclosure "B"

321118-605

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "C"

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

1. General.

a. Regardless of the echelon of command involved, a definitive method is necessary to translate the attack of the targets of the NSTL into an effective national effort.

b. The discussions which follow are developed within the context of:

(1) Prior establishment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of basic policy along the lines of Enclosure "A", and

(2) Approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of an NSTL prepared by a selected agency in consonance with the policy outlined in Enclosure "A" and assignment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a designated agency, of these targets to the appropriate commander(s) for attack.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Air Force View

c. (1) It should be noted that, in the past, many of the substantive divergencies and conflicts which have arisen have concerned such matters as:

Delete

(a) Which targets should be attacked?

(b) Who should attack the targets?

(c) The damage levels and assurance levels (i.e., the extent of desired duplication on targets to produce the desired effect).

(d) Priorities.

~~SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 10 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-506

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-679-60
15 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Twining
Admiral Burke
General White
General Lemnitzer
General Shoup

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
EXPIRATION BY *Sec. Def. memo, 28 Jan 1980*
REVIEW ON *July 1990*

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

Pursuant to the agreement at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 July 1960, the attached spread sheets, reflecting the various views on the National Strategic Targeting Policy, are circulated for consideration at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1400, Friday, 15 July 1960.

F. J. Blouin
F. J. BLOUIN,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Deputy Secretary.

Enclosure

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS 23934

Distr:

Gen Gerhart	(1)
Gen Oakes	(1)
Adm Ricketts	(1)
Gen Wieseman	(1)
Dir J/S	(2)
J-5	(3)

OASD(PA) DFOISR 15	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	1
Case No.	92-15-241
T.S. No.	92-15-230
Document No.	49

一

1. Purpose. To provide guidance, consistent with Executive policy, for the development of a target system in the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the destruction or neutralization of which is necessary for the attainment of U.S. National objectives. This policy covers the objectives, concept, and target analysis for the development of the National Target List (NTL). In addition, this policy states the damage criteria, assessments and considerations applicable to the targeting of the NTL.

DEBITORS AND CREDITORS

2. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to provide the criteria for the development of a class of the minimum number of targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to prevail in general war. The development of the MIL will be predicated upon the following specific objectives.

Product

2. Destruction or neutralization of the substance

OBEDIENCY AND CONCEPTS

2. Objective. The objective of this policy is to provide specific and measurable guidance, in conformance with the basis established by Executive Action on Study 2009, for the development and attainment of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) regardless of the conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

3. Conclusions

(1) National authority may determine, in response to some form of stimulus, burning such as explicit evidence of Soviet intention to attack the United States, or in response to Soviet attack upon an ally, that the U S strategic effort must be initiated before a comparable Soviet effort has been launched.

DISPOSABLE AND CONSUMABLES

2. The objectives of establishing a strategic target list are to provide a target base which must be attacked at the outset of the campaign in a conventional war, in conjunction with other operations to insure that the U.S. will prevail.

2. The successful attack on the

9. The objectives of the plan for the National Strategic Target List shall measure the desired level of destruction of the manner in which the war is initiated or the number of those available from the entire spectrum of destroyed or dismantled tactics and doctrinal assumptions under unified and specified command approved, integrated plans,

2 Concepts

b7c A National Strategy Target List which developed containing a minimum number of [redacted] in the Short-Term Mode which must be attacked in order to satisfy United States interests in the event of general war. This list consists of an optimum mix of [redacted]

The last three [redacted] based on Study 0009 and the President's [redacted] thereon.

- INTENT -

1. Intent To provide guidance for development of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and for attack of these targets in accordance with the Executive guidance on Study 2009 or subsequent Executive guidance

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS -

2. Objectives The basic objective of this policy is to establish clear guidance for the development of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and an operational plan outlining the initial task to be accomplished regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated. The attack of the targets on the National Strategic Target List is considered to be a task the accomplishment of which, when coupled with other essential military operations, is critical to preconditions in general war.

3. Terminology

a. General The essential criterion in developing a targeting concept is the determination that certain basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc must be neutralized or destroyed in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Such a determination must be expressed in terms of target categories

- INTENT -

1. Purpose To provide guidance, consistent with Executive policy, for the development of a target system for the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the destruction or neutralization of which is necessary for the attainment of U.S. National objectives. This policy covers the objectives, concept, and target analysis for the development of the National Target List (NTL). In addition, this policy states the damage criteria, assumptions and constraints applicable to the targets of the NTL.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS -

2. Objectives The basic objective of this policy is to provide the criteria for the development of a list of the minimum number of targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to prevail in general war. The development of the NTL will be predicated upon the following specific objectives.

a. Destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

b. Destruction of maintenance of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

c. Destruction of selected targets of particular

d. [REDACTED] at the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that, when coupled with other essential military operations, it

- INTENT -

1. Intent To provide, for implementing action by the Strategic Targeting Authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and for the guidance of other elements of the JCS, definitive instructions for the conduct and control of the strategic offensive effort in general war

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS -

2. Objective The objective of this policy is to provide specific and implementing guidance, in accordance with the basis established by Executive action on Study 2009, for the development and attack of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) regardless of the conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

3. Concepts

a. Strategic Concept The concept for the conduct of the strategic offensive effort of the United States in the event of war is to destroy the Sino-Soviet Bloc and ability to wage war, recognizing that the U.S. Armed Forces have the continuing obligation to maintain peace and ensure the United States and its Allies

(1) National authority may determine, in response to such form of strategy

known such as explicit evidence of Soviet intention to attack the United States, or in response to Soviet attack upon an ally, that the U.S. strategic offensive effort must be initiated before a comparable Soviet effort has been launched

(2) The U.S. strategic effort may also have to strike after the Soviet attack has been initiated. The available level of U.S. strike capability will vary, depending upon when the U.S. strike is launched, relative to the time of Soviet launch. That level may vary from virtually the total force to a significantly reduced level. If a Soviet attack has been sustained

- INTENT -

1. Purpose The purpose of this policy is to provide a basis for the development of a Strategic Target List, taking into account Study 2009 and the President's action in to outline the procedure for developing the attack on the targets so listed.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS -

2. Objectives The objectives of establishing a National Strategic Target List are to provide a list of targets which must be attacked at the outbreak of war, in conjunction with other operations to ensure that the U.S. will prevail.

3. The fundamental attack on these targets is the most important single task of our Armed Forces. Specific attack objectives are to be determined by the Sino-Soviet

a. Objectives of the plan for the

b. The National Strategic Target List shall include the desired level of destruction of the power in which the war is initiated separate to other from selections of goals from the entire spectrum of those available for destruction and destruction of essential operations under unified and specified command and control, integrated plan.

2. Concept

a. A National Strategic Target List shall be developed containing a minimum number of targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must be attacked in order to achieve United States interests in the event of general war. This list shall consist of an optimum mix of

2. National Strategic Target List

- (1) The NSST shall consist of an optimum mix of [redacted] target complexes in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
- (2) The target complexes, when attacked and subjected to the damage levels envisaged in paragraph 6, would reduce the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential to a level approximating that indicated in Annex "G" to Study 2009.

(3) The list will initially be prepared by utilizing the target complexes selected in Annex "G" to Study 2009 as a basic starting point, and modified as may be appropriate in the light of current intelligence available to the Department of Defense.

(4) The NSST will include at least the following:

(a) An alphabetical listing of the selected complexes designated by TDI major reference number.

(b) An alphabetical listing by country of selected complexes designated by TDI major reference number including a detailed listing of critical individuals, installations and the proportion of each critical category of the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential which is at risk in each installation.

(c) An overall target summary of the Sino-Soviet Bloc together with a summary by category and country (i.e., USSR, China, etc.) of the proportion of each country's potential war-making potential which is at risk.

d. Changes in the NSST.

(1) Additions and deletions of target complexes will be made when necessary on a continuing basis, in light of current intelligence available to Department of Defense. These changes will be brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when considered appropriate by the Director, Joint Staff.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the NSST annually.

a. Designate the Joint Staff to develop the NSST.

b. Issue specific terms of reference as required.

c. Review and approve the NSST annually.

d. Review and approve the damage criteria, assurance, and conclusions annually.

3. Concept

a. National Targets

The NSST is a list of critical targets comprising those elements essential to the enemy war-making capability and whose destruction or neutralization must be accomplished if the United States and its Allies are to prevail. The success of an attack on the NSST will require accurate identification of critical targets and effective employment of diverse U.S. atomic strike forces in a thoroughly planned integrated effort. All requisite forces will be employed. The attack on targets of the NSST will be planned to an extent which will permit immediate execution of assigned tasks by the Commanders concerned, when atomic weapons are released by the President, with confidence and effectiveness.

b. Target Selection

The NSST shall consist of an optimum mix of the minimum number of [redacted]

in order to achieve the objective of prevailing in general war. The following criteria shall govern the selection of targets for the NSST.

a. Targets in the NSST shall be selected from the current edition of the Target Data Inventory (TDI).

b.

c. All complexes which constitute [redacted]

shall be selected as targets.

(a) Procedurally, the first step is to shred out all targets in the Target Data Inventory (TDI) of strategic significance as represented by the broad categories listed above. First, second, and collective, these targets are examined in detail to determine relative worth and vulnerability.

(b) Based on this shred-out of targets of strategic significance, pertinent weapons data such as yield, thrust, etc., and weapon systems CEP are applied to obtain desired ground zero (DGZ's).

(c) By relating (1) the DGZ list, (2) the broad target categories to be destroyed and (3) operational planning factors (i.e., application of alternative capable delivery systems, tactical considerations, delivery systems limitation, timing of attack), the NSST is developed.

Overlaid?

2. The NSST will include at least

a. An alphabetical listing of complexes designated by major

b. An alphabetical listing designated by major reference

detailed listing of individual complexes the proportion of each Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential included in each installation.

c. An overall summary of all together with a summary by each (i.e., USSR, China etc.) of the countries' war-making potential in the targets on the NSST.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assign the responsibility and a making additions or deletions to the NSST.

b. Actually, the Joint Chiefs review the NSST in sufficient detail to be reflected in instructions commanders.

4. The Joint Staff will:

(1) On a continuing basis, addition or deletion of targets make corrections and changes included in each target complex necessary in the light of the changes in installations brought to the attention of the Staff when considered appropriate by the Director, Joint Staff.

(2) Review the summary, by quarterly, and at such other by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Evaluate the above procedures and changes as may appropriate to the Joint Staff experience is gained in the NSST.


5. The initial NSST will be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval by

(3) With full recognition of these possible circumstances, there is a minimum essential task to be accomplished under more favorable conditions additional tasks could be accomplished. The accomplishment of these tasks is governed by the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) which applies available capable forces to those Sino-Soviet Bloc ^{atomic} ~~basic~~ strengths to achieve necessary level of destruction.

b Strategic Targeting Concept

(1) There must be a finite expression of the job to be accomplished by the strategic efforts effort in order to prevail. In NSG Study 2009, the ability of the United States to prevail was measured on the basis of the damage to the enemy's basic military, political, and economic strengths. Hence, the essential criterion in developing a targeting concept is the determination of those basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc that must be destroyed. This determination is expressed in terms of broad categories of targets or installations to be attacked and that level of the total in each category that is considered necessary to destroy or neutralize.

These broad categories fall within four general classifications, as follows:



- NSM -

(2) The National Strategic Target List

(NSM) Taking the above criterion and in light of available intelligence and consideration of operational characteristics and facilities of employment of available capable forces, an NSM will be established. The NSM will constitute that list of specific targets whose timely and assured destruction is of national importance to war prevailing in general war.

- NSM -

1. In consonance with the attachment to SP-60 J/ such assistance from the unit commands, the Services, and necessary, will, as a matter consideration by the Joint C list of target complexes to in accomplishing this task, in agency of the Department of 1

- NSM -

7 Responsibility

The JCS shall exercise over-all responsibility for the selection of the targets in the NSM. The JCS will

- NSM -

b Designation of a Targeting Agency The Joint Staff is designated as the agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation and maintenance of the National Strategic Target List

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

(2) Under the preconditions set out in subparagraph b above, the primary substantive basis for divergence relative to attack of targets on the NSTL will have been resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, in this context, the effectiveness of the planning and coordination system can be measured against the remaining areas of potential conflict which concern primarily operational matters such as routes, timing and other details.

2. Terminology (definitions, etc.) - See Appendix.

3. Types of Plans

a. Several kinds of plans are necessary to the full and coordinated execution of military operations; however, the type of plans of particular pertinence to this discussion are those which relate to air or missile delivered attack of specified targets or target complexes (i.e., plans for strategic bombardment). While the basic purpose of plans at the various echelons of command is fundamentally the same, the detailed content necessary to the plans at each echelon vary widely depending upon the assigned responsibilities.

b. Relating plans specifically to the attack of targets of the NSTL, appropriate plans must be developed by each echelon of command to effectively pair up the forces available to that echelon with the targets to be attacked by

SECRET

JCSM-273-60

- 11 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-607

~~SECRET~~

those forces along with the guidance needed to provide effective coordination among the next subordinate echelons.

c. The following types of plans are pertinent:

- (1) Strategic Plans - "A plan for the over-all conduct of a war." (Example - JSCP)
A strategic plan such as JSCP furnishes strategic guidance to include:

Basic Undertakings

Strategic Concept

Tasks for Subordinate Commanders

In addition, the annexes provide more detailed guidance on various aspects of operations. In particular, the Atomic Annex to JSCP contains general policy and other additional details on this policy, guidance on targeting, damage criteria, and fallout constraints. In addition, it provides detailed allocations of atomic weapons to commanders. At such time as a definitive NSTL is approved, target assignment to the appropriate commander(s) for attack will be included. Such guidance as is necessary to insure effective coordination of the operations of subordinate commands (as envisaged in UNAAF - JCS Pub #2) is also included. This may include such matters as:

~~SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 12 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-608

~~SECRET~~

Guidance relative to submission
of plans for review by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Establishment of areas of
responsibility.
Appointing a coordinating
authority.

(2) Operations Plan - "A plan for the accomplishment of
an operation, a series of
operations, or a phase of a
campaign. It may be based on
stated assumptions and cover a
single operation or a series of
connected operations to be
carried out simultaneously or in
succession. It is the form of
directive employed by high
echelons of command to permit
subordinate commanders to prepare
their supporting plans or orders."

(Example - CINCEUR OPLAN 100-1 or
SAC Basic War Plan.)

An operations plan (such as SAC
Basic War Plan) includes such
guidance (taken from JSCP) to the
subordinate command as may be
pertinent to them. In addition,
it includes the mission of the
command as a whole and delineates
the tasks of the subordinate
commands. Among other things,
it includes:

~~SECRET~~

JCSM 273 60

- 13 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-609

SECRET

3
2

Strategic concept of the
command.

Operational and tactical
concept of the command.

Pertinent coordinating
instructions.

Execution instructions.

Pertinent target assignment
information.

The various annexes contain such
information as:

Staging bases.

Specific guidance relative to
atomic operations.

Airlift.

Support targets.

Aircraft evacuation.

(3) Operations Order - A directive to conduct an opera-
tion (Example - SAC Operations
Order 50-61).

SAC OPORD 50-61, in general, con-
tains information common to orders
of all types. Specifically, it
includes guidance relative to:

SAC command structure.

General instructions for sub-
ordinate units.

Pertinent coordinating instruc-
tions.

Operational concepts and other
data to permit detailed

SECRET

JCSM-273 60

- 14 -

Enclosure "C"

921118 - ~~540~~
610

SECRET

3
planning by task organization
commanders, such as target
assignment.

Annexes include details on such
matters as:

Priorities.

Tactics.

Timing.

ECM.

Emergency minimums.

Post-strike bases.

Corridors.

Electronic Reconnaissance.

Special instructions on atomic
weapons.

Fuzing data.

(4) Single Integrated Operational Plan -

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

This term is not specifically defined in Joint Publication #1. It has been used in conjunction with deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to planning for the attack of the targets of the NSTL. It would, in substance, be the same as an Operation Plan defined above. The addition of the adjectives "single" and "integrated" connote

Air Force View

This term is not specifically defined in Joint Publication #1. It has been used in conjunction with deliberations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to planning for the attack of the National Strategic Target List. It would constitute the single plan for the attack of all targets on the NSTL and would provide for the scheduled and controlled

SECRET

JCSM 273 50

- 15 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-~~501~~
611

~~SECRET~~

that the various operations plans of the commands taking part in the attack of the targets of the NSTL are dovetailed together into a single plan covering the entire operation. Such a plan would be prepared by a Unified Strategic Command if one were established. In fact, the JSCP is a plan which, at the national level, integrates military operations by specifying the missions, tasks and operational responsibilities of the commanders of unified and specified commands. Among other things, the JSCP would provide the commanders with policy guidance and the NSTL with assignment of targets to the appropriate commander(s). Commanders would prepare implementing operational plans and coordinate them as directed prior to submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Joint Staff would review these plans to insure complete integration of operational effort. Final

commitment of all effective forces against these targets on the basis of one integrated action designed to achieve prompt and decisive results. In essence, this is a detailed integrated strike plan based on the following principles:

(a) Execution cannot be dependent on coordination after war starts.

(b) Mutual support of attacking forces.

(c) Elimination of interference and possible self destruction.

(d) Maximum effectiveness, achieved through unity of the strategic effort.

~~SECRET~~

JCSM 273 50

- 16 -

Enclosure "C"

521118-~~5~~
612

3

~~SECRET~~

approval of the commanders' individual operational plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would effectively combine these individual plans into an integrated national-level operational plan.

4. Considerations Relating to Translation of Policy and NSTL into Appropriate Plans.

a. Nature of Tasks. The primary task under discussion is nuclear bombardment, by aircraft or missile, of strategic targets [in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.] The effective accomplishment of this task is of prime importance to the war effort and the nation. Consequently, direction to include definitive guidance from the National level, is an essential pre-requisite to its success.

b. Types of Plans Required.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

For a task of the type envisaged here, the normal types of plans, modified appropriately, are adequate. The essential new requirement for this task is a higher degree of centralized planning than is normally the case. Accordingly, the plans at all echelons must prescribe more precise detail than is usual to assure fully coordinated, decentralized execution by all subordinate echelons.

Air Force View

For a task of the type envisaged here, some modification of existing plans is necessary. The essential new requirements, for this task are clearer, more definitive guidance and a higher degree of centralized detailed planning than is normally the case. Accordingly, the plans at all operational echelons must prescribe more precise detail than is usual to assure fully

~~SECRET~~

JCSM 273-60

- 17 -

Enclosure "C"

321118-~~5~~
613

SECRET

integrated plans yet retaining
decentralized execution by
all subordinate echelons.

c. Type of Coordination Required. At each echelon of command, the elements of coordination are different depending upon the responsibilities which repose at that level. For example, at the National level, there is full responsibility for assuring effective attack of targets on the NSTL. Therefore, specific guidance must be generated by that level to assure unmistakable understanding on the part of subordinate commanders of their part in this undertaking. The necessary guidance should be incorporated in the JSCP. At the other extreme, at the level of the aircraft crew, complete and definitive detailed instructions must be prepared in advance, covering every aspect of mating man, machine - weapon and target which is susceptible to pre-planning.

d. Special Considerations. The special considerations associated with this type of operation are twofold:

(1) Criticality of the time factor in terms of reaction to warning or hostile attack as well as the potential strategic effect which can accrue in a limited time at the very outset of war.

(2) The unprecedented magnitude of the effect which can be obtained by a successful attack with nuclear weapons against the targets of the NSTL.

These factors must be given prime consideration in all plans at all levels.

5. Methods and Procedures Required to Keep Plans Current and to Assure Most Effective Execution. In the light of the criticality of the time factor discussed above and the volume of detail which must be incorporated in plans, methods and procedures are necessary which can accomplish the many unavoidable changes in a

SECRET

JCSM 27C 50

- 18 -

Enclosure "C"

021118 - ~~22~~
614

~~SECRET~~

rapid manner. Automation is needed to assist the operating levels in this respect to assure optimum readiness for action under all conditions.

6. Alternative Methods and Capabilities for Accomplishing Planning and Coordination Relative to Attack of the Targets of the NSTL.

a. In recent discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the following alternative approaches to accomplishing the above:

- (1) By the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff).
- (2) By the Strategic Air Command as agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (3) By establishment of a Unified Strategic Command.
- (4) By Unified and Specified Commands.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

b. The ultimate purpose to be achieved is the same no matter which of the above alternatives may be adopted - namely, assurance that a sound, coordinated effective plan exists to employ the available capable forces of the United States in a national effort designed to destroy or neutralize as appropriate the targets on the approved NSTL.

c. Comments relative to roles and responsibilities under the various alternatives follow:

Air Force View

b. The ultimate purpose to be achieved is assurance that a sound, integrated effective plan exists to employ the available capable forces of the United States in a national effort designed to destroy or neutralize as appropriate the targets on the approved NSTL.

~~SECRET~~
JCS: 273-60

- 19 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-~~615~~
615

~~SECRET~~

3
2

(1) By the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff).

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Under this alternative, planning and coordination would be carried out in much the same manner as now applies but with certain significant differences. First, an approved policy covering the essential aspects of the NSTL together with criteria and guidance relative to weight of attack against it will exist. Secondly, an approved NSTL will exist. Within this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff, are capable of providing the strategic direction and coordination which is necessary from the National level. To accomplish this, the JSCP and its Annexes will need to incorporate detailed guidance to commanders. Specifically, it would include, among other things:

(a) Essential features of the approved policy such as assurance, damage criteria, strike priorities, supporting targets, etc.

Air Force View

An approved policy covering the essential aspects of the NSTL together with criteria and guidance for the destruction of the basic enemy strengths will exist. For this alternative to be considered, it must be assumed that the NSTL would also be prepared by the Joint Staff. Within this context, the Joint Staff is not capable of developing a single integrated operations plan for attack of the NSTL and cannot become so without major augmentation and reorganization.

~~SECRET~~

JCSH-2,3 50

- 20 -

Enclosure "C"

921118

~~576~~
616

~~SECRET~~

(b) Assignment of targets of the NSTL to the appropriate commander(s).

(c) Coordination instructions to subordinate commanders.

(d) Allocation of weapons to commanders.

(e) Fallout constraints.

(f) Provisions for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the plans of commanders of the unified and specified commands.

Within the context of the JSOP guidance, the commanders of unified and specified commands would develop plans for accomplishment of their portion of the attack of targets of the NSTL as well as for the attack of such other targets as may be necessary to the accomplishment of their theater mission, thus insuring an integrated effective national effort.

(2) By the Strategic Air Command as Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Under this approach, it is assumed that, within the policy guidance of the JSOP, CINCSAC would be designated as the coordinating authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See definition of coordinating authority in the Appendix hereto). As such, the entire NSTL would be furnished him and he would write and promulgate and operational plan

Air Force View

Under this approach, CINCSAC would be designated "Strategic Targeting Authority", (to be defined in the Appendix) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is presumed that as such the responsibility for preparing the NSTL and Single Integrated Operations Plans is assigned to CINCSAC. In this capacity, the Strategic Targeting

~~SECRET~~

JCSM-273-60

- 21 -

Enclosure "C"

321118 ~~500~~
617

~~SECRET~~

in coordination with other interested commanders. The responsibility here would be limited, in that the power of resolution would be at the next echelon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under this situation, command authority would be retained by the individual commanders. After approval of the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be implemented by the commanders at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is considered that CINCSAC does have the capability to carry out effectively this type of planning and coordinating function. In this case, as in all of the others which follow, the Joint Staff would accomplish the normal functions of staff review on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Authority acts as agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reports to them. The Strategic Targeting Authority would require more joint support than is presently available in Hq SAC. CINCSAC has the capability to carry out effectively this type of planning and strategic targeting function. However, augmentation of joint support would be called for.

(3) By Establishment of a Unified Strategic Command.

Under this concept, within the policy guidance of the JSCP, the responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing the attack on all of the targets of the NSTL would be assigned to that command, subject to review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as is now done for plans of all unified and specified commands. Initially, at

~~SECRET~~

JCS:1-273-50

- 22 -

Enclosure "C"

921118-52
618

SECRET

least, such a command would have two component commands - Naval and Air Force. The command could develop the capabilities, utilizing existing available resources of CINCSAC, to carry out effectively the assigned responsibility.

(4) By the Unified and Specified Commands.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

The assigned responsibilities and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the commanders of unified and specified commands would be identical with that set out in paragraph (1) above.

Air Force View

The development of an integrated operations plan as the result of collating individual plans from the unified and specified commanders increases the complexity, further diffuses the responsibility and would be a variation of the method outlined in paragraph (1) above.

SECRET

JCS: 23 50

- 23 -

Enclosure "C"

921118 - ~~52~~
619

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "C"

TERMINOLOGY

<u>TERM</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
Strategic Plan	A plan for the overall conduct of a war.	JCS Pub 1*
Operations Plan	A plan for the accomplishment of an operation, a series of operations, or a phase of a campaign. It may be based on stated assumptions and cover a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is the form of directive employed by high echelons of command to permit subordinate commanders to prepare their supporting plans or orders. See operation order.	JCS Pub 1
Strike	An air attack on a single objective.	JCS Pub 1
Strategic Air Warfare	Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of <u>vital targets</u> , the progressive destruction and <u>disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity</u> to a point where he no longer retains the <u>ability or the will</u> to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material stockpiles, power systems,	JCS Pub 1

* Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage

TERMMEANINGSOURCE

transportation systems,
communication facilities,
concentrations of uncommitted
elements of enemy armed
forces, key agricultural
areas, and other such tar-
get systems.

pop. targets!

Strategic Mission

A mission directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity and his will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw materials, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range, rather than immediate, effect on the enemy and his military forces.

pop.

Coordinating
Authority

A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more forces of the same Service. He has

JCS Pub 1

TERM

MEANING

SOURCE

the authority to require
consultation between the
agencies involved, but does
not have the authority to
compel agreement. In the
event he is unable to obtain
essential agreement, he shall
refer the matter to the
appointing authority.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-679-60
15 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Twining
Admiral Burke
General White
General Lemnitzer
General Shoup

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
EXPIRES BY *Sec Def memo, 28 Jan 1980*
REVIEW ON *July 1990*

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

Pursuant to the agreement at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 July 1960, the attached spread sheets, reflecting the various views on the National Strategic Targeting Policy, are circulated for consideration at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1400, Friday, 15 July 1960.

F. J. Blouin
F. J. BLOUIN,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Deputy Secretary.

Enclosure

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS 22034

Distr: Gen Gerhart (1)
Gen Oakes (1)
Adm Ricketts (1)
Gen Wieseman (1)
Dir J/S (2)
J-5 (3)

OASD(PA) DFOISR 15	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	81
Case No.	92-15-241
T.S. No.	92-15-230
Document No.	49

2. Only [redacted] targets which meet the following criteria shall be selected:

(1) [redacted] - All sites whose locations are known.

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

(6) [redacted]

(7) [redacted]

(8) [redacted]

- ALL

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

6. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of all the targets on the NSM will be based upon the damage criteria set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects, from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [redacted]

TOP SECRET

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

4. The damage criteria are:

(1) A maximum of 90% probability of severe damage to 50% of the industrial floor space [redacted]

50% probability of severe damage to [redacted] may be substituted.

(2) A maximum of 90% probability of severe damage to [redacted]

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

5. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of individual targets of the NSM will be based upon achieving the minimum damage levels set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects, from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Severe damage to [redacted]

b. Moderate damage to [redacted]

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

4. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSM will be based upon the damage criteria set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Ninety percent probability of [redacted]

b. Ninety percent probability of [redacted]

8. Ninety percent probability of moderate damage to [redacted]

9. Ninety percent probability of destruction of 50 percent of industrial floor space [redacted]

10. For other installations the damage criteria are the prerogative of operational commanders, but will be no higher than 50 percent probability of severe damage.

- ASSURANCE -

7. Assurance. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and requirements will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSZL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

5. Strike Priorities. The attack of all of the targets on the NSZL is a minimum essential task, to be accomplished at the outbreak of general nuclear war. This fact precludes assignment of relative strike priorities within the NSZL purely in terms of importance. All of the targets on the NSZL are important and must be neutralized or destroyed. It is recognized that all of these targets cannot be brought under attack simultaneously, and that there are other factors, such as tactics, penetration, survival, timing of strikes by individual commanders in the same area, aborts, malfunctions, count-downs, pick-up schedules, re-fueling problems, etc., which directly affect the sequence in which the targets on the NSZL could be brought under attack. Appropriate coordination will be effected between the NSZLA and participating commanders and to the extent that, operational considerations permitting, the following strike priorities for accomplishment of the attack of targets

- ASSURANCE -

6. Assurance. Taking into account all pertinent operational factors, assignment of targets and strike plans will be based upon achieving a minimum of 75% assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of those weapons necessary to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSZL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

(None)

5. Severe damage to the principal war supporting industries [redacted]

6. For other installations the damage criteria are the responsibility of the operational commander [redacted]

- ASSURANCE -

6. Assurance. Taking account of all operational factors, and because of the urgency attached to the destruction of the first priority targets (Paragraph 4a), plans and requirements will be based on a ninety percent assurance of achieving the specified levels of damage to these targets of the NSZL. Plans and requirements for the remaining target categories will be based on a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of achieving specified levels of damage.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

4. Strike Priorities. The following priorities, in order of importance for strike planning purposes, are established for accomplishment of the attack on the NSZL.

a. First priority will be accorded to the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc

within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to the extent necessary to eliminate the threat of nuclear attacks on U.S. and Allied forces and territories. Specific target categories included in the first priority are

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]
- (4) [redacted]
- (5) [redacted]

9. Ninety percent probability of 50 percent of industrial floor space [redacted]

10. For other installations are the prerogative of operational commanders, but will be no higher than 50 percent probability of severe damage.

5. Assurance. Taking account of operational factors, plans and requirements will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSZL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

(None)

1. First strike priority will be accorded to the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc

to eliminate or significantly degrade the threat of enemy attacks on U.S. and Allied forces and priorities

2. Second priority will be accorded to the [redacted] to prevent [redacted]

er-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essential sea areas and the protection of vital communications.

3. Third priority will be accorded to denying the use of [redacted] which could immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations

and

b. Second priority will be accorded to selected targets of particular significance

to prevent over-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essential sea areas and the protection of vital communications. Specific target categories included in second priority are:

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]

c. The third priority will be accorded to denying the use of [redacted] which can immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations. Specific target categories included in the third priority are:

- (1) Critical war supporting resources

- (2) [redacted]

b. Second priority will be accorded to selected targets of particular significance

to prevent over-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essential sea areas and the protection of vital communications. Specific target categories included in second priority are:

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]

c. The third priority will be accorded to denying the use of [redacted] which can immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations. Specific target categories included in the third priority are:

- (1) Critical war supporting resources

- (2) [redacted]

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

c. Supporting Targets. It is recognized that the successful execution of attacks on target complexes of the NSM will require the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the NSM. Such targets are called Supporting Targets, the selection of which is a responsibility of the commanders concerned. These targets will not be included in the NSM; however, they will be included in the operational plan

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

b. Other Targets.

In addition to targets which will be assigned to them from the NSM, the Unified and Specified commanders will be responsible for targets other than those in the NSM. These targets comprise the Commanders' lists and include interdiction, isolation and suppression of air defense and counter measures.

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

(3) Supporting Targets. It is recognized that there is a requirement for the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the NSM, for example, suppression of enemy air defenses along the main corridors of attack. Such targets are called Supporting Targets, and may be reflected as such in the NSM

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

6. Supporting Targets. Successful execution of attacks on the NSM will require the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the NSM. In co-ordination with the NSM, the commanders of Unified and Specified commands will be responsible for the selection of which is a responsibility of the commanders concerned. These targets will not be included in the NSM; however, they will be included in the operational plan

- CONSTRAINTS -

Constraints Consistent with the necessity achieving the specified assurance of the damage as set forth above, certain constraints and limits will be observed

A. Surface Bursts Because of the relatively unpredictable extent of the lethal effects of downwind fall-out, surface-bursts could not be programmed except when required to achieve necessary damage

Particular care will be exercised on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether or not a surface burst is overriding military necessity. The combined contamination resulting from all surface bursts should not significantly endanger friendly forces and peoples. 6/4

in SM-264-58, dated 10 April 1958. Specific constraints are included in the Atomic Annex to the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

- CONSTRAINTS -

5. Constraints.

(1) In general, the minimum numbers and yields of weapons required to achieve the specified damage levels will be employed. Because the lethal effect of downwind fall-out cannot be reliably predicted, surface bursts shall be employed only where required to achieve necessary damage

(2) Subject to the general constraints, above:

(a)

In the USSR and China may be programmed for surface bursts.

(b) Carefully planned utilization of radioactive fall-out should be exploited where practicable to contribute to the destruction of enemy government and military controls and to the general deterioration of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

(3)

USSR and China shall be so conducted as to minimize non-military destruction and casualties.

(4) In the planning of all attacks a specific goal is

CONSTRAINTS -

(c) Adhere to established constraints. (Presumably JSCP)

- RESPONSIBILITIES -

9. Over-all Responsibility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the over-all establishment of, planning for, and supervision of the execution of attacks on the target complexes listed within the MTR. In this regard they will

- A. Review and approve the list of target complexes included within the MTR.
- B. Review and approve the operational plan.
- C. Direct and supervise execution of plans by the commanders of the unified and specified commands.
- D. Resolve disputes between the target selection and operational planning agencies and the commanders of the unified or specified commands, as required.

- RESPONSIBILITIES -

6. Planning Procedures.

A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide to the Unified and Specified Commanders a basic concept of Operations that includes target policy and the MTR.

B. The Unified and Specified Commanders shall submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following:

- (1) Recommendations as to those target complexes on the MTR for which they should be assigned the attack responsibility.
- (2) A summary of their assigned forces which are available and capable of attack of the targets on the MTR.
- (3) The degree of assurance that they can attack their recommended assigned targets on a continuing basis.

C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall issue a basic operations plan sufficiently definitive so that Unified and Specified Commanders can develop from it their individual strike plans.

D. The Unified and Specified Commanders shall prepare their detailed plans for the attack of targets on the MTR for which they have been assigned responsibility. The total precise contents of these plans are left to the discretion of the Commanders concerned but, to facilitate analysis by the JCS, they shall contain the following:

- (1) Identification of targets assigned.
- (2) Forces employed.
- (3) MTR's and weapons to be used at each MTR, including appropriate designation of those planned for use on targets to be attacked in support of the attack of the targets on the MTR.
- (4) Estimate of damage that will result to each target complex, including:
 - (a) The extent to which the specified damage criteria and assurance have been met or exceeded.
 - (b) Any non-compliance with specified constraints and reasons therefor.
- E. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will, in conference with the Unified and Specified Commanders, review, eliminate conflicts, and approve the Commanders' plans.
- F. The approved plans will be distributed to all Unified and Specified Commanders and to the JCS, JCEC and JCEC.

- RESPONSIBILITIES -

7. Responsibility

A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for providing clear, specific guidance for the total direction of the military effort in this regard, they will

- (1) In order to establish a definitive basis for development of the MTR, provide the determination of those basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must be destroyed or neutralized in order to achieve appropriate U.S. objectives and during the minimum acceptable level of destruction or neutralization required in each broad target category.
- (2) Designate CINCSAC as the Strategic Targeting Authority.
- (3) Review and approve the JDP which includes the MTR.

B. CINCSAC, as the Strategic Targeting Authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develops the MTR and prepares the JDP. In this regard he will:

- (1) In accordance with established procedures submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval the JDP to include the MTR as an integral element thereof.

- RESPONSIBILITIES -

7. Responsibility

A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the over-all establishment of, plan and direction of the execution of attack target complexes listed within the MTR regard they will

- (1) Review and approve the list of complexes included within the MTR.
- (2) Review and approve the plan for forces committed against the MTR.
- (3) Direct the execution of plan.
- (4) Coordinate with appropriate commandery of the unified and specified commands through the application of coordination by CINCSAC.
- (5) CINCSAC is designated as the Commanding Authority, and will insure, in accordance with the plan of the unified and specified commands are coordinated for the attack the MTR.

B. Unified and Specified Commanders prepare plans for the attack of their portions of the National Strategic Plan in coordination with each other and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. Approved plans, constitute a single integrated effort, executed on order of the Joint Chiefs.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

a. Operational Plan

a. Ultimate Purpose The ultimate purpose to be achieved is preparation of a sound operational plan for the initial attack of all target complexes on the NSM. This plan will provide for the scheduled and controlled commitment of the necessary nuclear capable forces against the targets developed from the NSM.

b. Designation of a Planning Agency The Commander, Strategic Air Command, is designated as a NSM Planning Agent (NSM-PA) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Responsibilities of the NSM-PA

(1) The NSM-PA, in conjunction with the commanders of unified and specified commands, will prepare and maintain an effective operational plan for the initial attack of all the targets on the NSM, utilizing the available nuclear capable delivery forces of the United States.

(2) Recognizing the nature of targeting, the NSM-PA will keep this plan under continuous review, revising it as necessary.

(3) The NSM-PA will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval once each year the operational plan showing as a minimum

(a) Allocation of target complexes which commanders of unified and specified commands have accepted.

(b) DGT's and weapons to be used at each DGT, including appropriate designation of those planned for attack of supporting targets.

(c) Over-all estimate of damage that will result to each target complex. Including the extent to which the specified damage criteria and assurance have been met or exceeded.

g. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish

staff procedures such that the unified and specified commanders' plans are kept under continuous review.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

NATIONAL TARGET PLANNING POLICY

1. Purpose.

To provide guidance for planning the attack of the targets on the National Target List (NTL).

2. Objective.

To assure that an effective plan exists for the optimum employment of the available and capable forces of the United States in a national effort for the timely and decisive attack of the targets in the NTL.

3. Concept.

a. National Target List (NTL). The destruction of the targets on the NTL will drastically reduce or eliminate enemy atomic strikes, retard or halt major land and naval campaigns, devastate enemy capability to integrate and control surviving resources. The success of the attack of the targets on the NTL will require optimum employment of the diverse capabilities of all national forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will retain full military responsibility for target planning. The attack will be pre-planned to an extent which will permit execution of assigned tasks by commanders concerned, with confidence that there will be no interference nor needless duplication of effort between own and friendly forces.

b. Other Targets. Unified and Specified Commanders will continue to plan the additional operations necessary to insure the interdiction, isolation and final defeat of enemy forces. These plans will provide for the detection, location and destruction of major enemy forces which are not included in the NTL but which pose a threat to Commanders concerned. Unified and Specified Commanders will make provision in their plans for follow-on operations as may be dictated by the situation following the initial attack.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

c. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

The SIOP governs the attack of all targets on the NTL; this plan will provide for the scheduled and controlled commitment in one mutually supporting effort of all available capable forces against these targets with the objective of achieving prompt and decisive results.

(1) The SIOP develops the SIOP.

(2) To assist the SIOP in applying forces for the accomplishment of his task, the appropriate unified and specified commanders identify those of their forces that can be made available for attack on targets on the NTL. Detailed arrows reflecting the commitments of each unified and specified command are included in the SIOP.

(3) The SIOP is prepared with recognition of the possible circumstances of how hostilities may be initiated. The SIOP, utilizing his staff and the representatives of the unified and specified commands, will use optimum targeting procedures to

(a) Select the actual targets to be attacked based on the capabilities and limitations of the available forces

(b) Control the weight of effort consistent with the worth of the DGT

(c) Compute probabilities to insure achieving prescribed damage criteria and assurance.

(d) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, EML, etc (Supporting Targets required attack are determined)

(4) As a fundamental element in the development of the SIOP, the SIOP will demonstrate that the specific ability, objectives as established by the JCS are accomplished

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

a. All unified and specified commands will possess capabilities to attack the NTL at all times, providing assurance factor targets appropriate to the

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the basic war plan the National Strategic Plan target assignments to the specified commanders for insuring a coordinated effort and specified commanders' plans will be designated a CINCAS will be designated authority in the preparable specified commanders' plans

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,
Subject: NSM Operation

1. In accordance with the Targeting Policy you are directed actions as are necessary to insure in the basic war plan of the necessary to insure that a no exists to employ the available the United States in a nation to attack all the targets of other things you will

a. Conduct a conference assignment to appropriate specific target complexes attack.

b. Incorporate, within essential features of the Targeting Policy.

c. Incorporate, within essential features of the of responsibility to apply for the attack of specific of the NSM

(c) Summary of over-all estimate of damage that will result by application of weapons to all of the targets on the NSTL.

(e) Summary of over-all estimate of damage that will result by application of weapons on supporting targets

(f) Coordination procedures

(4) Submit for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate any major changes in the operational plan.

Planning Sequence.

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide the NSTL to the commanders of unified and specified commands

(2) The commanders of unified and specified commands will recommend to the NSTPA target complexes on the NSTL for initial attack by forces under their control

(3) Taking into consideration the recommendations of the commanders of unified and specified commands, the NSTPA will allocate target complexes of the NSTL to the appropriate commanders.

(4) Unified and specified commands will prepare their own plans to include the selection of the DOZ's and the assignment of their own forces to attack the targets Nuclear Weapons requirements for these plans will be reflected in the commander's usual requirements studies submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

(5) Unified and specified commands will advise the NSTPA of their DOZ's, over-all estimate of damage that will result to each target complex, including the extent to which the specified damage criteria and insurance have been met or exceeded

(6) The NSTPA submits the operational plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. Participating Commands The acceptance of NSTL target complex constitutes a first step in commitment. Forces designated for attack of accepted NSTL targets will possess the hour, all-weather capability

5. Damage Criteria, Assurance and Constraints. Damage criteria, assurance, and constraints are prescribed in JCS National Target Policy.

5 Target Assignment.

A Having due regard for the requirements of other essential operations, targets on the NSTL shall be assigned to Unified and Specified Commands by the Joint Chiefs of Staff according to the capabilities of their assigned forces to launch timely, effective and efficient attacks against assigned targets To this end, the following factors will be considered in determining target assignments.

(1) Significance of targets on the NSTL to the accomplishment of the mission of the Unified or Specified Commanders

(2) Recommendations of the Commanders as to utilization of forces for strike of NSTL targets, defensive targets, and targets on the Commanders' lists in order to avoid overloading the forces of any one Commander to such an extent that his freedom of action is seriously reduced.

(3) Suitability of available weapon systems, considering

(a) Target characteristics, damage criteria, and constraints.

(b) Reliability.

(c) Vulnerability to:

1. Enemy pre-emptive action

2. Enemy defensive measures.

(d) Reaction time.

(e) Time of flight.

(4) The scope and effectiveness of attacks planned by Allied forces on NSTL targets, insofar as such plans are known.

b. Targets Other Than NSTL.

Assignment of targets other than those on the NSTL shall be made by the Unified Commander Commanders and submitted to the JCS for review. Those assignments shall be made so as to avoid interference with scheduled attacks on NSTL targets

d. Incorporate, provision for CINCS authority in planning

e. Review the damage criteria of the commanders of unified and prepare appropriate for consideration as Chiefs of Staff.

f. Relationship Between NSTPA and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.

(1) These foregoing responsibilities do not include command authority by the NSTPA over forces of other unified and specified commands.

(2) Unresolved matters will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.

(3) All participating commands and the Joint Staff shall furnish permanent representation to NSTPA to carry out the planning and coordinating functions. The NSTPA will recommend the number, rank, and qualification considered necessary from each command to carry out this function.

(4) COMUSMACV in his capacity as NSTPA for the Joint Chiefs of Staff will carry out the foregoing. In his capacity as Commander, Strategic Air Command, he will function and participate in the same manner as the commanders of the other unified and specified commands.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL BURKE'S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY FRANKE, 12 AUG 60

ADM BURKE: I have had a rough time in the last couple of days. Nobody knows this except Claude Ricketts who was there. He doesn't know what happened yesterday, except in very general terms. They asked us especially not to debrief anybody. I also told Jim Russell very generally what was happening in case anything happened. But nobody else in the Navy knows it at all. Or knows anything about it, although they are curious as hell. I put out the word not to speculate and not be curious--just hoping they will have patience.

But Tom came down with a proposal Wednesday afternoon. I had heard he was going to. And they came down with a proposal to give to SAC the responsibility for making out the target list--individual targets--not complexes--which would be nothing like 2009. And to make out the integrated operational plans--that he would have a deputy from another Service of his choice--he would recommend that that would be from another Service. That there would be staffs furnished--some people for his staff from the other Services. And there would be representatives of the other Unified Commands in SAC's headquarters.

MR. FRANKE: Permanently or just for this job?

ADM BURKE: For this job--permanent job. It would have to be done all the time. They would have to be right there.

MR. FRANKE: Constant changes?

ADM BURKE: Yes. Now he has done this, I am sure--I don't see how he can believe that is good. He is ignoring the fundamental thing--what SAC has done in the past. They have never followed

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

through with the Joint Chiefs policies. he says well they ought to. Well, sure they ought to. But the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense himself have not made SAC amenable to control. Libby was kicked out for telling the truth--just exactly what Libby said was going to happen. He was dumb for mentioning names. But Power who did not tell the truth is still in the Service.

So, what has happened in the past--there are a lot of things like that--but Tom ignores that and says he does. Because he says he cannot build his bases on distrust. And he is right.

He would have this operational plan--he has got some policy statements there which are pretty broad--he has it in his policy planning--operational plan that the plan would include a list of all the targets which would be hit. That it would determine the weight of the attack. In other words, the Titan bomb order would be placed, and the numbers of bombs which in effect determines the atomic weapons requirement. And SAC is about ten times as high as anybody else--very much higher, not ten times. He would determine--he would integrate in detail the details of corridors, timing of the attack, the ECM's, everything, though that would mean that they could, and SAC will, I think, go so far as to position the carriers in the ocean--say you stay right here, Or that you will stay within your corridors. In other words, they can make it very tough. Now worse than that, it does not allow any flexibility for conducting attacks. SAC itself does not follow those things. They have a general rule but they do not follow it

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

This would give SAC--I think it completely abrogates the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in spite of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would get to review this. But if they can't make out the thing, they can't review it. Another point to this thing is that Tom is going to have all the Joint Chiefs go out and stay for three whole days to review this thing. I could not review the thing in three months by myself. It takes a staff to analyze this stuff. It takes three months to work it out with 600 people. Nobody else can do it because they have the brains up there. And they are going to take the Joint Chiefs of Staff out there to review it. It is a snow job. Tom ought to know that. It is a complete snow job. But I could not go out there and kick. And neither could anybody else because you could not know what the score is. The Joint & Chiefs of Staff would abrogate their responsibilities absolutely, and SAC would be running the general war. That is the first thing. Now Tom does not believe that. He says the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to. I said you set it up so they can't.

The next thing was the effect on Unified Commanders. Because this operational plan has to be followed in detail--the details that are in there--the forces of the commanders that are participating in that--they are rigid. You take the atomic delivery forces--you take the carriers--they ante up the carriers--then their plans have to be rotated around this plan. And all the other plans have to be rotated around this plan and you have just froze it. And you cut out--not only for those forces but for all other forces. Not all of them, but most of them. If the plans are rigid, then all of your plans are rigid. If your plans are

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CLASSIFIED~~

flexible, and they are continually modified by CinCSAC every morning say, and their plans are changed, then your plans are in a state of flux, and all the other plans have to be in a state of flux. Each one is dependent upon this plan. ~~ADM~~ And it all has to go back to Omaha for control. And then, of course, it has its effect on NATO allies--may have. I think it would.

Tom presented this thing--and a lot of other things too--I do not have a copy of it. He did not leave it. He presented this and then all the people agreed with it except me. And the Marines--Dave.

MR. FRANKE: Did the Army agree with it?

ADM BURKE: Yes, the Army agreed with it because they think it can be controlled because of the Deputy out there you see. They said they would put some very good Army officers in--and we would put some Naval officers in. But it is just like putting a little bug in a piece of plastic. The bug does not control the plastic. The plastic encases the bug. In other words these people could be absorbed. There might not be. There is a hope in it. There is a hope. Even if this group is honest--I am using words now that I did not use down there--even if they turned out the very best plan they can, it is still so rigid that it has a lot of very bad things in it.

MR. FRANKE: Suppose you get a disagreement?

ADM BURKE: Well if you get a disagreement, the disagreement is settled by SAC--by the Commander of SAC--but it is highlighted in the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff get their report three or four months later and you have a whole series of little disagreements. They will take them up

~~TOP SECRET~~

4
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

and they will be split and go up to SecDef. How are they going to be settled? They will be settled in favor of SAC. Tom, I think, has sold his soul there and I don't think he wanted it. I fought this pretty hard. Tom got very much distressed with me. Hurt I think. Tom is stripping. The night before he had a meeting on the SEQUOIA in which he had the White House people--Goodpaster John Eisenhower, Bryce Harlow, I think. I heard about this from Noel Gayler who went--who expected to go to a social meeting. They talked about this somewhat although there was a lot of politics. Noel came up and told me the next morning that he was distressed. He did not know anything about this. He was distressed because Tom said that he knew that I was going to the President--but I would lose. Of course, he lined the thing up pretty well. I don't know whether he talked with the President or not but anyway, he had the Presidential Advisors there. And he gave them a good briefing that night. They did not offer anything one way or another. He talked around this thing quite a bit. To a lot of people I guess. So I said that I wanted to see the President on this thing. That hurt Tom. He thought I ought not to want to. So I went up yesterday and I was prepared to turn in my suit and I thought during the course of the conversation I might have to. In fact it might be advisable.

Lemnitzer came up afterwards--after the meeting on Wednesday, and told me that the only reason that he went along with this was he thought it could be controlled. I went over some of the incidents of the Army ~~of~~ and the Air Force. And I said do you think you are going to control that? You can't control these things. Like the...that you have now. It is yours. The Air

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CLASSIFIED~~

will
Force is take it away from you. I cited what they were doing with atomic weapons--what SAC has done. He said, well, I know. He said I will be Chairman. We can keep it under control. I told him what I was going to do with the President. He said for God's sake don't... We need you around here. You will be a big help. I said this is an important thing. He said I agree with you. He said would it help if I went. I said no, I don't think it would. You are neutral. You would accept this. In the discussion down with Tom he went farther than he would have had to to accept it. I mean he supported Tom pretty strongly. So I said you had better not. It would not do any good to have him go.

So yesterday when we went over there--we went over around 10:15 and we stayed for about two hours. Tom laid out his proposal--the policy kpart of it--not the other part--he had 3 or 4 papers. He discussed from the top of it that there would not be a Strategic Command but that all the rest was an Air Force thing. Basing some of his argument on making one statement that the Joint Staff had neither the manning capability nor the equipment to do these things. They both had to be done together. I read a statement which I had written in longhand last night--the night before last--
will give
which I ~~xxx~~ to you if you can read it. I doubt if you can read it because I was writing so late at night and I was pooped.

The President naturally because Tom was there-- Douglas was there and Twining was there--all violently opposed to it. The President said he agreed with Tom in general. He agreed with the thing in general. Twining made some pretty strong statements about the Navy's recalcitrants--the Navy was never opposed to putting its forces under Unified Commanders. I brought out that

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 155-120
the Navy was the only Service ~~x~~ who had all of its combat forces under the Unified Commanders. He brought out the Navy would wreck this thing. And I said that is not a fair accusation. I said if it will work we would like to see it work but it won't work the way it is set up, I am afraid.

Tom went backwards and forwards--me arguing against the 3 of them. The President got a little irked I think, because it took a long time--and I wasn't giving. It looked to me like Tom was about to say once either you accept it or else. You have got to have a team and there was a lot of ~~px~~ play about teamwork. I didn't give an inch. I agreed as I always have that a single operational plan is good providing it does not have the details, providing that it gives the Unified Commanders a task and let them do it to the best of their abilities. Guarantee to do the task. That it can be done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I agree that there should be a master target list. My idea of what comes out of those papers--~~xxxx~~ and what Tom thinks will come out of these are two--Tom thinks they will come out the same paper. They will be different. If the Joint Staff makes them they will be a different paper. Twining kept saying that I would ensure that this thing did not work if it went into the Joint Staff. We did not want to make this thing work. Pretty strong accusations which surprised me and hurt a little. Tom also got ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{provoked}...but he did not intend ...People sometimes say things they don't mean.

It ended up where I fought my--for God's sake, don't make the final decision on this now. You don't know what is coming out of it. Tom thinks it is going to be small list. I don't think so. It is going to be a big list. Tom thinks it won't affect the Unified Commanders. I think it will and seriously. We don't

7
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET//SI//NF

know. Let's see. Let's try one of these things. The President ^{not} bought it. The President said he would make the final decision now. But that we would make this list--He wanted to make the final decision before he left office. Of course all three of these people are all for the list--for doing it this way. Tom will do everything he can of course--he has got to to drown me. He has got to drown me. But I will fight like hell in or out of the Service. I realize it is completely ineffective outside. That thing has got to be good because if SAC gets control of this thing, the number of atomic weapons will be tremendous and they will be the wrong kind of atomic weapons. The numbers of ^{Forces} ~~Horses~~ will be tremendous. There will be thousands and thousands of Minutemen. They will control the budget. They will control everything, and they will wreck--I am sure they will wreck everything in the rest of it if they can. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and nobody else can stop it because they are the ones ~~it figured~~ that have the figures. And they are the only ones who have the figures. In a year of this stuff--you can never undig it. Grave harm. And the President won't have the guts any more than the past Presidents have had the guts--because these people will then be entrenched. The systems will be laid. The grooves will be dug. And the power will be there because the money will be there. The electronic industry and all of those things. We will wrick this country. If we are not careful. Tom does not think to be done at all. I think he is abrogating his own power. I think he is obsessed with one thing. He has been praised so much for getting these things off the books that he wants to get it off the books. And the only way he can get it off the books with a recalcitrant

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED

Service with the Air Force is to give them what they want.

The Air Force is working on the system--you either do it my way or we wreck it. And Tom will give them their way. He does not realize that and I did not say that. But I think that is it.

Tom I think, will do everything he can to get this thing through of course.

MR. FRANKEE: He has to. It is his plan.

ADM BURKE: I am in a very tough spot--the Navy is. But I don't know what we can do.

MR. FRANKEE: A very basic fact about this is that if you had complete confidence in SAC it still would not work but you would be this thing of--Tom won't accept this. I don't think he believes it.

ADM BURKE: No, he doesn't believe it. He had this party. They are nearly all Air Force people. He listens to Brown. This plan is not the one he wrote but I can see Brown's writing in the thing. Part of that is SAC's. It came from Power. He said Power did not know anything about it. The hell Power didn't. I am sure that Tom didn't tell him but Brown did.

~~MR. FRANKEE~~ Or got the facts from him. Got what they wanted.

I am going to have to go down there and fight like hell I think.

For a long time. All I would have to do is just mention this to our people and they would rise in wrath. They would ruin themselves.

But they have got to know sooner or later. The thing that is coming up now how are they going to do this? I said that you have got to do it the same way that you would do it regularly. They said how are you going to get people. I said order them. So we are now--people don't know why--but I am preparing a list of all the Navy people who have talent in this direction and there are quite a few

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ ASSIFIED

of them. We will have to put some of them up in SAC and some of them here. to be prepared to check this thing. There are 3 Flag Officers--4 possibilities--Lemaitzer also said we could have the Deputy and work with us. ^{There} ~~it~~ would be Riley who has had some experience but I don't think he is the best one. Pirie has had some experience. Butch Parker who has had a lot of experience. Tom Moorer. I may have to pull Tom out of where he is to do this send Butch Parker there who has had some machine experience and who knows a lot about it and put Tom Moorer right under him. And then get about 20 other people there.

The Air Force is going to accuse us--"Burke's Wreckers" or something like that--to wreck this but we do not want to wreck it. And we want to make it work. We want to make this thing work just as well as we possibly can.

If this plan can be made to work--if they don't tie the hands of the Unified Commanders--if they turn the cards and the tapes, and the dope over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if they assemble these things in target complexes, and if they are reasonable about this thing, and they show some consideration for the Commanders, ~~it may work~~ it could work. But there are a lot of ifs.

I will give you this thing here. As a matter of fact the Air Force is liable not to make it work unless they get it exactly their way in what they are doing in two things. So that they get the only voice in this thing, and they can get the carriers out of the business completely, and they can control Polaris by putting them on insignificant targets or putting so many of them on one target or something like that. This is a bad

~~TOP SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED

thing to give you and I doubt if you can read it. But that is the speech I made before the President essentially. I didn't want to get it typed up. *Revised*

MR. FRANKKE: I will put this in my pocket. I don't see how even under this plan the Joint Chiefs are going to control this thing.

ADM BURKE: Well they can.

MR. FRANKKE: How are they going to control it? Are they going to take a report from SAC and just say it looks pretty good. How are they going to check this thing?

ADM BURKE: They are going to have to--

MR. FRANKKE: Remember, Arleigh, times have changed in this--I think Tom Moorer would be tops for this job. ...Five years from now ...he will get in the habit of being accustomed to things, accepting things and pretty soon you could find that the check and balance system attempts to provide through utilization of officers in the Army and ~~XXXXXX~~ Navy, don't work any more. It has become an accepted organization.

ADM BURKE: Yes. We won't have the numbers of officers. We're going to have to pull people--every officer we're going to have to pull out of this thing because we don't have the numbers. The same thing is true in communications--we're stuck on ~~communications~~ ~~errors~~.

MR. FRANKKE: Part of Tom's thinking, I know, has been the fact that the Joint Staff doesn't have enough people to do it. Remember, we had talked one time about having the Joint Staff take over part of SAC or all of SAC for that matter. At least this part of it. And run it themselves, even if they had to run it all. ~~Tom doesn't see~~

~~SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED

any difference, having SAC run it and use officers from the other Services.

ADM BURKE: He doesn't, he still doesn't.

MR. FRANKE: And it's hard to see. People have to go all the way back to the original suspicion of the Air Force.

ADM BURKE: Let me show you some papers here.

MR. FRANKE: I got an eye-opener at that briefing that you...to see. It's a terrible thing to do.

ADM BURKE: You might want to take this with you too. If you've got time to read it. Those are things that SAC has done. (Mr. Franke reads papers). That's agreed intelligence. They paid no attention to that. They used their own. Now, one thing about this if you ever talk to Tom and I don't think you should now, ~~and~~ unless he brings it up, because I was told to keep it quiet and I am violating that to this extent, because I think you ought to know, have got to know--because you're liable to have to choose another Chief. He doesn't say that CINCSAC will do this, he says--he appoints CINCSAC as the director of this strategic target plan, but still in the next breath he says that only SAC can do this and so he's going to use a staff, so it's the same thing, and that is just a gimmick. This snow job that he wanted to do to have the Chiefs go out there, he knows that's a snow job. He knows that. Well, I'm sorry I bring so much trouble, but this is the first time--every once in awhile you get something that you know is right and this one, I know is right. I know it's for the good of this country that this cannot be, forever and over.

MR. FRANKE: You've only got one more...and it's not a very good one. That is that the decision wasn't made yesterday, but this doesn't mean anything to Nate...

12 ~~SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

120
60
ADM BURKE: That's right. If this plan is good--maybe yesterday it jolted the President a little bit, not much but a little bit. I used my quota of mercy up on him too, I'm afraid. But maybe a good plan can come out of it. I don't think so, but if it does, then it has been worth it. Now here is what I think will happen. I think that they won't force it now before the election. That would be very bad, but after the election I can be very good fodder, and I think I probably will be. Now there's another thing here that--

MR. FRANKE: When is this going to start?

ADM BURKE: Well, I don't know. They were talking about it.

MR. FRANKE: What does he mean by "trying out"? Are they going to put it into effect?

ADM BURKE: They're going to make a sample, they're going to make a Basic National Target List and submit that, then the President said that this was to be analyzed every way by every agency who ix wants to have a hand in it, by everybody. He made a point there--I made that point and he accepted that. Then that National Target List, that can be done very good. That can be done very good, and we can tell on that if it can be analyzed. If they permit us to analyze it and if they turn over all their records and their cards, their machine cards and things like that, we can analyze that fairly rapidly, fairly accurately, good. Then on the operational plan, they are going to make out an operational plan just the way--I mean, the operational plan--we'll see what that looks like and see what effect it has on the unified commanders and whether it is feasible or not for other forces, whether or not it can really be made to work with the changes and the things, with reality. If those do turn out to be good, we can accept them. But on the basis that this is the way

13
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED

it will be done and in addition to that we can draw up rules.

MR. FRANKE: I think that we have to do is tell our people on this preliminary thing that they've got to strive and work like hell to find out what they think is wrong about it, what kind of a job it is, what questions they can raise, but Arleigh, if SAC is as smart as I think it is, these trial jobs will be done to everyone's satisfaction. There won't be any way to find anything wrong about them at all. That isn't ~~xxxxx~~ the way it will be. That's the way it will be at that point but that's not the way it will be permanently.

ADM BURKE: Well, that's true, that might happen.

MR. FRANKE: Then you've got to set up some kind of ground rules to control it.

ADM BURKE: That's right, that's right.

MR. FRANKE: Nobody can downgrade the intelligence of this organization. These are smart people.

ADM BURKE: They're smart and they're ruthless. They're ruthless with their own organization. There are a lot of Air Force people that don't like this, a lot of them, including Norstad, I think. Now, Tom has tried to railroad this thing through me. He hasn't talked to any of the Unified Commanders. He's doing a good railroading job. He had me set up in an impossible situation yesterday. It was clever, where everybody in the room was against me, and it was very good. It wasn't unethical either, it was just good politics. Perfectly all right, but he knows how to do these things. This thing of keeping quiet, putting me so that if there is any leak he'll point the finger at the Navy, but the leak won't come from the Navy. As a matter of fact, nobody knows it now. It will come from the Air

ERROR undefined
OFFENDING COMMAND Db"SVlr Vucr" T&0 qZHn J'83 FQ32

STACK

Force and he'll still point the finger--but in order to be sure
that I can't make any preparations. I am by myself, but the Air
over
Force will get--I am sure this is all ~~the~~ the Air Force.

MR. FRANKE: With glee.

ADM BURKE: Yes. Well, we won a big battle there yesterday within--

MR. FRANKE: Well, I think you did as well as could be expected,
~~the~~ better than I thought you would do.

ADM BURKE: Well, if I hadn't done that well, you would have had

K+RA

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. _____

J.C.S. 2056/165

(DISTRIBUTION "A")

22 August 1960

Pages 1595 - 1605, incl.

Case file

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
20 YEARS BY *SP-4 J. H. [illegible]*
ON *11/18/80*

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS (U)

Reference: J.C.S. 2056/164

OASD(PA) DFOISE	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	_____
Case No.	92-FOI-241
T.S. No.	92-TS-230
Document No.	3.8

1. At their meeting on 19 August 1960, after considering J.C.S. 2056/164 and DJSM-583-60, dated 18 August 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to:

a. Approve for promulgation the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy in Enclosure "A" hereto.

b. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "B" to General Thomas S. Power, USAF.


c. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "C", together with copies of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy in Enclosure "A" to the addressees indicated therein.

d. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "D" hereto, together with its Tabs "A", "B" and "C",* to the Secretary of Defense.

2. The memorandum in Enclosure "B" was forwarded as SM-809-60, dated 19 August 1960, to General Power. The memorandum in Enclosure "C", together with copies of Enclosure "A", was forwarded as SM-810-60, dated 19 August 1960, to the addressees indicated therein. The memorandum in Enclosure "D", together with its attachments,* was forwarded as JCSM-372-60, dated 22 August 1960, to the Secretary of Defense.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

320-1-10-203



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.

F. J. BLOUIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1596 -

921118-220

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

19 August 1960

NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY (U)

1. Intent. To provide guidance for the optimum employment of appropriate United States atomic delivery forces in the initial strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. (S) *

2. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. Specific objectives are:

a. Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc [REDACTED]

b. Attack [REDACTED] of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to achieve the general level of destruction as indicated in Study No. 2009. (T) *

3. Method of Accomplishment. In planning the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) shall be developed which will provide for the optimum integration of the committed forces for the attack of a minimum list of targets, the destruction of which will accomplish the objectives stated in paragraph 2 above. (S)

4. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and of the Director of Strategic Target Planning are as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1597 -

Enclosure "A"

921118-92/

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

(1) Be responsible for National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. ✓

(2) Review and approve the NSTL and the SIOP.

(3) Specify the date on which the SIOP will become effective.

(4) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group at the headquarters of the DSTP.

b. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

(1) Provide permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the Director of Strategic Target Planning for participation in the preparation of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

(2) Commit appropriate forces to the attack of targets of the NSTL and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with the SIOP.

(3) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by the SIOP.

✓ c. Director of Strategic Target Planning

(1) There shall be a Director of Strategic Target Planning, who as agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

(a) Organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning staff consisting of personnel from the various Services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions.

(b) Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL.

(c) Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, highlighting points of difference which he resolved during the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/165

1598

Enclosure A
~~TOP SECRET~~

(Revised by 3rd Note to Holders - 24 September 1963)

921118 722

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(d) Maintain a record of considerations, assumptions, and actions of the principal elements of the Strategic Target Planning Staff, supported as necessary, to provide a recognizable chain of developments from inception to current status at all times.

(e) Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff currently informed of weaknesses or deficiencies in guidance provided the Director, Strategic Target Planning, which require early correction.

(f) Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff currently advised of the status of development of the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan through regular progress reports.

(g) Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised on impending or actual divergencies of significance associated with the development of the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan.

[Handwritten signature and initials]

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

1598 a

Enclosure "A"

(Added by 2nd Note to Holders - 1 August 1963)

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-12

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) There shall be a Deputy Director of Strategic Target Planning of flag or general rank who shall be of a different service than the Director. (S)*

5. Damage and Assurance Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSTL will be based on the criteria set forth below:

a. Damage Criteria. In applying these damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. It is recognized that variations from established probabilities will be desirable in order to adjust to variable target configurations, yields and CEP's of available weapons, characteristics of delivery vehicles, and other operational factors.

(1) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [REDACTED]

(2) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [REDACTED]

(3) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to 50 percent of industrial floor space [REDACTED]

b. Assurance Criteria. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and operations will be based upon achieving a minimum of [seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL)] of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL. (S)*

6. Analysis and Review. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (S)*

7. Constraints. Constraints will be exercised in accordance with approved JCS Policy. (S)*

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1599 -

Enclosure "A"

*Revised N. to N, dtd. 8 Sept 60. 921118 724

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-809-60
19 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL THOMAS S. POWER, USAF

Subject: Director of Strategic Target Planning (U)

1. You are hereby designated Director of Strategic Target Planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (U)*
2. Your task, responsibility and authority are as contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, dated 19 August 1960. (U)*
3. You will prepare promptly and forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review your proposed organization and manning requirements to carry out your responsibilities as DSTP. (U)*
4. One complete copy of Study No. 2009, including the "Oral Briefing", a copy of OM-500-60, dated 19 February 1960, and a copy of a memorandum by the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 February 1960, advising of the President's decision with respect to Study No. 2009, have been forwarded to you under separate cover. Access to this study and these memorandums will be on a strict need-to-know basis in connection with your duties as Director of Strategic Target Planning. (S)*

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ F. J. BLOVIN,
RADM, USN,
Secretary.

** Per 1st N. to N., dtd. 8 Sept 60.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/165

- 1600 -

Enclosure "B"

921118 725

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

1

1

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "C"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-810-60 *
19 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Target Planning
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, Alaska
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Caribbean
Commander in Chief, Continental Air
Defense Command
U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

DO NOT CLASSIFY TO

~~SECRET~~

*14 Nov 60, dated
8 Sept 60*

Subject: Implementation of Strategic Targeting and
Attack Policy (U)

1. In consonance with "National Strategic Targeting and
Attack Policy", dated 19 August 1960, the Director of
Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) will develop for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the commanders of unified
and specified commands the National Strategic Target List
(NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) as
a matter of priority. (S)

a. NSTL. The NSTL will consist of a minimum number of
specific targets whose timely and assured destruction will
accomplish the specific objectives set forth in paragraph
2 of the policy.

b. SIOP. The SIOP will be prepared in consideration of
the several possible ways in which hostilities may be
initiated and will:

(1) Govern all attacks on all targets listed in the
NSTL.

(2) Determine the targets to be attacked based on the
capabilities and limitations of committed forces.

(3) Determine the effort against each target consistent
with the worth of the target and damage and assurance
criteria specified in paragraph 5 of the policy. (S)

DO NOT CLASSIFY TO

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

** per 14 Nov 60, dated 8 Sept 60*

Enclosure "C"

- 1601 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

00 11 * 0 926

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, ECM, etc. (S)*

2. In accomplishing this task, direct liaison with any agency of the Department of Defense is authorized. (U)*

3. In accordance with the foregoing, the DSTP shall submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early December 1960 and by 1 May of each year thereafter, commencing with 1 May 1962, the following: (S)*

a. The NSTL, consisting of all installations under attack in the SIOP. These installations will be grouped together by Target Data Inventory (TDI) major reference number.

b. The SIOP, in a format which can be readily reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DGZ's selected for various conditions of warning supplemented with:

(1) The list of the weapons, delivery forces, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands furnishing those forces programmed for each DGZ.

(2) The list of the installations under attack by weapons assigned to each DGZ.

c. An over-all damage assessment summary by country for each category of essential enemy resources attacked to include the assurance of attaining specified levels of destruction under the following assumed conditions for initiation of war:

(1) U.S. attack with full strategic warning.

(2) U.S. attack with tactical warning under initial circumstances that are reasonably likely to occur.

d. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization prescribed. (S)*

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1602 -

TOP SECRET
Enclosure "C"

~~TOP SECRET~~

001110 921

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Participating Commands and Forces. The commanders of all unified and specified commands shall advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the NSTL and which should be included in the SIOP. The inclusion of forces in the SIOP constitutes a first priority commitment. ~~(S)~~*

5. The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority. It is recognized that points of difference involving tactics, use of forces, etc., may develop between the commanders of unified or specified commands and the DSTP. Such differences will be resolved by the DSTP to permit completion of the SIOP and will be highlighted in presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their review and approval. ~~(S)~~*

6. The commanders of unified and specified commands will meet at the Headquarters, DSTP, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, in early December 1960, to review with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the initial NSTL and SIOP. ~~(S)~~*

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. Blouin
F. J. BLOUIN,
RADM, USN,
Secretary.

Attachment:

National Strategic Targeting and
Attack Policy, dated 19 August 1960*

** per 1st N. to N, dtd. 8 Sept 60.*

* Enclosure "A" hereto

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1603 -

1050 7-1-61
SECRET
Enclosure "C"

921118 72
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "D"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

JCSM-372-60
22 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCSM-362-60, dated 16 August 1960, and to the memorandum** by the Secretary of Defense, dated 16 August 1960, both subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted your general approval of the draft National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, the draft memorandum to General Power, and the draft directive memorandum for implementation of the Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed again those drafts and have made certain minor changes as a result of their discussions with you and the commanders on 17 August 1960. The policy and the two directives are now being promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copies are attached as Tabs "A", "B" and "C"*** for your information.

3. With respect to the remaining questions to which you referred, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that:

a. Questions 2j and 2k of OM-386-59, dated 24 August 1959, require further study and development by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A separate study on these two questions will be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be forwarded to you at a later date.

* Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 2056/164
** Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/164
*** Enclosures "A", "B", and "C" hereto

921118 729

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1604 -

Enclosure "D",

~~TOP SECRET~~
when separated from
this enclosure
TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(NOTE: These two questions are as follows:

j. Does the JCS Organization need policy control of an agency capable of operational analysis and wargaming of operational plans?

k. If so, what agency should perform this function for the JCS?)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/165

- 1605 -

Enclosure "D"

DOWN GRADING TO

SECRET

921118 730

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum

Folder

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Admiral Russell R 10-14 DATE: 12 Oct
FROM : RADM Blackburn ~~FOR NFO~~
SUBJECT: Attached are the questions of comments I
have sent across the river per our
conversation this a.m.

Very
DECLASSIFIED and Blackburn

DECLASSIFIED

Folder
Memo/4 Lhas

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Admiral Russell

R

10-14

DATE:

12 Oct

FROM :

RAAhn Blackburn

Phi Phi B Thacker

SUBJECT:

Attached are the questions of comments

have sent across the river for our
conversation this a.m.

V124h

DECLASSIFIED
and Blackburn

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Objective - To determine if the methodology, procedures and criteria being employed by the Strategic Target Planning Staff are sound and are optimal in the development of a National Strategic Target List and a Single Integrated Operational Plan that are in conformity with the National Objectives as approved by the President.

To this end, the following queries are suggested:

(a) What are the overall methodology and procedures being employed by the Director Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) in the development of the NSTL and the SIOP? How does the DSTP approach compare with that used to develop Study 2009? If differences exist, what are the relative advantages and disadvantages of each system?

(b) What is the target point value system? How was it derived? How is it employed in computer solutions? At what point is the human judgment factor injected? What system of checks and balances is employed?

(c) The damage criteria which you were instructed to employ are quite stringent. (90% probability of severe damage to military nuclear delivery capability and to primary military and government controls of major importance; and 90% probability of destruction of 50% of industrial floor space in urban-industrial targets) Do you feel that they could be relaxed? Weapon requirements are of course critically dependent upon the damage criteria which is utilized for effects computation. They are also influenced by

DECLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

the effects manual being employed. Have you comparative values for weapon requirements based upon the DASA Atomic Weapon Employment Handbook and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Employment Handbook (AFM 200-8)?

It is apparent that percentage probability specified for achieving a given damage level will greatly influence the weapons requirements. Have you had an opportunity to examine the effect of a 75% probability as opposed to a 90% probability?

The level of damage desired is also a determinant of weapon requirements. Would it be desirable to run a comparison using moderate rather than severe damage as a criterion for military targets (or destruction of total floor space or dwelling floor space rather than industrial floor space as a criterion for urban-industrial complexes). Along these lines, would it be meaningful to examine the damage which would result to total floor space and dwelling floor space from the application of weapons considered necessary to destroy 50% of industrial floor space? Re

(d) What are the salient points of difference between the SAC urban-industrial model and the Library of Congress Tract Data Model? What if any, is the difference in weapon requirements resulting from the use of the SAC model as compared to the requirement resulting from the use of the Tract Data Model? and this?

(e) What is your basic plan for destruction of Soviet missile sites? How many of these sites (ICBM, IREM, SAM) have you targeted?

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

(f) What data processing procedures are used in the development of the NSTL and SIOP? How many different programs are used? Can you utilize your computer set-up to optimize DGZs for the spectrum of weapons being employed by the Unified Commanders? If not, how are you handling this problem?

(g) Have you progressed far enough to have any feel as to whether this process is resulting in a requirement for fewer forces to do the same job than were needed under the old planning system? *Ro*

(h) You are backing up missiles and non-all weather aircraft with scheduled all weather aircraft. Is a system being developed wherein these back-up aircraft are used on alternate targets if the missiles or non-all weather aircraft delivers on target? How long do you consider it will be necessary to back up missiles with aircraft? *Ro*

(i) It would appear that the effects of the bombing effort laid on by the SIOP would be cumulative in nature and thus result in more damage overall than straight line summation of the individual damage effects. Have you considered this in your plans? *?*

Comment - An oversimplified example might be the destruction of the Moscow water supply pumping stations by one bomb and resulting greater destruction from fires in another part of the city initiated by a second bomb, fires that could not be fought due to failure of the water supply.

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

(j) To what extent have you considered the effects of fall-out in your plans? With respect to enemy territory and population? With respect to friendly territory and population?

Will?
(NOT)

Comment - Sino-Soviet territory and population stand to be heavily damaged by fall-out from a level of attack even below "massive." It appears that at some point in the application of massive forces of massive destruction, fall-out will seriously menace friendly countries and populations contiguous to the Sino-Soviet areas.

"too much
destruction"
of SC

What analysis is made of these effects? Is there a cut-off point?

will?
(NO-62.
Ever?

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

J.C.S. 2056/184

18 October 1960

Pages 1731 - 1741, incl.

COPY NO. 87

(DISTRIBUTION "A")

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
20 YEARS BY SECDEF MEMO 28 Jun 1980
REVIEW ON 28 Jun 1980

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

ANALYSIS OF INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 1259/474
b. J.C.S. 2056/165
c. J.C.S. 2056/174
d. J.C.S. 2056/177
e. J.C.S. 2056/182 - 3205 (17 Aug 59)

1. At their meeting on 18 October 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to note the attached memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

F. J. BLOUIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.

* 3205 (17 Aug 59)

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	11
Case No.	92-75-2211
T.S. No.	92-75-2211
Document No.	69

921118-1026



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ANALYSIS OF INITIAL NSTL AND SIOP (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 1259/474
b. J.C.S. 2056/165
c. J.C.S. 2056/177

5 October 1960

1. Currently effective JCS-approved procedures for the review of plans of the commanders of the unified and specified commands* provide for concurrent review of atomic annexes by the Services and the Joint Staff over a period not to exceed sixty days following receipt of machine analyses of the annexes. However, those procedures recognize that circumstances may arise which prohibit pursuit of the normal review schedule, and they provide that in such event the Director, Joint Staff, may take action as required to insure an adequate or timely review of a plan or related annex.

2. The Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) has indicated** that 15 November 1960 is the target date for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the completed National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

4 days The period 30 November - 3 December 1960 has tentatively been scheduled as the time during which the initial NSTL and SIOP will be reviewed by the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of unified and specified commands.***

*after election!
imposed on
Admiral!*

* JCS 1259/474

** Bi-weekly Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Oral Briefing of Representatives of the Joint Staff and the Services, 28 September 1960

*** Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to CINCAL, and others, JCS 983405, DTG 262126Z September 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat - *mag Burke*

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1732 -

921118-~~7~~1027
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Clearly the time available for review of the initial NSTL and SIOP after their completion will not permit pursuit of the normal JCS-prescribed procedures for review of plans and annexes.*

3. Recognition of the effect of the expected time schedule on the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discharge their responsibility for review of the NSTL and SIOP was a major consideration leading to the inclusion in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP)** of provision for establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group (JCSLG) at the headquarters of the DSTP. Further, the Terms of Reference for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group to the Director, Strategic Target Planning*** reflect recognition of the need for action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrently with the development of the NSTL and SIOP by assigning to the JCSLG the mission, inter alia, of:

a. Monitoring the development of the NSTL and SIOP so that, as developed, the resulting effort will conform to the NSTAP of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Providing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in timely fashion data necessary and pertinent to effective and expeditious review of the NSTL and SIOP.

Additionally, the Terms of Reference prescribe that the JCSLG will be prepared to assist the Joint Staff in review and analysis of the NSTL and SIOP.

4. Measures taken to date contributing to review of the NSTL and SIOP include the following. On 28 September 1960 the DSTP gave to representatives of the Joint Staff and the Services the

* JCS 1259/474

** Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165

*** JCS 2056/177

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/184

- 1733 -

921118-~~1028~~
~~TOP SECRET~~ 1028

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

first of a series of bi-weekly briefings on the status of Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff activities. The JCSIG has planned a series of briefings of the Joint Staff, the first of which will be given about 12 October, which will provide information which will assist the Joint Staff in its review of the NSTL and SIOP.* Additionally, the JCSIG submits to the Director, Joint Staff, and for information of the Service Chiefs, weekly activity reports. Also, the Director, Joint Staff, is provided with copies of minutes of the meetings of the DSTP Policy Committee.

5. As additional measures for facilitating review of the NSTL and SIOP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the following:

a. The Joint Staff and the Services shall conduct the maximum possible useful analysis and review of the NSTL and SIOP during the period of their development. Specific procedures to be followed are outlined in Enclosure "A" hereto.

b. To permit the analysis and review described in subparagraph a above, the Director shall request the JCSIG to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the information described in Enclosure "B" hereto. To the maximum extent possible, but not to interfere with the development of the NSTL and SIOP, the data provided should be in such form as to permit direct evaluation and require minimum detailed analysis by the Services and the Joint Staff.

c. To facilitate conduct of the analysis and review described in subparagraph a above, there shall be established by the J-3, the responsible Directorate, a working group for analysis and review of the NSTL and SIOP. This working group

* Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AF IN 56214, DTG 171645Z September 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1734 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-429

~~TOP SECRET~~

shall be composed of representatives of the Services and of appropriate Directorates of the Joint Staff.

6. In advancing the above recommendations, it is recognized that much of the information available during the developmental stages of the NSTL and SIOP will be tentative in nature and that it must be so treated in its review and analysis. In some instances, the analysis appropriately will be done on a spot check or sample basis. Also, some aspects of analysis and review will be impossible until completion of the NSTL and SIOP. However, the measures proposed above will result in:

- a. General familiarization with and common understanding of the data involved and the basis on which it was generated.
 - b. Accomplishment of those analyses possible prior to completion of the NSTL and SIOP.
 - c. Clear definition of the remaining task of review to be performed when the completed NSTL and SIOP become available.
 - d. Marshalling of personnel and facilities in preparation for review of the completed NSTL and SIOP.
 - e. Elimination of unnecessary duplicatory analysis efforts.
 - f. Providing guidance to the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff as to the form the NSTL and SIOP and supporting material should take to facilitate review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - g. Early identification and evaluation of any problem areas.
- In particular and of prime importance, the proposed measures will contribute strongly to so preparing the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they will receive maximum benefit from the preview briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the NSTL and SIOP during the period of 23-25 November 1960 proposed by the DSTP.*

* Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AF IN 59381, DTG 211625Z September 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1735 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

09 11 10

1030

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

While it has not been determined at just what point the Joint Chiefs of Staff will formally consider the NSTL and SIOP for approval, it appears highly desirable that they be prepared to express their views to the Secretary of Defense immediately following the formal presentation of the NSTL and SIOP, now scheduled for about 1 December 1960. The measures proposed above will assist greatly in that respect.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1736 -

921118 - 72
10J/

~~TOP SECRET~~
921118

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

PROCEDURES FOR ANALYSIS AND REVIEW
OF THE NSTL AND SIOP

1. Purpose. The basic purpose of the review of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) by the Joint Staff and the Services shall be to insure conformance with the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy* (NSTAP) and related JCS directives. A primary purpose of the review shall be to determine if the SIOP will provide for attainment of the specific objectives outlined in the NSTAP. Measures for accomplishing review objectives are outlined below.

2. NSTL. As versions of the NSTL or the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) are developed and made available, they shall be analyzed from the standpoint of:

a. Inclusion of those targets, successful attack of which would result in meeting the specific objectives outlined in the NSTAP.

b. Agreement with the optimum-mix target list of Study No. 2009, taking into account latest intelligence and the fact that the 2009 list does not include either targets in the [REDACTED] or specific suppression-type targets.

c. Comparison with corresponding types of targets appearing in currently effective plans of the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

3. SIOP. As elements or versions of the SIOP become available, they shall be analyzed as follows:

a. The portion of the national effort in terms of delivery vehicles and atomic weapons which are governed by the SIOP

* Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1737 -

Enclosure "A"

921118-~~92~~
~~TOP SECRET~~ 1032

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

and the remaining such vehicles and weapons which are available for other undertakings shall be identified and evaluation made of these allocations in terms of the ability of the commanders of unified and specified commands to carry out all of their assigned missions.

b. The SIOP shall be evaluated as to the consideration given to the scope and effectiveness of attacks on NSTL targets planned by allies, insofar as plans for such attacks are known.

c. Target assignment. Target assignments shall be analyzed from the standpoint of optimum utilization of all types of delivery systems available for timely, effective and efficient attack of targets on the NSTL. Specific factors to be considered include the following:

(1) Recommendations of the commanders as to the utilization of forces.

(2) Suitability of available weapon systems, considering such factors as target characteristics, damage criteria, reliability, and vulnerability.

(3) Weight of effort required against individual targets for attainment of the assurance prescribed by the NSTAP for delivery at each bomb release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL.

d. Weapons employment. As information on weapons employment and associated delivery systems becomes available, that employment shall be analyzed from the standpoint of:

(1) Achieving levels of damage necessary for meeting the specific objectives outlined in the NSTAP, utilizing as a reference the general level of damage indicated in Study No. 2009.

(2) Comparison of damage from weapons employed against individual NSTL targets with damage on corresponding targets in Study No. 2009.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1738 -

Enclosure "A"

921118-425
~~TOP SECRET~~ 1033

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) Meeting, but not unduly exceeding, prescribed damage criteria.

(4) Compliance with prescribed constraints.

4. Differences. Review and evaluate any reported differences between commanders of unified and specified commands and the Director, Strategic Target Planning.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1739 -

Enclosure "A"

921118 - ~~1034~~ 1034

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF THE NSTL AND SIOP

1. The Terms of Reference for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group (JCSLG) to the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP)* prescribe that the JCSLG shall provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with data necessary and pertinent to the effective and expeditious review of the NSTL and SIOP. Outlined below is data of such nature to be provided, as available and on a basis not to interfere with preparation of the NSTL and SIOP:

- a. Minutes of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Policy Committee Meetings.
- b. Most recent National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) and National Strategic Target List (NSTL), together with suppression-type targets associated with NSTL.
- c. DGZs for various conditions of warning, together with the list of weapons, delivery forces, and the commanders furnishing those forces programmed for each DGZ. Alert forces shall be identified.
- d. The list of installations under attack by weapons assigned to each DGZ.
- e. Recommendations of the commanders as to the utilization of their forces.
- f. An over-all damage assessment summary by country for each category of essential enemy resources attacked, to include the assurance of attaining specified levels of destruction under the following assumed conditions for initiation of war:
 - (1) U.S. attack with full strategic warning.
 - (2) U.S. attack with tactical warning under circumstances that are reasonably likely to occur.

* JCS 2056/177

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

Enclosure "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~

09 11 12 - 245

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Operational factors for each weapon delivery system utilized in determining employment of that system in the SIOP (reliability, CEP, weather, etc.), including brief explanation of derivation of factors.

h. Description of point value system being employed.

i. Description and rationale for options.

2. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be provided the data and associated explanatory material presented at the bi-weekly DSTP progress briefings and at the JCSIG briefings of the Joint Staff scheduled in mid-October, in early November, and on completion of the NSTL and SIOP.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/184

- 1741 -

Enclosure "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~

1036
021118-~~996~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Office Memorandum

SECRET - U. S. NAVY EYES ONLY

Op-06C1/cso

Ser:00193-60

DATE: 26 OCT 1960

OP-001

OP-002

OP-003

OP-004

OP-005

OP-006

TO : Op-06

Via : Op-06...Op-09 R11-1

FROM : Op-06C

SUBJECT: SAC use of computers in targeting, information on

1. Some rather startling information on SAC uses of computers in performing the NSTL/SIOP targeting function has come to light as a result of our request for their computer programs. Although not officially stated nor widely known, computers are used by SAC for less than 5% of the targeting function. Planning actions are the result of staff manipulation, judgements, and decisions with the computer used in a straight bookkeeping role. Selection of a target appears to be a case of staff officer judgements, computer listings, followed by a case of staff officer judgements, computer listings, followed by more staff manipulations, judgements, and decisions. It appears that the advertised "unique" scientific computational capability is in fact a rather expensive and inefficient sorting and listing operation. Development of the NSTL/SIOP involves a six step process sequentially as follows:

a. Establish target priority - Two lists are prepared according to arbitrary point worth.

(1) Military targets (A points) have point values applied according to type installation utilizing a computer to produce a priority listing in descending order of total points assigned.

(2) Urban/Industrial targets (B points) - Computer program provide priority according to population and industrial worth determined by an appraisal of an item's relative order of importance and worth in the U.S. industrial economy. This value is then applied to the Soviet economy. Manual analysis contributes other point information. Therefore a combination of manual and machine produced point values for each target is determined.

(3) Prior to establishment of DJSTP the A and B points have never been mixed. Mixing of these lists in development of the NSTL is accomplished manually since A points and B points have no apparent relation. This appears to be an arbitrary if not capricious solution.

X b. Establish DGZ - A computer program is used. The SAC program used fixed factors as follows: CEP 3,000 feet, all surface bursts, all weapons 3.8 mt; SAC is currently redesigning this program to provide an average height of burst and to make allowances for different CEP's as introduced by JSTRS. DGZ's are checked manually and reset as required.

c. Damage analysis - A computer program exists for this function, however, it is limited to a comparison of the point values destroyed by manually selected DGZ's against the total point value used in subparagraph 1a preceding.

Secret

SECRET

U. S. NAVY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

10/31

Secret U S NAVY EYES ONLY
SECRET - U.S. NAVY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED Op-0601/oso
Ser: 00193-60

(The preceding three functions are performed as a responsibility of the Intelligence organization while the remaining functions are performed as a responsibility of Operations). 26 OCT 1960

d. Penetration analysis - This is reported to be a complicated, completely manual operation, utilizing desk calculators and the computer is used only for bookkeeping functions. This analysis is conducted by 15 minute time blocks. Assessments of the damage inflicted to reduce enemy effectiveness is made by applying weapon system reliability and enemy defense probabilities to produce enemy defense effectiveness for the beginning of each succeeding time step.

e. Flight Planning - Profile flight planning is accomplished for each individual mission, with mass penetration and suppression flights in the same area planned together. When all flights have been individually laid down, all will be computer processed for TOT resolution and interference analysis. Information indicates that: (1) This method of resolution has not been accomplished in this manner before; and (2) this could not be done until December.

f. Fallout analysis - Here a computer program exists although it is reported that this is not as good as either the AFCIN model or the Naval Weapons Laboratory model.

Essentially then, the computer is used in the targeting function to perform bookkeeping functions. Apparently each program is run on the computer by the officer who wrote the program and since he is not required to document his program a good deal of the operating instructions are unrecorded. One knowledgeable computer expert has stated the programs are extremely inefficient but do provide accurate processing of the functions programmed.

2. SAC has a war gaming capability for SAC programs. However, it cannot, without extensive reprogramming covering some months, accomplish a valid war gaming of the SIOP. Neither can the Air Battle Analysis model.

3. Resistance is mounting to the Navy request for SAC computer programs. A great danger exists that SAC will strive to sell the viewpoint that furnishing NSTL Data Base, Alert Force DGZ's and IDA's on tapes satisfies the Navy request for computer programs. This is fallacious. Unless otherwise directed I intend to pursue obtaining SAC computer programs. My estimate of the outlook is that DSTP (SAC inspired) will procrastinate and delay furnishing this information. They will attempt to avoid furnishing computer programs entirely because if furnished it will show SAC as an agency which has done a lot of talking about their scientific approach to the problem while in reality they have used hand methods which moreover are applicable solely to SAC needs.

Very respectfully,

PAUL P. BLACKBURN, Jr.

Copy to:
Op-604
Op-922V

DECLASSIFIED

Secret
SECRET

~~DECLASSIFIED~~ file NSTL/SIC
TOP SECRET file #1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36671 (29 Oct 60)

PE/rvp

ACTION: JCS (4-31)

INFO : ARMY (32-46), NAVY (47-66), CMC (67-72), CSAF(XPD) (73-76),
XDC (77), QOP (78), CIN (79), ODC (80)

DE RJWXR 3-3

R 282012Z

FM JCSLG OFFUTT AFB NEBR

TO JCS WASH DC

BT

get info. from file - 13

T O P S E C R E T 60-11. FROM JCSLG. FOR DIRECTOR JOINT
STAFF SIGNED SPIVY. THIS IS THE EIGHTH WEEKLY ACTIVITY REPORT.
THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I. JSTPS ACTIVITY: (A) THE
11TH POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING WAS HELD ON 26 OCTOBER. MINUTES
OF THE MEETING WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN AVAILABLE. IN ORDER TO
SECURE POLICY COMMITTEE APPROVAL A PRESENTATION WAS MADE ON
THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY TO BE USED IN PREPARING THE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT PORTION OF THE SIOP. IT IS PROPOSED TO ATTACK THE
PROBLEM BY DERIVING A FIGURE FOR EXPECTED DAMAGE ON THE PRODUCT
OF ASSURANCE PROBABILITY AND DAMAGE PROBABILITY AND THEN, BY
TAKING A SUMMATION OF ALL COMBINATIONS OF EXPECTED DAMAGE FOR
A GIVEN NUMBER OF SORTIES AGAINST A GIVEN DGZ TO END UP WITH
A FIGURE REPRESENTING TOTAL EXPECTANCY. THE POLICY COMMITTEE
AGREED TO USE THIS METHODOLOGY IN FORTHCOMING DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.
(B) THE COMMITTEE THAT WAS WORKING ON BASE SURVIVABILITY

(C) PAGE 1 OF 5

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without
approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

AFHQ FORM 0-309
22 JUN 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~ **TOP SECRET** COPY NO. 54

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36671 (29 Oct 60)

FACTORS, WHICH WAS MENTIONED IN THE 7TH WEEKLY ACTIVITY REPORT, PRESENTED A REPORT OF THEIR WORK. THEY PRODUCED A RANGE OF FACTORS BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS PECULIAR TO THE PROBLEM OF THE SIOP, AND USING AS BACKGROUND AND SOURCE INFORMATION STUDY 2009, NORAD STUDIES AND SEVERAL RAND STUDIES. AFTER SEEING THE FIGURES PRESENTED, THE POLICY COMMITTEE AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE EMPLOYED ONLY AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DETERMINATION OF FACTORS TO BE USED FOR DISPLAY PURPOSES AFTER THE SIOP HAS BEEN COMPLETED IN ORDER TO GIVE A FEEL FOR A RANGE OF HYPOTHETICAL BASE SURVIVABILITY FACTORS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ASSURANCE LEVELS. THEY AGREED THAT THE FIGURE OR FIGURES FOR BASE SURVIVABILITY, OTHER THAN HYPOTHETICAL ONES, MAY HAVE TO WAIT ON MORE INTENSIVE STUDY AND WAR GAMING OF THE PLAN. (C) ALSO ON 26 OCTOBER, A REVIEW OF ALL THE WORK DONE SO FAR IN TARGETING AND LAYING DOWN THE ALERT FORCE WAS PRESENTED TO GENERAL POWER AND SERVED AS A DRY RUN FOR THE JSTPS BI-WEEKLY STATUS BRIEFING SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT DAY. SIGNIFICANT FIGURES PRESENTED WERE THAT THE ALERT FORCE WILL CONSIST OF 880 VEHICLES DELIVERING 1459 WEAPONS ON 654 TARGETS FOR AN AVERAGE ASSURANCE OF 74.5 PCT. GENERAL POWER BROUGHT UP THE THE SUBJECT OF TAC'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE SIOP. DISCUSSION BROUGHT OUT THE FACT THAT TAC COULD POSSIBLY BE

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without
approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

PAGE 2 OF 5

AFHQ FORM 22 JUN 58 0-309

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36671 (29 Oct 60)

CONSIDERED FOR OPTION (16)² BUT FOR NO OTHER OPTION AND THAT SINCE TAC FORCES WILL BE UNDER CONTROL OF THE THEATRE COMMANDERS, THEY POSSIBLY MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN SIOP FORCES. THE PRESENTATION INCLUDED CHARTS EXPLAINING RESULTS OF THE OPTIMUM TARGETING OF THE ALERT FORCE AND PROBABILITY OF DELIVERY FACTORS. (D) ON 25 OCTOBER, THE SACEUR REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JSTPS RECEIVED FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS WRITTEN TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH, IF INTERPRETED LITERALLY, WILL TEND TO DELAY A POSSIBLY UNACCEPTABLE EXTENT, THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN. COLONEL LONG, SACEUR REPRESENTATIVE, IMMEDIATELY DEPARTED FOR EUROPE TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE FROM GENERAL NORSTAD. (E) ON 27 OCTOBER, THE BI-WEEKLY STATUS BRIEFING WAS GIVEN BY GENERAL POWER AND THE JSTPS. IT COVERED MATTERS MENTIONED IN (C) ABOVE. (F) ALSO ON 27 OCTOBER, WORD WAS RECEIVED FROM PARIS THAT THE SACEUR FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED AS THEY HAVE BEEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PLANNING. THEREFORE, THE SACEUR SITUATION SHOULD NOT DELAY THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN. PART II. JCSLG LIAISON ACTIVITY: (A) ON 24 OCTOBER, A MEETING WAS CONVENED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, JSTPS, JCSLG AND NINE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT STAFF FROM WASHINGTON FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING AND COMMENTING ON A PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR COMMAND, CONTROL AND EXECUTION OF

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

PAGE 3 OF 5

AFHQ FORM 0-309
22 JUN 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

Downgraded To	<u>Secret</u>
By Authority Of	<u>NSC 7/15/91</u>
By	<u>LHC</u> NLE Date <u>8/14/96</u>

November 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 387th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, November 20, 1958

Present at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Acting Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. The following members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff also attended the meeting: General Gerald C. Thomas, Director; Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director; Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, Director Designate; Colonel Charles L. Granger, USMC, Colonel James O. Beckwith, USAF, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, Colonel Lloyd D. Chapman, USAF, Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, Colonel Kenneth R. Dyer, USA, Captain David L. Whelchel, USN, DR. R. J. Smith, CIA, and Colonel S. J. West, USAF. Also attending the meeting were the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Major John Eisenhower for the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. REPORT BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
(NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641 and 1815;
NSC 5816)

Mr. Gordon Gray introduced General Thomas, the Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, and explained the general purpose

DECLASSIFIED	
<u>MR. Appeal</u> NLE 95-299 Doc 1	
By <u>BP</u>	NARS, Date <u>8/9/96</u>

of the meeting. (A copy of Mr. Gray's remarks are included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

General Thomas summarized the methodology of the report that was about to be given. He pointed out the change which had been made last year by the President in the directive to the Subcommittee and also referred to the use made by the Subcommittee of the current National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities. General Thomas also pointed out the assumptions under which this year's evaluation had been developed and noted the participation in the evaluation of representatives from all four of the military services as well as representatives of each of the other responsible Government agencies.

CBM's? General Thomas then introduced Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, who discussed the basic assumptions concerning the assumed Soviet attack on the U.S. which was mounted by the Soviets in mid-1961 with strategic surprise. This was followed by General Smith's discussion of the detailed assumptions made by the U.S.S.R. with respect to the nature of the attack which it made on the continental U.S. General Smith followed with a discussion of the detailed assumptions underlying the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union.

Upon the conclusion of General Smith's portion of the report, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, described the Soviet attack on the continental U.S. Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, subsequently described the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. military posture after the attack on the U.S. by the Soviet Union.

Colonel Calhoun next expounded the estimate of the damage inflicted on the U.S. by the Soviet attack and Captain Dashiell described the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the U.S. retaliatory attack. Dr. R. J. Smith of the Central Intelligence Agency, also a member of the Subcommittee Staff, discussed the potentialities of the Soviet clandestine attack on the U.S. which concluded the formal presentation.

In his concluding statement General Thomas emphasized the difficulties involved in attempting to achieve realistic assumptions with regard to the evaluation as a whole. There were obviously many uncertainties with respect to the military capabilities of the U.S. at a period as distant as mid-1961 and of course even more uncertainty as to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union at the same time. Despite these uncertainties, General Thomas believed the assumptions were sufficiently realistic to bear out the essential validity of the evaluation.

General Thomas also invited the Council to take a backward look at the previous reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in relation to the findings of the report just rendered. There was, he pointed out, an essential similarity in the findings of all the reports since the first one was delivered in 1954. These findings were listed in a chart described as "Recurrent Conclusions".

Mr. Gray reminded the President and the Council that this was General Thomas' last appearance as Director of the Subcommittee Staff, and that his successor, ^{by} General Thomas F. Hickey, was present this morning. Thereafter, Mr. Gray presented a recommendation in substantially the following language:

"You will recall that the 1957 report involved a retaliatory attack confining itself to a primarily military target system. For 1958, the President directed that the exercise concern itself with the retaliatory objective of immediately paralyzing the Russian nation, rather than concentrating on targets of a military character although not entirely ruling out particular military targets which the Subcommittee believed would significantly contribute to paralysis of the Russian nation.

"The presentation you have just heard has concluded that a substantial reduction of the capability of the USSR to recover would be accomplished by the concentration of a U. S. retaliatory effort against a combined military-urban industrial target system as opposed to a strictly military target system. The conclusion also was that such an effort would destroy the Soviet nuclear offensive capability."

"A central aim of our policy is to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the U.S. There has been no suggestion from any quarter as to a change in this basic policy. However, as you know, NSC 5410/1, the so-called 'war objectives' paper is in the process of review. These matters are inextricably interwoven.

"In the light of these facts, it seems to me that it is important for you, Mr. President, to have before you, for your consideration, an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of retaliatory efforts directed toward:

- "1. Primarily a military target system; or
- "2. What might be felt to be the optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system."

Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61
(Ann Whitman file)

"Such appraisal should also take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity which might conceivably be called upon in the case of unequivocal strategic warning of impending Soviet attack on the U.S. The question here might be whether the character and composition of such a force would be adequate to the purposes of 1 or 2 above, and vice versa.

"These matters have been under intensive study in the Department of Defense. If it is agreeable to you I shall be glad to work with Mr. McElroy and General Twining to determine the best way to accomplish such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the review of the so-called War Objectives paper, bearing in mind that the knowledge and views of the State Department and other Federal agencies would be importantly involved."

BNSP?

X When Mr. Gray had concluded his suggested Council action, the President said he was convinced that what Mr. Gray proposed to have done was essential for the obvious reason that in today's presentation of the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union, the U.S. had as targets every city in the U.S.S.R. with a population of over 25,000 people. In view of this very large number of urban targets, the President believed that we must get back to the formulation of the series of targets in the Soviet Union destruction of which would most economically paralyze the Russian nation. Turning to General Twining and addressing him and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President said that he could remember well when the military used to have no more than 70 targets in the Soviet Union and believed that destruction of these 70 targets would be sufficient. Now, however, a great many more targets had been added. He accordingly expressed his approval of the suggested action by Mr. Gray.

Secretary McElroy expressed his view that the dispersal of the hardened Soviet ICBM bases introduced a new element in the picture because even if we succeeded in destroying the cities and urban centers of the Soviet Union, these missile sites would still enable the Soviet Union to retain an add-on capability with their long-range missiles.

NSM
IN
'61

In response to Secretary McElroy's point, the President commented that in this morning's presentation the Soviets delivered all of their ICBM's in the first two hours of their attack on the U.S. Secretary McElroy agreed that this was the case but said that there was some doubt as to whether this was a sound assumption as to the Soviet use of their ICBM's. The President replied that the presentation assumed that we are trying to destroy the will of the Soviet Union to fight. If in the first thirty hours of the nuclear exchange

the U.S. succeeded in accomplishing the degree of devastation in the Soviet Union that had been outlined in this morning's presentation, we would already have accomplished our purpose of destroying the will of the Soviet Union to fight. One could not go on to argue that we must require a 100 per cent pulverization of the Soviet Union. There was obviously a limit - a human limit - to the devastation which human beings could endure.

Secretary McElroy expressed his agreement to the action recommended by Mr. Gray and the President brought the meeting to a conclusion with an expression of warm congratulations to General Thomas and his associates and also a welcome to General Hickey who would be taking over henceforth from General Thomas.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1958 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.
- b. Noted the President's request for an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of alternative retaliatory efforts directed toward: (1) Primarily a military target system, or (2) an optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system. Such an appraisal is to take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity and whether such a counter-force capacity would be adequate for (1) or (2) above and vice versa. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are to determine the best means of defining and accomplishing such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the current review of NSC 5410/1 and the interests of the Department of State and other Executive agencies.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

S. EVERETT GLEASON

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CM-380-59
17 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Target Coordination and
Associated Problems (U)

1. On 28 July 1959, at the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting, you asked for my views on procedures for coordination of atomic strike plans. This memorandum presents, for your information, a resume of what we are currently doing and a discussion of controversial issues which must be resolved in order to improve our effectiveness. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to reach agreement on any aspect of this problem area, you will be advised.

2. Target coordination and associated problems have received more and more attention during the past few years not because of unacceptable weaknesses in our present position -- but, rather, because of the impact of decisions in this area on future Service programs and on the allocation of resources available to the Department of Defense. We do have weaknesses in our system today, and these weaknesses should be eliminated as rapidly as possible. However, the major impact of our current examination of this problem will be on future posture and future capability, and we must expect that attitudes and judgments on these issues will be somewhat influenced by the budgetary implications.

BACKGROUND

3. Before 1952 there were so few atomic weapons in the stockpile and such limited capability outside the Air Force

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/131

- 1144 -

SECRET

921118-448

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

that coordination presented no significant difficulties. Early in 1952, as the stockpile became larger, and delivery capability of other than Air Force forces increased, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up machinery to coordinate atomic targeting. Two types of procedures evolved: planning coordination and operational coordination.

4. Planning coordination stems from the requirement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that commanders develop and dove-tail with other commanders the individual strike plans which are spelled out in their atomic annexes, which are prepared in support of the (JSCF). Up to the present time, this initial coordination of plans between commanders has been somewhat spotty. It is rather good between some commands; inadequate between others. Following individual coordination between commands, the plans are further coordinated at conferences at which all commanders are represented.

to SecDef
59

5. Prior to 1955 this coordination was accomplished at conferences held at SAC. Since 1955, this coordination has taken place at World-Wide Coordination Conferences (WWCC's) held at the Pentagon. The last two of these were monitored by a senior member of the Joint Staff and the next conference is scheduled to be monitored by J-3. This is in line with the new operational responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. Following the World-Wide Coordination Conferences, the plans are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, at which time the Joint Staff reviews each plan and the combined plans as a whole.

Not, SecDef

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1145 -

Enclosure

921118-449

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

7. So far I have been dealing only with planning coordination.

To effect operational coordination the Joint Chiefs of Staff have established Joint War Room Annexes (Pentagon and Fort Ritchie) and the Joint Coordination Centers (JCC's) located in the United Kingdom and in Hawaii. These centers screen all atomic strike plans, and, based on targets and routes thereto, identify potential conflict situations. Actual conflicts develop only when actual strike timing is made known. *R*

Representatives of the commands, permanently stationed at the JCC's, are charged with monitoring execution of the plans and resolving conflicts as they develop. Communications exist so that recommendations on conflicts which cannot be resolved can be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and agreed resolutions can be flashed to commanders for implementation. Joint exercises are held periodically to test the effectiveness and exercise the procedures of this system. The last of these exercises, DIOX CUP, was held between 27 February and 2 March of this year. While these exercises have resulted in some improvements, they have also defined more clearly certain fundamental weaknesses in current procedures.

8. The procedures outlined above are elaborate, well-established and sophisticated systems which over the years have effected a substantial measure of target coordination. Out of a total of about 2,400 targets, something over 300, or about 13%, have been labelled "duplications." Whether or not these are in fact duplications is a matter of judgment entailing such considerations as the degree of destruction required on a target, the reaction time of the various forces, the attrition of delivery vehicles, and other operational factors. Furthermore, an overlap in scheduling because two or more

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/131

- 1146 -

Enclosure

921118-450

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

commands consider the destruction of a single target essential to the accomplishment of their missions does not necessarily mean that there will, in fact, be a duplication in execution. Once it has been determined that a target has been neutralized or destroyed the procedure is that messages will be dispatched to preclude a second and unnecessary attack. However, an elaborate world-wide communications system is required to effect the coordination. In maneuvers and exercises communications frequently lag too far behind. Under combat conditions the system would undoubtedly be degraded and might function with considerably reduced effectiveness.

9. From our experience in this area to date, we can derive at least one fundamental principle. This principle is that atomic operations must be pre-planned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance on post-H-hour communications. However, with respect to the Joint Coordination Centers, I believe that we should continue their functioning even if we make other changes which will be discussed hereinafter. The Joint Coordination Centers are an extremely useful maneuver tool. Even if they never functioned in war, during exercises they isolate problem areas and develop valuable data which is fed back into our operational plans.

10. From our experience to date, I have also arrived at the conclusion that not much more progress can be achieved under the present arrangements for target coordination. Some minor improvements can, of course, be made, but any significant progress will require fundamental changes in our present system. Some of these changes should be made immediately; action on others may be deferred without serious consequences.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

SECRET

- 1147 -

Enclosure

921118-451

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

ACTIONS CURRENTLY IN PROCESS

11. In addition to the routine staffing of atomic annexes as described in the preceding paragraphs, two actions are now in process which may contribute toward improvement. These are:

a. The "Optimum Mix Study" being conducted by General Hickey's staff, due date 31 October 1959.

b. JCS study of procedural arrangements for target system analysis and war gaming.

UNDERLYING ISSUES

12. Having described procedures currently in effect, and noted additional actions in process, we should now examine the underlying issues. In terms of these issues, the problem breaks down into three categories. These categories are:

a. The process of targeting which leads directly to consideration of force adequacy.

b. The development of integrated operational plans.

c. The question of operational control of the strike forces involved.

13. In the past there have been basic differences of viewpoint within the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all three of these categories. Unfortunately, it is not possible to resolve the issues by mathematics or precise techniques. Diagnostic studies and mathematical treatment can provide inputs which assist in tackling these problems -- but such analytical work cannot produce a definitive answer. Ultimately, military and executive judgment must be exercised in determining specific policies and programs.

14. The resolution of the underlying issues calls for command decision, and we will never make much more progress in

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1148 -

Enclosure

921118-482

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

this area until these decisions are made and enforced. In order to isolate the specific decisions, which in my judgment are required, I will treat with each category of the problem in some detail.

The Process of Targeting

15. The process of targeting is the most complicated of all the issues. It involves specific sub-issues and problems which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

16. The first problem is -- How many and what kind of targets should be destroyed? The area of disagreement here is exceedingly wide. Opinions vary possibly by a factor of ten. The real question is -- What constitutes an adequate deterrent and an effective counter-force if deterrence fails? What should our targeting philosophy be? Should we plan only for the destruction of population centers and control centers? Or should we keep in being a strong counter-force capability? What constitutes an "optimum mix" of targets of various categories?

general 17. Those who propose a basically population center target (FS) system for the future insist that it will be an impossible task to neutralize the Soviet ICBM system; that we will not know where the missiles are located and, even if we did know, we would never strike the first blow -- hence the Soviet missiles would be on the way before we could counter-attack. On the other hand, if we were to strike certain urban and control centers, the Soviets would be incapable of prosecuting the war, and the United States would emerge on top. Therefore, according to this line of thinking, it is a waste of money to build a strategic delivery system capable of attacking more than a few hundred targets.

Who? Navy? Army?

SU attack on Europe? X

Dead Hand?

If SU strike first?

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

SECRET

- 1149 -

Enclosure

921118-453

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

18. Those who propose a strong counter-force capability insist that we must develop the necessary Intelligence; that it will be easier to destroy a missile before it is launched than after; that the Soviets will not be able to launch anything like 100% of their missiles in the first salvo; that, in any case, we must destroy the Soviet capability to re-attack in order to minimize damage to the United States; that a force geared to a few hundred targets cannot survive a surprise attack in strength and thus would not provide a deterrent to Soviet aggression; and that we will have no strength in foreign policy if we lose the capability for pre-emptive action based on strategic Intelligence.

U-2 flights;
Sb, Adl

Palanis?
An alert?

FS

19. My own judgment on this issue is influenced somewhat by our past experience and by my estimate of Soviet philosophy. We have developed a strategic capability to launch, under good to optimum conditions, possibly 2,000 to 4,000 strategic weapons with manned aircraft, and we have, thus far, deterred general war. Soviet military doctrine is based on the Principle of Mass, and I believe that the Soviets will respect only a very powerful force. Further, I believe that they will attempt, over the next several years, to augment their present force of about 1,000 medium and heavy jet bombers with a limited number of manned bombers of advanced design and with an ICBM force numbered in four figures. We have developed our present long-range strategic force during a period of relative Soviet weakness. I would see no logic in allowing our own strategic force to decline in power -- actually or relatively -- when we have certain knowledge that the Soviet strategic force is gaining in power. Moreover, I consider that the necessity of prevailing in general war is of such vital import that any error in judgment should be on the safe side. I, therefore, lean to the heavy side on this issue.

71000; rather, 4 (integers)

X 17 Aug 59 X

✓

X

130 sov cities
- US FS
+

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

SECRET

- 1150 -

921118-454

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

20. From previous experience and study I have always believed that we should adopt a policy along the following lines:

Policy. We should continue to develop and keep up-to-date a target system for strategic attack which includes:

- (1) The critical components of Soviet long-range nuclear delivery capability.
- (2) Governmental and military control centers.
- (3) War-sustaining resources.
- (4) Population centers.

21. On completion of General Hickey's study we may have more definite information on this subject. Once we have adopted a targeting policy, such as the one above, or any other as finally determined by the Secretary of Defense, we will have made significant progress. The questions we next face are as follows:

a. Who or what agency is going to apply this policy, develop the target system and keep it up-to-date?

b. What agency will review the target system for consistency with policy and give it the stamp of final approval?

22. My thinking on this is that the commander responsible for the strategic mission should take the initial steps to develop the national strategic target system -- regardless of and without prejudice to what forces might attack what targets. For the development of this national strategic target system, the responsible commander should be provided with an approved targeting philosophy and guide lines. He will, of course, rely heavily on the work of the targeting section of the Air Intelligence staff, and the analytical work which has been produced by such agencies as WSEG, DASA and Rand. Since any commander may be expected, at times, to err on the safe

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1151 -

Enclosure

921118-455

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

side in determining his requirements, higher level non-partisan review is obviously necessary. This kind of a higher level review, of the target system per se, is, initially, an Intelligence function. "Intelligence," in this initial review of the target system recommended by the commander, should determine if the system constitutes a suitable basis for further analysis. Is the target system in consonance with approved targeting policy? Will the system, if destroyed, accomplish the commander's mission as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Based on past experience and judgment, does the listing of targets appear excessive, insufficient, or generally in the ball park? In my judgment, this initial review is a Joint Staff (J-2) function. What J-2 should do here is to come out with one of the problem elements which is required in the succeeding steps of operational planning, operational analysis, and war gaming. The J-2 review of the commander's recommended target system should, of course, receive final review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the succeeding steps are taken.

Development of Integrated Operational Plans

23. The next major issue with respect to targeting and associated problems involves both intelligence and operations. Once you have an approved target list for further analysis, the question arises as to how many bombs or missiles should be launched against each target. Here we get into the area of the "over kill" controversy. Operational factors such as estimated attrition of the attacking force, weapon yield, CEP, level of destruction required, and surface versus air-burst weapons enter into this aspect of the problem. Do we want a 10% probability of 10% destruction, or a 90% probability of 90% destruction, or something in between? Should we surface burst, well?

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

SECRET

- 1152 -

Enclosure

921118-456

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

ANA

which gives a higher level of local destruction and fall-out but requires more bombs, or should we air burst? These are complicated problems and the answers are not the same for the various categories of targets. The geography of the problem is also important because it affects friendly or neutral populations. However, in general, it can be stated that the Army and Navy favor a lower level of destruction while the Air Force favors a higher level of destruction. The Air Force favors a higher level of destruction because of their experience that it is almost always cheaper to destroy a target in the initial attack, even if it requires more force, than to have to re-attack the same target.

24. Fortunately, this aspect of the problem can be better handled by analytical and mathematical techniques than can the other aspects of the problem. However, handling this aspect of the problem goes beyond the Intelligence function of targeting. It requires that there be developed an outline operational plan which provides a general plan of attack, to include timing and the characteristics of delivery vehicles and weapons. Working with the operational plan, it is possible to apply war gaming techniques to shed some light on the question of how many bombs or missiles should be launched against the various elements of the strategic target system.

25. In the past and at the present time various commands have been involved in the planned attack of the strategic target system. Hence, the agencies which have conducted war games have had no single integrated operational plan with which to work. They have had to piece together the operational plans of the field commanders and utilize the results of World-Wide Coordination Conferences as a basis for war gaming. One of the problems, then, is: Do we need a single integrated operational

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/131

- 1153 -

Enclosure

921118-457

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET

plan for the strategic attack? In my judgment we do need such a plan. Since CINCSAC is assigned the major portion of forces responsible for the strategic mission, I would think that he should be charged with the responsibility for developing such a plan. His plan should, of course, be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

26. In the development of this integrated operational plan we would have to face up to two questions now and one at a later date.

a. The two questions for immediate decision would be:

(1) Should any force without an all-weather capability be allocated strategic targets?

(2) Should the aircraft carrier forces be taken off strategic targets because of uncertainty as to their location at the outbreak of general war?

b. The additional problem, not requiring immediate decision but continuing attention, is where does POLARIS fit into this scheme of things?

c. With respect to the question of all-weather delivery capability, I would strongly recommend that vital strategic targets, such as enemy long-range nuclear delivery capability and control centers, be assigned only to forces having all-weather capability.

d. With respect to the aircraft carrier forces, the following factors and arrangements should be considered:

(1) In order to provide maximum security to the fleet, it should not be tied down to an area limited by the requirement to remain within aircraft range of pre-selected targets. The fleet should be free to exploit its inherent mobility. In addition, the usefulness of the carrier forces in limited war situations should not be degraded by the requirement to remain on station, on a continuing basis, in order to cover targets of vital strategic importance.

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-468

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX B

SECRET

FROM: JCS WASH DC
TO: CHAIRMAN JCS WASH DC
CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY WASH DC
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASH DC
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE WASH DC
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS WASH DC
CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
CINCARIB QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ
CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII
CINCNELM LONDON ENGLAND
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
DIRECTOR STP, OFFUTT AFB NEBR
USNMR-SHAPE PARIS FRANCE

TOP SECRET

From JCS

THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 for the integration of the initial national strategic attack. JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 will be promulgated to the commanders of unified and specified commands, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as documents approved for use in the preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures. PART II: 1 April 1961 is established as the effective date of JCS SIOP-62. PART III: Review of JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 will continue directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. These will include recommendations on methods to be followed in preparation, policy guidance (including bringing the NSTAP and JSCP into consonance),

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/194

- 1817 -

Appendix "B"

9211187

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

organization and procedures of the JSTPS.

These recommendations will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by each member thereof, the commanders of unified and specified commands and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, as soon as practicable. Included in the measures for review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NSTL and SIOP-62 will be a wargame of the SIOP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by the commanders, for their respective portions of the SIOP.

PART IV. This part for CJCS, CSA, CNO, CMC and the DSTP. Following changes in JCS SIOP-62 are directed:

- (1) Page 5, para 3b (3), third sentence, change to read:

"Strikes against these defensive targets"

- (2) Page 10, change entry for following CINCs to read as follows:

<u>"Agency</u>	<u>Copy Numbers</u>
Commander in Chief, Europe	12 - 13***
Commander in Chief, Atlantic	14 - 15***
Commander in Chief, Pacific	16 - 17***"

- (3) Page 10, delete NOTE in its entirety and substitute the following:

"NOTE: * Complete SIOP.
 ** Complete SIOP, less Apps I, II & VI to Annex "E" & App I, II & III to Annex "F".
 *** Appendices I, II and III to Annex "F" will be distributed according to operational areas of recipients (see Para 5, Annex I.)"

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1818 -

Appendix "B"

921118 74

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "C"

2 December 1960

Letter of Promulgation

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D.C.

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN 1962

1. The Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1962 (Short Title: JCS SIOP-62) has been prepared under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is hereby promulgated for planning the initial nuclear strategic attack against the [Sino-Soviet Bloc] and for operations, when directed. Guidance contained herein supersedes any conflicting guidance in currently effective JSCP.

2. JCS SIOP-62 is effective for planning purposes upon receipt. Commanders concerned shall have their forces prepared to execute the Plan by 1 April 1961 and shall reflect the provisions of the Plan in appropriate portions of their general war plans. The Plan shall be effective for execution when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Command, Control and Execution of the JCS SIOP-62 will be in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff concept as outlined in JCS message No. 986489 DTG 292243Z November 1960.

4. Amendments to the Plan will be processed in accordance with Annex "B" to the Plan, should time considerations permit. In the event exigencies of the situation preclude using procedures outlined in Annex "B", commanders concerned shall report changes in accordance with SM 606-60, as revised.

5. Distribution of the Plan shall be as indicated on distribution page of the Plan. Recipients are authorized to extract and reproduce to subordinate echelons on a strict basis of need-to-know. Particular attention is directed to Appendices

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1819 -

Appendix "C"

921118 75

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

I, II and VI of Annex "E", and Appendices I, II and III, Annex "F". These constitute EXTREMELY SENSITIVE INFORMATION; distribution to subordinate echelons will be (1) partial and extract only, according to operational area of the recipient and on a basis of rigorous and discriminating need-to-know, and (2) only to commanders having responsibilities of command, control and execution under the SIOP.

6. Special Handling of this Plan is directed. The information contained in the Plan will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives, except as may be specifically authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

F. J. BLOVIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/194

- 1820 -

Appendix "C"

921118-76

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "D"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In accordance with his guidance, the Director, Strategic Planning (DSTP) organized a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) consisting of personnel from the several Services possessing the required skills to perform targeting and planning functions.

2. The Commanders of unified and specified commands committing forces to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) provided permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the DSTP, who participated in the preparation of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the SIOP. In addition, these commanders provided personnel qualified as intelligence and targeting specialists to assist in detailed development of the NSTL and the SIOP.

3. The Commanders in Chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Strategic Air Command each committed nuclear weapon delivery forces to the attack of targets on the NSTL.

4. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe committed SACEUR forces to participation in the attack of targets on the NSTL on the following basis:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1821 -

Appendix "D"

921118 77

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. The organization established by General Power, as DSTP, provided for:

a. Joint consideration of divergent views at all levels of the planning organization.

b. A Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy Director, composed of permanent representatives of the participating CINCs and Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps members of the Director's staff. This committee considered and resolved all matters of guidance required by the NSTL and SIOP Divisions in performance of their functions. Proceedings of the Policy Committee have been provided to the Joint Staff and the Services.

6. All agencies participating in development of the NSTL and SIOP, plus the Services and the Joint Staff, have had access to all data and methods used in the planning process. Through frequent briefings at Omaha by the JSTPS and in Washington by the DSTP and the JCS Liaison Group, explanation of procedures and bases for planning have been available to interested agencies.

7. The National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB), source document for the NSTL, was developed by representatives of the participating CINCs and the Services. The initial version of the NSTDB included the targets in Study 2009 and other targets in the Strategic Air Command's Target Register. It has been revised by the JSTPS to reflect latest available intelligence, and the current version provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services is dated 19 October 1960.

8. All targeting was accomplished by joint teams composed of personnel qualified in tactics, force capabilities, missile launch data, weapons effects and penetration of enemy defenses. The teams followed jointly agreed procedures which applied

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1822 -

Appendix "D"

921118-78

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

forces in chronological sequence of arrival at the target system, utilizing minimum weapons and applying a "roll back" principle for establishment of corridors through area and perimeter defenses for following sorties. Cross targeting of weapons system, or assignment of different forces and/or weapons systems to a single desired ground zero (DGZ) was employed to optimize probability of arrival at the BRL. As each sortie was selected, its probability of arrival at the BRL was computed, based upon the delivery system's reliability as degraded by enemy defensive capability. As the enemy's defensive airfields were attacked by succeeding sorties, degradation of those defenses was incorporated in computation of the following sortie probability.

9. Material has been furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services as available. To date this has consisted of the NST Data Base, the alert force DGZ list and indirect damage assessment, and the follow-on force DGZ list and indirect damage assessment. The latter was received 21 November and is now being reproduced for analysis. The final version of the NSTL and SIOP and associated over-all damage assessment and final reports required by JCS 2056/165 have not yet been received. Format and content of data provided corresponds to that prescribed in JCS 2056/183, thus facilitating use of the data in the coordination and reporting of atomic operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

- 1823 -

Appendix "D"

921118 79

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "E"

DISCUSSION

1. Except for a report by the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) of a damage assessment of the Alert Force against industrial floor space, there is not available at this time any significant information derived from analysis and review of the initial NSTL and SIOP additional to that earlier reported in the Director's Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 21 November 1960.* Consequently, material earlier provided is included herein by reference only. The additional Alert Force damage assessment results are described in paragraph 2, below.

2. DASA has made a damage assessment of the Alert Force against industrial floor space [REDACTED] (U.S.S.R. and China). This assessment was made utilizing first, the smallest weapon programmed at each DGZ and second, the largest weapon at each DGZ. The smallest weapon programmed on [REDACTED] has a 90% probability of severely damaging about [REDACTED] of the industrial floor space [REDACTED], and the largest weapon has a 90% probability of severely damaging about [REDACTED] or an average of about 53%. In other words, based on this damage assessment, the JSTPS method of targeting [REDACTED] has resulted, for the Alert Force, in meeting but not excessively exceeding the damage level specified in the guidance.

X 7

X

X

?

* JCS 2056/189

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/194

921118-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

J.C.S. 2056/197

30 December 1960

Pages 1833 - 1836, incl.

COPY NO. 72

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND
20 YEARS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 2 Jan 1980
DECLASSIFY ON: DATE 1990
REVIEW ON: DATE 1990

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SICP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)
Reference: J.C.S. 2056/194


The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Serial 000359P60, dated 23 December 1960, subject as above, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOUIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/197
(Rev. 1/9/61)

- 1833 -



~~TOP SECRET~~

091118-58

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)
Reference: J.C.S. 2056/194

Ser 000359P60

23 December 1960

1. J.C.S. 2056/194 contains approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the NSTL and SIOP-62 and provides for a continuing review of these documents, directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. Recommendations from the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the DSTP have been requested.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations notes the following specific areas which require further investigation and possible action:

a. Damage Criteria.

(1) Preliminary damage assessment indicates that use of the criteria contained in the Targeting and Attack Policy results in damage levels and population casualties beyond those which appear to be required. The damage assessment is based on blast damage only, and does not take into account thermal and radiation effects. It is also based on only one weapon per DGZ. Most DGZs have multiple weapons programmed, and the most likely occurrence is that more than one weapon will arrive, further raising damage levels.

Wow!

(2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Simplification and

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/197
(Rev. 1/9/61)

- 1834 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-59

~~TOP SECRET~~

economy could be realized if the damage criteria finally determined for [REDACTED] were also applied to [REDACTED]. Investigation on a case-by-case basis of the military acceptability of this procedure is probably required.

(3) All targets of a given category are subject to the same damage criteria. Consideration should be given to provision of a sliding scale of damage, based upon relative target worth.

b. Assurance at BRL. Existing guidance has been subject to diverse interpretation. The alert Force was applied to achieve an over-all average assurance approximating but not less than 75% for arrival at those BRLs associated with the Alert Force. When the Follow-on Force was applied, the assurance level raised to approximately 97% assurance on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Attainment of this extremely high level of assurance requires the programming of many weapons on most DGZs.

c. Constraints. The expected dose rates at selected monitoring points do not exceed existing constraints levels. These dose rates were computed utilizing yearly average mean winds; were based on one weapon per DGZ; and [REDACTED] only. A complete constraints analysis, to include seasonal wind data and the effect of multiple weapons on a single DGZ, should be made to determine total expected dose rates. (World-wide contamination), to include effect of Soviet weapons employment, should also be considered.

d. Base Survivability and Employment of Follow-on Forces. These two are very closely related. Base survivability was not taken into account in JCS SIOP-62. Survivability factors should be developed, and any adjustments resulting therefrom applied to the use of the follow-on forces. JCS war gaming will develop useful data concerning base survivability.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/197
(Rev. 1/9/61)

- 1835 -

Enclosure

00 1 1 1 2 -60

~~TOP SECRET~~

e. Point Value System. In developing the initial NSTL and SIOP, SAC's existing point value system, adjusted to accommodate an optimum-mix target system, was used. ALPHA [REDACTED] and BRAVO [REDACTED] points were developed independently and manually integrated into a single list. Time precluded consideration of alternate procedures. The point system should now be examined closely to insure that we are in fact using the best method for the determination of target priorities and location of DGZs.

f. Factors Used in Determining Probability of Success.

The factors used in computing the probability of success of weapons system should be reviewed carefully, for these factors have a strong bearing on total force requirements. The factors applied to missile systems and to non-all-weather delivery systems appear to warrant special consideration.

3. Three additional related areas are not addressed herein. These are: organization of the JSTPS; joint operational intelligence; and the determination of the essential national task together with the development of a target list based thereon. These, and others which may arise later, will be the subject of separate memoranda.

4. It is recommended that the Director, Joint Staff include the subjects discussed in paragraph 2 above in the review of the NSTL/SIOP and associated policy guidance directed by J.C.S. 2056/194.

5. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

6. In consonance with the provisions of J.C.S. Memorandum of Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers in NATO activities.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/194
(Rev. 1/9/61)

- 1836 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~
021118-61

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY ROUTINE	(ACTION) (INFO)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT NO
-----------------------------------	--------------------	-------------	------------	--------

7P R182250Z Jan

FM CINCPAC CAMP H M SMITH HAWAII

TO RPEPW/JCS

INFO RJWXB/DSTPS OFFUTT AFB NEB
RPEPW/CINCLANT
RJKDAG/CINCAL
RUFZC/CINCEUR
REDLNR/CINCNELM
RJWXB/CINCSAC
RJWXB/CINCPACREP JSTPS OFFUTT AFB

//TOP SECRET//

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SIOP-62

- A. JCS 987018 DTG 092127Z-DEC
- B. JCS 539220 DTG 070009Z-
- 1. REFERENCE B

REQUESTED INITIAL SUBMISSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
REQUIRED BY REF A BY 20 JAN.

2. MY PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SIOP -62 CONFIRMS DOUBTS IN MY MIND
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF SEVERAL PLANNING FACTORS WHICH WERE USED IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN. I THINK WE CAN PRODUCE A BETTER ONE BASED ON
MORE REASONABLE PLANNING INPUT FACTORS.

3. DAMAGE CRITERIA.

A. THE CRITERIA FURNISHED IN JCS GUIDANCE FOR SIOP-62 WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCING SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF DGZS. IN THINKING
ABOUT THIS, I REEXAMINED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE WHICH WAS INFLICTED
ON HIROSHIMA BY A (7KT AIR BURST). THIS EXERCISE REVEALED THE EXTREMES
TO WHICH WE HAVE GONE IN OUR PLANS DURING THE PAST 15 YEARS. WHILE I
CAN CONCEIVE THAT SEVERE DAMAGE AS CURRENTLY DEFINED MAY NOT BE
NECESSARY IN RESPECT TO SOVIET ATOMIC DELIVERY CAPABILITIES, I CANNOT
DO SO WHEN I THINK OF STRIKING MAJOR GOVERNMENT CONTROLS. HERE IS AN
EXAMPLE WHERE, IN MY OPINION, DAMAGE CRITERIA APPLIED TO ONE TYPE OF

JCS...ACT(1-27)CSA(29-43)CSAF(44-45)CMC(46-51)CNO

J-3

ACTION	
INFO	
CJCS	2
Dir JS	2
Secy/JCS	1
DepSecy	2
J-1	
J-2	2
J-3	5
J-4	2
J-5	2
J-6	
JMAAB	
ASG/JCS	1
JWR	
JSSC	
JFO	
NSA	1
N/C	6
NSA	2

23

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO 3580 SVB 2	CIRCUIT NO B004	PAGE 1	OF 4	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT 0153Z/19 JAN 61	DATE TIME GROUP 182250Z JAN 61
--------------------------	--------------------	-----------	---------	-------	------------------------------------	-----------------------------------

OASD(PA) DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL

~~TOP SECRET~~

(When filled in)

Copy No. 92-118-202
Case No. 92-118-202
T.S. No. 92-118-202

Doc #14

921118-202

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT NO
	(INFO)			

TARGET SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED AGAINST ANOTHER TYPE. ADOPTING GRADUATED DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF TARGETS WOULD PERMIT CHANGING DGZS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF CO-LOCATION OF TARGET ELEMENTS IN AN AREA WHICH CAN BE DAMAGED BY A SINGLE DETONATION. I BELIEVE WE CAN ATTAIN OUR OBJECTIVES BY DOING LESS DAMAGE AND USING FEWER FORCES AND WEAPONS.

B. IN THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL FLOOR SPACE [REDACTED] THE CRITERIA USED FOR SIOP-62 DID NOT PERMIT SELECTIVITY AS TO CRITICAL INDUSTRIES AND DID NOT ENCOURAGE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHER WEAPONS EFFECTS. ONLY BLAST EFFECTS WERE CONSIDERED BY THE JSTPS. OTHER EFFECTS SUCH AS HEAT, FIRE AND RADIATION SHOULD BE USED WHEN DRAWING UP DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR THE SIOP.

4. CONSTRAINTS.

A. UPON REACHING AN INCAPACITATION THRESHOLD OF AN INDIVIDUAL, SMALL ADDITIONAL EXPOSURE TO RADIATION MAY CAUSE DEATH AND AS A MINIMUM, WILL INCREASE RECOVERY TIME. WHILE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RADIATION EFFECTS RESULTING FROM THE ENEMY'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS UNKNOWN, WE DO KNOW THAT THE CENTER OF THE AREA COVERED BY RESIDUAL RADIATION IS DOWN-WIND FROM THE DETONATION POINT. THIS MEANS TO US IN PACOM THAT OFF-CONTINENT WINDS ALOFT MAY CAUSE US TO BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT RESIDUAL RADIATION DAMAGE RESULTING FROM OUR OWN WEAPONS THAN THOSE OF THE ENEMY. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN WE CONSIDER THAT WORLDWIDE ABOUT 1450 WEAPONS ARE PROGRAMMED BY ALERT FORCES AND ABOUT 3400 WEAPONS BY ALL OF THE COMMITTED FORCES, WE REALIZE THAT OUR WEAPONS CAN BE A HAZARD TO OURSELVES AS WELL AS TO OUR ENEMY.

B. THE PROCEDURE USED BY JSTPS OF USING THE SINGLE LARGEST WEAPON YIELD ON A-GIVE DGZ FOR CONSTRAINT COMPUTATION IS NOT SATISFACTORY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE HIGH DAMAGE CRITERIA WHICH WERE USED. THESE CRITERIA CAUSED THE HEIGHT OF BURST TO BE LOWERED AND SEVERAL WEAPONS TO BE PROGRAMMED AGAINST EACH DGZ TO MEET THE DESIRED ASSURANCE. IN THE CASE OF PROGRAMMING MULTIPLE ATTACKS FOR HIGH ASSURANCES WE EXPECT ON A RANDOM PROBABILITY BASIS THAT MORE THAN ONE WEAPON WILL BE DELIVERED MOST OF THE TIME. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN COMPUTING PROBABLE FALLOUT ON OUR OWN FORCES AND ON OUR FRIENDS. NEUTRALS: HA

5. ASSURANCE.

AS POINTED OUT DURING THE CONFERENCE AT OMAHA, AN ASSURANCE OF 97 PERCENT WAS PLANNED ON HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS BECAUSE NO BASE SURVIVABILITY FACTOR HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE HIGH ASSURANCE WAS CRANKED IN AS AN ARBITRARY PIECE OF INSURANCE. THE METHODOLOGY OF APPLYING AN ASSURANCE FACTOR SHOULD BE REFINED. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A BASE SURVIVABILITY FACTOR CAN ACTUALLY BE DEVELOPED.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO	CIRCUIT NO	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
3580		2		4		182350Z JAN 61

~~TOP SECRET~~

(When filled in)

921118-203

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT NO
	(INFO)			

6 WEATHER FACTOR.

I DO NOT QUARREL WITH THE FACTOR ITSELF NOR THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS DERIVED. MY POSITION WHILE SIOP-62 WAS BEING DEVELOPED WAS THAT THE WEATHER FACTOR SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED AS AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD WEAPONS SYSTEM DEGRADATION FACTOR. I TOOK THE POSITION DURING THE PLANNING CYCLE THAT THE FACTOR SHOULD BE APPLIED TO NON ALL-WEATHER AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE IN THE ALERT FORCE BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO LAUNCH UPON RECEIPT OF A RANDOM GO SIGNAL. HOWEVER, I DID NOT AGREE THAT THE SAME FACTOR SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE FOLLOW-ON FORCES WHOSE LAUNCH TIME IS FLEXIBLE WITHIN A RANGE OF 4 - 5 HOURS. MY VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT HAS NOT CHANGED, AND I HOPE IT WILL BE CONSIDERED WHEN DEVELOPING GUIDANCE FOR THE NEXT SIOP. THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY OF NON ALL-WEATHER AIRCRAFT SURVIVAL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN LAUNCH UNDER CONDITIONS WHERE THEY CAN IDENTIFY VISUALLY THEIR TARGET. A POINT WHICH WE WISH TO REITERATE IS THAT OUR FORCES OUT ON THE WESTPAC LINE CAN OPERATE FOR SOME FIVE (5) HOURS BEFORE SAC ARRIVES ON THE SCENE AND THUS BEFORE THERE IS AN INTERFERENCE AND COORDINATION PROBLEM. WE HAVE A LEEWAY OF 5 HOURS AND WILL ADJUST OUR LAUNCHES WITHIN THIS LEEWAY TO ACHIEVE MUCH HIGHER PROBABILITY OF VISUALLY SIGHTING THE TARGET THAN THAT DERIVED FROM USING THE OVERALL NIGHT / BAD WEATHER FACTOR. WE THINK A FACTOR APPROXIMATING 85 PER CENT INSTEAD OF 49 PERCENT IS PROPER FOR APPLICATION TO OUR FOLLOW-ON FORCES.

7. TARGET WEIGHTING SYSTEM.

TARGETS MUST BE RANKED TO INSURE CONFORMANCE WITH JCS GUIDANCE. THIS MEANS THAT A TARGET WEIGHTING SYSTEM MUST BE USED. THE JSTPS HAS JUST DISTRIBUTED A TARGET WEIGHTING SYSTEM MANUAL WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS BEING AN INTERNAL JSTPS PROCEDURAL MANUAL. IT IS NOTED THAT POINT VALUES CONTAINED IN THE MANUAL DIFFER FROM THOSE CONTAINED IN THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGET DATA BASE (NSTDB) PUBLISHED 12 OCT 1960 WHICH WAS USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIOP-62. WE ARE REVIEWING THIS MANUAL AND INTEND TO COMMENT ON IT BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT PROCEDURES WILL HAVE ON DEVELOPING SIOP. I WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE REVIEWED THE MANUAL CONCURRENTLY AS IT WAS BEING DEVELOPED.

8. WAR GAMING.

A. I AM PROCEEDING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TWO-SIDED WAR GAME OF THE FRIENDLY FORCES OPERATING IN THE PACOM PRIMARY AREA OF INTEREST. BY THIS MEANS, I PROPOSE TO IDENTIFY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIABLES UNDER MY CONTROL IN PROVIDING MAXIMUM TARGET DAMAGE WITH MINIMUM ATTRITION. OF NECESSITY, MUCH EFFORT WILL BE EXPENDED IN

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO	CIRCUIT NO	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
3580		3		4		182250Z JAN 61

~~TOP SECRET~~

(When filled in)

921118-204

NAVAL MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT NO
	(INFO)			

FURTHER EXPLORING THOSE FACTORS DISCUSSED ABOVE. SUBSEQUENT STUDY OF THE GAMING RESULTS SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY FIX THE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH VARIABLE OF PRIMARY CONCERN.

B. IN THE NEAR FUTURE I PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO THE WASHINGTON AREA AND JSTPS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS, WITH A VIEW TOWARD EXCHANGING IDEAS AND PROCEDURES WHICH MIGHT BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

C. NOTWITHSTANDING MY PLANS TO GAME SIOP-62, FOR THE LONG HAUL I BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL WAR GAMING FACILITY FOR USE BY JCS, JSTPS AS WELL AS THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS IN GAMING THEIR PLANS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH FACILITY COULD BE AN EXTENSION OF PRESENT EQUIPMENTS CURRENTLY USED BY NESC, AND SHOULD BE CLOSE TO WASHINGTON WHERE USE CAN BE MADE OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMPUTERS. FURTHER, THE FACILITY SHOULD CONTAIN SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION TO USERS SPECIFIED ABOVE. THIS SUGGESTION IS MADE IN RECOGNITION OF THE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH DUPLICATIVE WAR GAMING STAFFS. IF A CENTRAL FACILITY WERE ESTABLISHED, MACHINES, PROGRAMMERS, TECHNICIANS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL WOULD SERVE ALL USERS. OPERATIONS ANALYSTS IN STAFFS OF COMMANDERS CONCERNED COULD DETERMINE TYPES OF PROGRAMS AND INPUTS AND UTILIZE CENTRAL FACILITY TO PRODUCE WAR GAME CONCLUSIONS.

9. ORGANIZATION OF JSTPS.

I REALIZE THAT THE JSTPS WAS HASTILY ASSEMBLED AND ORGANIZED LAST AUGUST UNDER THE PRESSURE OF HAVING TO PRODUCE THE NSTL AND SIOP BY DEC 60. AS A CONSEQUENCE, SOME REORGANIZATION AND REALIGNMENT OF BILLETS WITHIN THE JSTPS IS PROBABLY WARRANTED AND DESIRABLE IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE GAINED THUS FAR. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JSTPS TO MAKE AT THIS TIME, THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH I THINK SHOULD APPLY:

A. SINCE JSTPS IS AN AGENCY OF THE JCS, ITS ORGANIZATION AND MANNING SHOULD APPROXIMATE THAT OF A JCS STAFF DIRECTORATE, WITH DUE REGARD TO THE PROBLEM WITH WHICH IT IS CONCERNED AND THE DUTIES FOR WHICH IT IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE JCS AND THE SECDEF.

B. JSTPS PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY OUTSIDE JSTPS.

C. SERVICE REPRESENTATION IN THE JSTPS SHOULD BE EQUITABLE, PARTICULARLY IN KEY BILLET ASSIGNMENT.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE						
CONTROL NO	CIRCUIT NO	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
3580		4		4		182250Z JAN 61

~~TOP SECRET~~

(When filled in)

921118-205

~~TOP SECRET~~ 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 72

J.C.S. 2056/204

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

19 January 1961

Pages 1887 - 1891, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/165

b. J.C.S. 2056/191

c. J.C.S. 2056/194 - 3205 (17 Aug. 59)

Sec 8

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, CSAM 19-61, dated 17 January 1961, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOVIN,

M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat.

26 Mar 82 JCS

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	1
Case No.	92-118-2241
T.S. No.	92-118-2241
Document No.	13

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1887 -

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS AREA DE NO 23034

921118-197

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

CSAM 19-61

17 January 1961

1. Action* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving NSTL/SIOP 62 provides that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning shall recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff areas to be investigated for possible change in developing NSTL/SIOP-62.

2. Pursuant to that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I consider the following areas to require further investigation:

a. Basic Policy Guidance:

(1) Determination of the essential general war task for strategic nuclear delivery forces. The basic objective of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. SIOP-52 reflects an initial strike capability of the forces made available. The task against which this capability has been applied remains to be defined; i.e., no task is stated except that which committed forces can accomplish.

(2) Specific objectives. Preliminary damage assessment reveals that although the general levels [REDACTED] prescribed in the NSTAP have been attained, the targets selected do not provide for full neutralization

* See Decision On J.C.S. 2056/194

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1888 -

Enclosure

921118-198

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of any resource system. Yet it is evident that within the over-all level of damage there is marked redundancy of damage in terms of the end effect on the economic and control system. The selection of more precise objectives should more effectively neutralize the war-making and political potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc at the same or a lesser level of effort.

(3) Damage criteria. The over-all level of damage and population casualties appear to exceed that which is required even though no account is taken of thermal or radiation effects. Damage criteria specified in NSTAP deal only with severe damage. Yet lesser but significant damage may in many cases contribute equally to attainment of the over-all objective.

(4) Assurance at BRL. NSTAP prescribes 75% assurance of delivery at each bomb release line of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL. SIOP-62 provides a variable scale of assurance averaging over [redacted]. The assurance method, compounding the probability associated with individual weapons carriers assigned to a target to attain an assurance that the target is struck, produces an expectancy that a large proportion of targets will be struck with multiple weapons. It is not clear that coupling delivery assurance and damage probability for individual targets is the optimum method by which a realistic and reasonable level of assured damage may be prescribed. Consideration also is needed of the feasibility

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1889 -

Enclosure

921118-199

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ *65*

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 72

J.C.S. 2056/204

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

19 January 1961

Pages 1887 - 1891, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/165

b. J.C.S. 2056/191

c. J.C.S. 2056/194 - 3205 (17 Aug. 59)


Sec 8

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, CSAM 19-61, dated 17 January 1961, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOVIN,

M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat.



OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	<i>8</i>
Case No.	<i>92-107-2241</i>
TS No.	<i>92-75-222</i>
Document No.	<i>13</i>

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1887 -

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS AREA 02 02 23534

921118-177

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

CSAM 19-61

17 January 1961

1. Action* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving NSTL/SIOP 62 provides that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning shall recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff areas to be investigated for possible change in developing NSTL/SIOP-63.

2. Pursuant to that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I consider the following areas to require further investigation:

a. Basic Policy Guidance:

(1) Determination of the essential general war task for strategic nuclear delivery forces. The basic objective of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. SIOP-62 reflects an initial strike capability of the forces made available. The task against which this capability has been applied remains to be defined; i.e., no task is stated except that which committed forces can accomplish.

(2) Specific objectives. Preliminary damage assessment reveals that although the general levels [REDACTED] prescribed in the NSTAP have been attained, the targets selected do not provide for full neutralization

* See Decision On J.C.S. 2056/194

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1888 -

Enclosure

921118-198

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of any resource system. Yet it is evident that within the over-all level of damage there is marked redundancy of damage in terms of the end effect on the economic and control system. The selection of more precise objectives should more effectively neutralize the war-making and political potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc at the same or a lesser level of effort.

(3) Damage criteria. The over-all level of damage and population casualties appear to exceed that which is required even though no account is taken of thermal or radiation effects. Damage criteria specified in NSTAP deal only with severe damage. Yet lesser but significant damage may in many cases contribute equally to attainment of the over-all objective.

(4) Assurance at BRL. NSTAP prescribes 75% assurance of delivery at each bomb release line of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL. SIOP-62 provides a variable scale of assurance averaging over [redacted]. The assurance method, compounding the probability associated with individual weapons carriers assigned to a target to attain an assurance that the target is struck, produces an expectancy that a large proportion of targets will be struck with multiple weapons. It is not clear that coupling delivery assurance and damage probability for individual targets is the optimum method by which a realistic and reasonable level of assured damage may be prescribed. Consideration also is needed of the feasibility

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1889 -

Enclosure

921118-199

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

and desirability of providing the higher levels of assurance which may be necessary through the use of alternate target assignment and reporting or post-strike reconnaissance procedures to guide commitment of follow-on forces.

(5) Initiative/Retaliation. NSTAP* requires the SIOF** to be prepared in consideration of the several ways in which hostilities may be initiated. Yet except for missiles there is no provision for alteration of the target system or target priority between the circumstances of pre-emption and retaliation. Target priorities, particularly for the alert force which may be the only force *not for pre-emption* launched, appear to be optimum for neither circumstance. X

b. Constraints. The SIOF conforms to the prescribed constraints criteria. However, the methodology employed for computation of expected dose of residual radiation from fallout does not consider seasonal wind variations and multiple weapon probability. Further, it has not yet been possible to consider additive effects due to employment of weapons outside the SIOF. The range of probability of adverse effects on other concurrent military operations due to fallout from SIOF and other weapons has not been considered. *on our forces?* Both the method for computation of expected dose and the tolerance levels for the several monitoring points require close review.

c. Organization of the JSTPS. The current organization of the JSTPS reflects the necessity which existed in September 1960 to rely on the experience of SAC headquarters personnel

* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/165
** J.C.S. 2056/191

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/204

- 1890 -

Enclosure

921118-400 200

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

and the existing organization of Headquarters, SAC for preparation of the initial NSTL/SIOP in the limited time available. This necessity no longer exists. The permanent organization of the JSTPS should be that best calculated to fulfill the requirements of the JCS and to this end should provide for equitable representation among the services, particularly at the policy level.

d. Relation of SIOP to Other Planning Documents. Although the SIOP is a significant component of the JCS guidance for commanders, it fails to bear a logical relationship to other primary planning documents, notably JSCP, in the planning cycle. The due date of May 1962 for SIOP-63 provides insufficient time for commanders to incorporate it into their plans prepared in support of JSCP-63. Neither does the May date provide sufficient time for SIOP preparation subsequent to provision of over-all strategic guidance in SIOP-63.

3. I recommend:

a. That the foregoing comments be forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration in the development of the plan of action with respect to the NSTAP.

b. That the Director, Joint Staff prepare, for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a time-phased program for actions in support of NSTL/SIOP-63.

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/204

- 1891 -

Enclosure

921118-10/

~~TOP SECRET~~

#22

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 170

J.C.S. 2056/206

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "B")

26 January 1961

Pages 1897 - 1903, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF JCS NSTL AND SIOP-62 (U)

Reference: J.C.S. 2056/194

3205 (17 Aug 59)
Sec 8


The enclosed memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, serial 00011, dated 19 January 1961, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOUIN,

M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat.

3205 (17 Aug 59)
Sec 8



~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1897 -

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	92-118-2241
Case No.	92-118-2241
T.S. No.	92-118-2241
Document No.	10

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS REGA BA RM 20534
921118-168
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

E N C L O S U R E

THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Ser: 00011/J08

19 January 1961

From: Commander in Chief, Atlantic

To: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: JCS NSTL and SIOP-62, Review of (U)

Ref: (a) JCS Msg 092127Z, JCS 987018 DEC 1960*

1. Reference (a) approved the JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 and requested recommendations from Unified and Specified Commanders relative to future improvement in developing the next Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and National Strategic Target List (NSTL).

2. The JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 were developed on a crash basis. Because of the extremely short time available to the planners at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) it was necessary to utilize certain procedures and methodology which subsequent review has indicated could be improved. The basic guidance to the JSTPS was also developed hurriedly, and can be modified and improved to permit more economical utilization of the committed forces. Specific areas, in which change is recommended, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

3. Establishment of an Essential National Task: Although the basic guidance to the JSTPS stated the specific objectives which were to be achieved, and called for a list of a minimum number of specific targets whose timely and assured destruction would accomplish these objectives, the JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 actually

* Joint Chiefs of Staff message to CINCLANT and other addressees, JCS 987018, DTG 092127Z December 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat
3205 (11 Dec 1960)

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1898 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-169

~~TOP SECRET~~

resulted from a full application of all committed forces. The damage assessment of the probable effect of this very large weight of effort against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, even with the application of very high base loss factors, shows that it is probably greater than that required to achieve the specified objectives. It is recommended that the JCS take the earliest possible steps to establish the Essential National Task which must be accomplished should the national policy of deterrence against general war fail, and to develop a plan to accomplish that specific task.

i.e. asked, What
could you do with
all committed forces
(?)

FS or 2d S?

4. Damage Criteria:

a. The level of damage specified in the JCS guidance essentially requires destruction of all important target elements by blast damage. An exorbitant weight of effort is required to accomplish this. The level of damage required by the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) is much higher than that previously required by JCS guidance. Moderate damage is considered to be sufficient to meet the concept expressed in the NSTAP. It is recommended that the damage criteria be modified that "moderate damage" be substituted for "severe damage" where appearing. Due to lack of tract data, the JSTPS did not follow the guidance to achieve ninety per cent probability of severe damage to fifty per cent of industrial floor space [REDACTED]. Either the guidance should be changed to indicate some other method of achieving the required level of damage [REDACTED] or the tract data should be made available to JSTPS. Total floor space is considered a more meaningful measure of damage [REDACTED]. Therefore, it is recommended that the guidance be modified as follows:

only?

aka (SAC?)

"Ninety per cent probability of moderate damage to fifty per cent of the total floor space [REDACTED]"

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1899 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-170

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. The over-all damage effects of nuclear weapons should be considered. In addition to blast, these weapons have significant thermal and radiation effects which should be considered in the determination of the level of damage actually achieved. The JCS NSTL and SIOP-62 also does not take full advantage of the over-lapping effects of adjacent bursts, but generally treats each desired ground zero (DGZ) in isolation, with a resulting excessively high weight of effort above that needed to neutralize many enemy installations. A change in the damage criteria specified in the NSTAP is recommended to ensure economical use of forces by specifying that all weapons effects be considered, and that over-lapping effects of adjacent bursts be fully examined in the interest of achieving destruction or neutralization with the least practicable weight of effort.

5. Assurance of Delivery at BRL: The basic guidance called for planning for at least seventy-five per cent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the weapons required to achieve the specified damage levels. On most high priority targets an extremely heavy weight of effort is planned in order to ensure the arrival of at least one weapon at the BRL. When the assurance of delivery of at least one weapon is ninety per cent or greater the most likely event is that multiple delivery will in fact be achieved. Clarification of the basic guidance to specify avoidance of excessively high assurance of delivery is recommended.

6. Constraints. It has always been the understanding of CINCLANT that the basic reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribed constraints was to avoid unnecessary damage, radiation fall-out effects and casualties to allies, friendly, and neutral

~~TOP SECRET~~


JCS 2056/206

- 1900 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-171



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

peoples, unless these occurred through unavoidable military necessity. The radiation levels due to fall-out resulting from SIOP attacks were kept within JCS prescribed levels² principally by air bursting weapons which otherwise would have been surface burst. However, the unrealistic assumption was made that only one weapon would be delivered at each DGZ, and "average season" wind template was used in the calculations rather than the "most unfavorable season" template in common use prior to the SIOP planning, and it was assumed that all SIOP forces were in one command. Current JCS guidance specifies that calculations to determine fall-out will assume that each command programming on a given DGZ will deliver one weapon. Two or three Unified or Specified Commands are involved in most DGZ's in SIOP-62. These unusual measures to reduce fall-out levels were taken in a sincere effort to follow JCS guidance, but from a practical, realistic standpoint they cannot be regarded as successful. In a great many cases air bursting instead of surface bursting reduces fall-out but actually increases casualties. An entirely new examination of this problem is recommended to develop a constraint policy and new guidance which are both effective and practical.

7. Evaluation of Target Worth: A point system in use by the Strategic Air Command to list targets in order of priority was utilized for SIOP-62. This system consisted of two separately developed point systems for [REDACTED] (alfa) and [REDACTED] (bravo) installations to make it possible to assign these installations a point value based on their worth or importance. These two sub-systems for point values could not be readily mixed, so the relative importance of installations in the optimum-mix target system under attack in SIOP-62 could not be established except by arbitrary means. In addition, the alfa and bravo points were assigned to installations principally from the point of view of their importance in the SAC mission. Many installations of

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1901 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-172

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

relatively low importance to SAC are of high importance to other commands. There is a need to develop a system for rating installations in the optimum-mix target system in accordance with their importance to all commands.

8. Mathematical Probability Factors: Many factors were utilized to calculate the probabilities of success of the various delivery systems. These factors had to be developed in a very short time. Subsequent careful examination of these factors indicates that many are not entirely valid or could be refined to represent more accurately actual system capabilities. A case in point is the weather factor as applied to visual delivery forces. A review of all such mathematical factors and the manner in which they were applied in SIOP-62 is recommended with an eventual goal of establishing better, jointly agreed factors.

9. Base Loss/Survivability: It was not possible in the time available to develop factors for expected losses due to enemy action. It was generally agreed that without such factors there is considerable doubt as to the probable contribution of follow-on forces. A study by a group such as Net Evaluation Sub-Committee (NESC) or Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) could produce meaningful, realistic factors for expected survivability of the fixed and mobile bases from which the various delivery vehicles are launched. Development of such factors as a matter of priority is recommended.

10. Missile Targeting: The first generation of strategic missiles is employed in SIOP-62, with target assignments for [both a retaliatory and initiative role.] when these missiles, which are all assumed to have [a [redacted] CEP,] are targeted using the specified damage criteria they make a very small apparent contribution. Inordinately large numbers would

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1902 -

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-177

~~TOP SECRET~~

have to be planned against most DGZ's in order to achieve the specified damage levels. At the present time, the available strategic missiles are not well suited for the task of destroying hard point targets. However, if utilized against total floor space [REDACTED] can be very effectively used in their intended role of deterrence/retaliation. The growing inventory of missiles indicates a shift in the principle instrument of deterrence. Appropriate changes in the damage criteria are recommended (paragraph 4a) to permit the optimum use of the available missiles.

11. Flexibility: There are no provisions in SIOP-62 to provide for circumstances that might make it advisable to cease execution of a part of the plan. The provisions for withholding in the [REDACTED] does not conform to previous JCS guidance. Specifically, there are no provisions for withholding attack against [REDACTED] Procedures should be developed for cessation of attack when appropriate.

12. Organization of the JSTPS: It is considered that the current organization of the JSTPS could be substantially improved by making it work as an integrated joint staff. A better SIOP would inevitably result from placing officers from all the services with their varying backgrounds of experience in the many delivery systems in the various key staff positions of importance and influence. At present "two-hatted" officers from the SAC Staff serve concurrently in all the key JSTPS Staff billets as Heads of all Divisions, Branches and Sections. It is clear in the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense of 16 August 1960, which originally set up the JSTPS, that a joint staff was intended. Therefore, earliest steps to make the present JSTPS Staff joint and "single hatted" are recommended.

/s/ FITZHUGH LEE
Acting

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/206

- 1903 -

Enclosure

091118-174

~~TOP SECRET~~

J.C.S. 2056/208

27 January 1961

Pages 1909 - 1921, incl.

35
COPY NO. 33

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION "I")

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/164 ✓
b. J.C.S. 2056/194 ✓

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 20 January 1961, together with its attachments (Appendix, Annex and Tab), is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP as indicated in paragraph 5 of Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

3207

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	21
Case No.	92-118-2241
T.S. No.	10-75-222
Document No.	11

F. J. BLOVIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Burke (CNO)
Gen. White (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (GMC)
Gen. Hamlett (DG/S, OPS)
Adm. Sharp (DONO-P&P)
Gen. Gerhart (DG/S, P&P)
Gen. Wiseman (DG/S-P, MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)

Adm. Wellings (DD/JS)
Gen. Breitweiser (J-2)
Gen. Dean (J-3)
Adm. Ferrall (J-5)
Gen. Campbell (NSC Rep)
Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)
Secys, J-2
Secys, J-3
Secys, J-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

-1909 -

26 Mar 82

921118-175

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS 2224 DA 25 23334

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

But

20 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject : Strategic Target Planning

You will recall that, during the discussions leading to the designation of General Power as the Director of Strategic Target Planning, it became apparent that a National Strategic Target List could only be developed in the final analysis through the intelligence and operational planning and war gaming functions associated with the development of the Single Integrated Operations Plan. My decision* of 16 August 1960, approving the Strategic Target Planning policy, was based on the conviction that the resources to develop and maintain a Single Integrated Operations Plan existed in large measure at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, and not within the Joint Staff. I gave assurance that the views of the Unified Commanders would be considered in the development of the Plan, and in addition to the planning teams provided from the participating Unified Commands, each participating Commander in Chief was authorized a senior personal representative to work with the Director and his staff.

At the Unified Commanders Conference held in Omaha 1-3 *JCS review*
December 1960, I expressed my gratitude for the work of the *(after liberation)*
Director and all others who contributed to the development of the first Plan and discussed other work that must follow. I am

* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/154

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1910 -

Enclosure

921118-176

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

reasonably optimistic that with continued concerted effort, without disrupting the maintenance of the SIOP-62, further actions should be initiated leading to continued refinement of strategic planning for the initial retaliatory strike under various conditions of warning.

Incident to further actions, I would include a detailed study by General Power and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the attached memorandum* for the President from Dr. Kistiakowsky. Further, both General Power and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should re-evaluate the damage criteria used in SIOP-62, specifically, the 50% destruction of industrial floor space.

/s/ THOMAS S. GATES

* Extract in Annex hereto

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1911 -

Enclosure

921118-177

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

A P P E N D I X

Extract from memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense from the Staff Secretary to the President,
dated 12 January 1961.

* * * * *

At the request of the President, the attached report* to him from Dr. Kistiakowsky is forwarded for the information and permanent files of the Department of Defense. A copy is also being placed in the permanent files of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The President anticipated that you and your successor would wish to give this document special handling within your own office and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in view of its references to war plans.

* Extract in Annex hereto

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/208

- 1912 -

Appendix

921118-178

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

A N N E X

Extract from memorandum for the President
from the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960

cut

* * * * *

Carrying out your directive to report to you on the methodology used in the preparation of the Optimized Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), my associates (Dr. H. E. Scoville and Dr. George Rathjens) and I studied the relevant aspects of the activities of the Joint Strategic Plannin. Staff (JSPS), and I have come to the following conclusions:

1. The staff is following the directives received from the JCS which, in turn, are based on your approval of the NSC action following the presentation of "Study 2009" by General Hickey. The JSPS is making effective use of available intelligence information. I believe that the presently developed SIOP is the best that could be expected under the circumstances and that it should be put into effect. *WHY?*

2. I recommend that, an effort be initiated now to review the directive to, and the procedures used by, the JSPS in anticipation of the preparation of subsequent SIOPs for the following reasons:

(a) To achieve operational simplicity, each weapon carrier is now assigned the same target or targets regardless of whether our strike is preventive or retaliatory. This leads to the result that even a retaliatory strike has largely a "counter force" character. For instance, in the optimized target list, the [REDACTED]

X

S-S D-2

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/208

- 1913 -

Annex

921118-179

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] but then follow
in [redacted]

infto airfields

The question may be raised as to whether they need to be given such high priority in a retaliatory strike and be assigned about 5 weapons apiece.

(b) The JSFS used blast effect as the only criterion of damage and neglected thermal radiation, fires which will be caused by it, and fall-out. The question may be raised as to whether the resultant damage criteria are unnecessarily conservative, whether they result in overkill and will create unjustified additional "force requirements."

and have neg value

For example, [redacted] are each considered to require

*generally in S/C
"abandon"
US forces killed*

X [redacted] has 3 desired ground zeros (DGZ), 2 for the alert force strike and the 3rd for the "follow on" force. The highest priority DGZ there has 4 weapons scheduled on it, 3 of them missile warheads. Using DASA damage criteria and the JSFS weapon delivery probabilities (allowing for attrition), we calculate for these 4 weapons the expected percentage of immediate casualties as [redacted]

X [redacted] This figure has been computed using only blast and thermal radiation and not allowing for fires, for fall-out and for direct neutron and gamma radiation. Moreover, DASA criteria which we use are very conservative. For instance, for a 20 kt burst at 1500 feet altitude, DASA handbook gives an immediate casualty radius of 1500 yards. From actual observations in Hiroshima, the lethal radius there, upon the burst of less than a 20 kt weapon, was 2200 yards. ! 50% growth radius!

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/208

- 1914 -

Annex

921118-180

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

In addition to the 4 weapons scheduled on the 1st ground zero [redacted] 3 from the alert force are scheduled on the 2nd one (about 6 miles away) and 1 on the 3rd DGZ from the "follow on" force. Are these additional weapons really necessary, since it would appear that hardly a person [redacted] will survive unscathed the attack, on the first ground zero?

(c) The staff is making extensive use of computers, but I believe that their programming could be improved and that the most competent people (such as available in WSEG, for instance) should become involved. This refinement, the revision of damage criteria, and possibly a re-evaluation of the importance of "counter force" strikes, will become especially important when operational plans are developed for less than our total alert force (the force that may survive a surprise attack by the enemy).

(d) The present SIOFS which are being developed for situations in which we receive longer strategic warning call for the use not only of the alert, but also for the larger "follow on" forces. The damage which is expected to the Sino-Soviet Bloc from the strike of the alert force alone appears to be so extensive that one may question whether the commitment of "follow on" forces to strategic strike is urgently required. If not, the over-all national planning of strategic forces may need revision, with the highest emphasis being given to the survival of the alert force and low emphasis to the use of "follow on" forces.

I attach herewith a summary* of our detailed observations, made on the basis of briefings from the Joint Strategic Planning Staff.

/s/ G. B. KISTIAKOWSKY

* Extract in Tab hereto

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1915 -

Annex

921118-181

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

T A B

Extract from Comments on Briefings by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff, November 3 - 5, 1960.

The JSTP staff is following quite closely the so-called "Study 2009" - General Hickey's presentation to NSC - as regards criteria for the selection of targets and the assessment of damage required. Since that study, in turn, followed rather closely the earlier War Plans of SAC, so-called ALPHA and BRAVO, the emerging SIOP is in these respects a refinement, a combination and expansion of earlier SAC plans, rather than a brand new approach.

ofc. may?

Much of the briefing emphasized the objective character of the plan of procedure and the extensive use of machine calculations. Actually, however, we found so many consecutive steps involving judgment that the so-called point system of military worth of targets and the machine calculations based on it appear to be of very secondary importance. In fact, some of the machine uses may be unsound. So long as the plan is designed for the entire alert force, this has no grave consequences because of the large number of weapons assumed to be available and, therefore, of exceedingly high expected damage to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. However when, subsequently, operational plans based on smaller forces (assumed to survive surprise attack) will be developed, it will be most important to review the entire procedure and introduce more effective use of mathematical procedures, as otherwise the assignment of forces to targets may be inefficient, and less than optimum effect may be calculated for the retaliatory force still available to us; thus "evidence" may be obtained that we have inadequate forces and the attack, if carried out, will not be optimized.

The steps which are involved in the preparation of SIOP are as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1916 -

Tab

921118-182

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The first is to determine the priority order of targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. According to the directive received by the Planning Staff, it is to be the "optimum mix" [REDACTED]

To arrive at this "optimum mix" target list, the JSPS first arranges in order of descending priority, [REDACTED]

In a similar way, but separately, [REDACTED]

In a number of cases the [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/208

- 1917 -


Tab

921118-183


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The next step is to combine the ALPHA and BRAVO target lists into a combined "optimized list" which is done by



The next operation is performed on machines.



as defined

according to the "2009 Study" (that is, 90% probability of severe damage to  and to 50% of industrial floor space). "Severe damage" is calculated on the basis of blast effect alone using Air Force and DASA handbooks on nuclear weapons effects. Each thus optimized DGZ has attached to it a point value, i.e. the worth of targets which will be destroyed as defined above if a weapon of adequate size is exploded at that desired ground zero. The DGZs are then arranged in the order of descending priority, i.e. their point value, the total number being about 1000.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1918 -

Tab

921118-184

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The next step involves the assignment of available forces against the strategic DGZ (target) list. For the alert force are chosen about

The assignment is done by a complex procedure, the logic of which is not wholly clear. It is first assumed that every weapon that will be used in the alert force, has the

[REDACTED]

. This weapon allocation, however, is only preliminary and the machine calculations involved are not very relevant to the end result, in view of the computations that that follow it.


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ 145

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The next step is done largely manually; it involves the determination of the



Thus, two very important aspects of the plan, although they are worked out on the machines, are then redone on the basis of judgment, so that the machine calculations are in effect not used. One of them is how to form the "optimum mix" target list. The other is the decision of how many weapons to assign to a given DGZ.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1920 -

921118-186

Tab

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The attack by our total alert force, after allowing for attrition, low OEP of missiles, etc., is calculated to inflict severe damage, as defined in the directive, to about [REDACTED] in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We have no way of judging whether the attrition to our forces has been estimated conservatively or not. The expected damage certainly has been, because of excessive requirements and the neglect of the effect of fall-out, thermal radiation, induced fires, etc. Naturally, when not only the alert force, but the "follow on" forces are employed, [REDACTED]

A comparison of the present SIOP for the alert force with the plans worked out in the "2009 Study" is informative. The latter

[REDACTED] in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/208

- 1921 -

Tab

921118-187

~~TOP SECRET~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRIORITY	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
(INFO)				

P 052100Z

#24A

FM NAVRESTRACOMD OMAHA NEBR

TO CNO

EXCLUSIVE

ADM RABORN
ADM Hayward
ADM Mustin
Rudolph

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

//TOP SECRET//

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL BURKE FROM VADM PARKER

JSTPS briefings to Mr. Mc Namara on 4 Feb brought forth the following questions and observations.

1. General observations. The Secretary has a good background on probabilities and was penetrating with his questions on probabilities of damage, assurance and overall effectiveness. He asked questions on ratios of force structure versus damage, pursuing it from a statistical approach. He is weak in his knowledge of weapons effects including vulnerability numbers system, delivery tactics and basic knowledge on airburst versus surface burst. It is understood that steps have been taken to rectify this situation shortly after his return to Washington. His overall approach was quite objective and oriented toward future planning rather than current plans which he indicated he probably couldn't do anything about if he wanted to.

2. Subject: Aircraft tankers. Asked several questions concerning delays in the SIOP for the last bombers to rendezvous with third cycle tankers. This led to question on requirement for tankers now under order. Many of them will not be delivered until 1964 and 1965 although required now. He suggested that maybe we would be better off to spend the money on missiles rather than for tankers.

ADM BURKE...ACT
via 942T6(1-6)

942T6 file(1) 00(2-3) 09(4)
sp(5-6)

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
RETURN TO CP-003

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO. <i>Schaler</i>	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
9658/J0/J0/3	CR 009	2		4	0441Z/06 Feb	052100Z Feb 61

DECLASSIFIED

02

(When filled in)

NAVAL MESSAGE ~~TOP SECRET~~ NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
	(INFO)			

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

3. Subject: Missiles. Indicated favorable approach towards increasing missile role in the future. Stated that we should aim to have more missiles in SIOP-63 with such reliability and capability as to permit us to remove our aircraft backup of missile delivered warheads. Stated that we should probably purchase missiles for "reliability testing". Discussed the effect of giving missiles to NATO countries. General Powers answers dealt with the survivability of the missiles and the dependability of the NATO countries to use the missiles if hostilities commenced.

4. Subject: Polaris. Questions started with the role of the FBM on station and he expressed interest in the ability of the Russians to track the FBM or to destroy with hunter/killer subs. Dr. David Stern somewhat belligerent in his statements that the US NY with SOSUS had tracked the George Washington considerable distances and felt the Russians could do the same. This discussion was terminated rather abruptly in that this was not considered the proper atmosphere in which to discuss the entire Polaris program but it is obvious that an early briefing of Mr. Mc Namara and Dr. Stern is in order with answers to questions on communications reliability and detection defense.

5. Subject: Damage and assurance criteria. We went through the exercise of explaining the difference between damage and assurance criteria including the term "expected damage". Believe he now understands the difference. He was quick to see the significance of damage and assurance criteria as they relate to force structure. He also understands the problem of a missile in meeting current damage criteria because of the large CEP and relatively small warhead. Believe he will be most receptive to suggestions on the subject of revising future criteria and realizes the responsibility he has in this regard. He asked questions on the possibility of developing two different plans of attack - one for retaliation purposes and another for preemptive attack, these questions stemming from the optimum mix problem. He eventually seemed to be satisfied with the optimum mix approach. He asked questions on bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, specifically how much would we require under JSTP methods to do the same amount of damage. The answer given was that it would require three 80 KT weapons on DGXS to do the same amount of damage under our criteria but there were many qualifications to this answer. Dr. York pointed out this is equivalent to about one megaton.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
RETURN TO OP 003

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE					
CONTROL NO	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT
9658		2		4	
					DATE TIME GROUP
					052100Z Feb 61

TOP SECRET
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRETIFIED NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
	(INFO)			

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

6. Subject: Organization of JSTPS. No significant questions although he is probably under the impression that there is general agreement with JSTPS in view of the fact that we produced SIOP-62. This belief should be modified to show that SIOP-62 was produced because some good men compromised in the national interest and not because they agreed with all the guidance, procedures, factors and concepts that were employed.

7. Subject: Damage to Sino-Soviet Bloc. Asked piercing questions concerning the number of weapons that would be exploded in Russia, not just on DCXB. Went on into detail on fact that programming four weapons to ensure a high probability of getting one on a DCXB would mean also a very good probability of getting more than one in Russia itself; was most concerned on what the size of this number of weapons might be; stated that he thought that the fallout would be "fantastic". Expressed concern over the amount of damage that was being obtained by SIOP-62 on the soviet industrial worth and thought that probably it should be higher than indicated by our damage assessment. He felt that the casualty figures for Russia and China were probably conservative. Also expressed the usual concern about withholding strikes in the satellite countries, particularly against their urban industrial targets and explored the procedures for ensuring that this could be accomplished.

8. Subject: Force structure. Asked one basic question on how force structure was determined. Then went into the need for a balance of forces and was particularly concerned throughout the day with aircraft/tankers versus missiles. Desired to know and expects to receive a presentation as to whether or not, at least within SAC, we are getting weaker or stronger with the weapons systems we are purchasing for the future as opposed to what we have in the present force. Stated that one of the firm conclusions of the day is we must strive to get a larger proportion of the SIOP force into the alert force. Even talked of retiring B-47s to get more money to operate the B-52s in an alert status. This led to lengthy discussion on airborne alert and he will receive, from SAC, an extensive briefing on this subject. He asked questions of why we didn't go to airborne alert no, what prevented it, and when was the proper time to go. He brought up the overflight of Canada problems AIW indicated that there was a possibility that overflights were in jeopardy. Was most interested in what effects this would have on the airborne alert flights if they were put into effect. Answers by General

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
RETURN TO OP-003

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO.	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
9658		3		4		052100Z Feb 61

TOP SECRETIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
(When filled in)

NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
	(INFO)	DEC	DEC	

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

Power on the subject of airborne alert indicated that we could have an eighth of the SAC force ready by 1 May and that with additional crews he could be ready to go with one quarter of the force by January 62, all of this providing he got enough gasoline money to do the necessary training. Mr. McNamara was concerned that we have enough force surviving after the attack on the US to at least destroy the urban industrial targets of the SINO-SOVIET bloc. He seemed to be receptive to the idea of going after urban industrial rather than military targets under the conditions under which we will probably fight the war.

9. Subject: General Comments. SAC taking this opportunity for big pitch. Briefings on 5 Feb will be SAC specifically and have no members of other services attending. It is obvious that they will be highly centered on intelligence and the SAC capability in this regard, with more emphasis on airborne alert. There was usual concern over base loss, now called the FBL factor (destroyed before launch). Also there was concern expressed over the enemy ICBM and FBM threats to the US with specific questions on how many enemy missiles could affect our bases. One speculation was made that the Soviet FBM's alone could destroy 60% of SAC bases.

10. Subject: Recommendations:

- (1) That briefings on Polaris be given at an early date and
- (2) that damage and assurance criteria be stressed to influence guidance for SIOP-63.
- (3) That the survivability of Naval weapons systems be stressed as the answer to much of the Soviet threat to our own US strength.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
RETURN TO OP 003

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE

CONTROL NO 9658	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE 4	OF 4	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP 052100Z Feb 1961
--------------------	-------------	-----------	---------	-------	-----------------	-------------------------------------

TOP SECRET

(When filled in)

#24 B

~~SECRET~~

6 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Visit to JSTPS, 4 February 1961

1. The following Department of Defense personnel were briefed by JSTPS on Saturday, 4 February 1961:

Mr. McNamara
Mr. Gilpatrick
General Lemnitzer
Dr. York
Dr. Stern
B/General Seawell
B/General Brown

At the request of General Lemnitzer, the number of personnel in the audience was held to the minimum. The personnel in attendance were 12 in all, consisting of:

General Thomas S. Power
Lt General Griswold
Vice Admiral Parker
Major General Blanchard
Major General Wheless
Major General Eisenhower
Brig General Spivy
Brig General Smith ?
Col Crumm
Col Hines
Col Philpott
Capt Miller ?

See DECLASSIFICATION
STATE - ^{MENT} PAGE 4

Briefing officers were present only for that portion of time they were actively briefing.

2. The briefing commenced at 0945 and was completed at 1935, CST. During this time many questions were asked by the visitors. An effort has been made to indicate below the general context of the questions as well as the answers given to the questions.

Q - McNamara - What kind of a target list did you have prior to the inception of the DSTP. Is the weight of effort essentially the same as that which was available when individual commands prepared their own plan?

A - It was pointed out that it would be very difficult to compare the target list, inasmuch as individual commands compiled their own

~~SECRET~~

Pg 174

1 copy
352 E
for file
11/29/93

~~SECRET~~

from the basic intelligence sources available. With regard to the weight of effort, it is not possible to answer this directly at this time inasmuch as a comparison of this nature has not been compiled.

Q - McNamara - Was the consideration of a Strategic Command discussed within the basic 18 questions?

A - Yes.

Q - McNamara - Are there still two target lists?

A - No, there is one target list which will be discussed in detail at a later time.

Q - McNamara - What is the affect on force composition of changing of assurance or probability from that which was received in the Directive.

A - The greatest affect on forces is realized by changing the degree of damage rather than the percentage of probability and by changing the amount of assurance desired at the BRL.

A - Dr. York - If 90% ground probability of severe damage was changed to 70%, only about 1/2 the force would be required. If it was raised to 99% twice the force would be necessary.

Q - McNamara - Is ^{he}shock, resulting from detonation of nuclear weapons, considered in the determination of specific VN's (target toughness) for a given target.

A - No.

Q - McNamara - Recognizing that the DBL isn't considered and assuming that 4 weapon systems are programmed for attack against a specific DGZ, how many of the four weapons could we expect to fall in the USSR?

(Note: Considerable discussion ensued with regard to this probability; no specific answer was given. However, the impression was left with Mr. McNamara that in this case "it would probably be about two of the four weapons."

Q - McNamara - If part of the force is lost and only alert aircraft get off, what number or percentage of the Urban/Industrial areas on the target list would be under attack?

(Note: This question was left unanswered. If it had been answered, the answer should have been --- of the 151 Urban/Industrial targets, approximately 130 are brought under attack by the alert force.

~~SECRET~~

Pg 274

~~SECRET~~

Q - McNamara - When do we put up airborne alert?

(Note: A period of discussion followed and General Lemnitzer stated we could put up airborne alert as required by the world situation. The impression was that at such time as a period of tension is reached an airborne alert could be placed in the air.

Mr. McNamara and General Power both agreed that probably this would be the one time when it would not be possible to place the airborne alert force in the air. Mr. McNamara said he thought this would be considered a provocative act on the part of the U. S. Further discussion ensued with regard to the requirement for achieving 1/16 capability as soon as possible and ultimately going to 1/4 of the SAC B-52 force. It was pointed out that the support and logistical requirements for placing 1/8 of the B-52s on airborne alert will be available and on the shelves by 1 April - 1 May 1961.

Q - McNamara - Where did the two hour period come from in defining alert forces for carriers and submarines?

A - The two hour figure for carriers and submarines was an arbitrary time period recommended to the Policy Committee in order to get on with the planning of the alert forces. The rationale involved, it was pointed out, does have a connotation of relative survivability. However, the period was purely arbitrary and was selected for a planning basis only.

Q - McNamara - With regard to constraints, how do we control fallout and stay within the JCS constraint policy?

A - By going to smaller weapons and by changing from surface to air bursts. It was pointed out that this causes the use of tactics which will be less than optimum.

Q - McNamara - Recognizing that SAC has requested a specific number of KC-135 Squadrons by 1964 and realizing that there will probably be a slippage in this program, could the tankers effectively be utilized if they were not available in 1965.

A - No direct answer, however, much discussion.

Q - McNamara - It would seem that 2 target lists would be necessary - one for an initiative type situation and one for retaliation.

A - As the alert force grows and gets large enough it is possible to expand its targets from just the military and government controls. An optimum-mix system becomes possible when the alert force is large enough.

~~SECRET~~

Pg 374

?
always,
130 U-I

~~SECRET~~

Q - McNamara - Have you applied your procedures to Hiroshima?

A - Smith - Yes. 3 DGZs of 80 KT each.

Q - McNamara - If 4000 planes are sent at 1000 targets with 93% assurance, how many weapons would go off?

A - York - About 2 1/2 per DGZ.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6000

Reply To:
J5


20 DEC 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: J035

Subject: FOIA Request (93-24) - Briefings on SIOP-62

1. Reference is made to the attached FOIA request (93-24) (Encl B).

2. Review of the responsive record to this request has been accomplished by knowledgeable personnel. Although the overall classification of this document is SECRET, the determination has been made that this data may now be declassified. The document will be declassified by this office as the OCA for this information and released in its entirety.


ROBERT E. LINHARD
Major General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

~~SECRET~~

Page 4 of 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

16
112

~~TOP SECRET~~

#25

COPY NO. 74

JCS 2056/220

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION B

11 February 1961

Pages 1955 - 1958, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND
RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

- References: a. JCS 2056/165
b. JCS 2056/194 — 3205 (17 Aug 59) ✓
c. JCS 2101/339 — 3071 (59)

The enclosed memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, serial 0003B1961, dated 8 February 1961, is referred to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in Paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to JCS 2056/194.

3205-1
2056/194

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

26 Mar 62

by JCS

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	2
Case No.	2241
T.S. No.	22-75-230
Document No.	9

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/220

- 1955 -

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
JCS 2056/194

921118-64

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

0003B1961

8 February 1961

1. JCS 2056/194 contains Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and invites continued review directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. Recommendations were requested from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning.

2. The Commandant of the Marine Corps considers that the following area requires further investigation and possible action:

a. Flexibility

BNSP? yes
(1) NSC 5904/1* provides policy guidance for the United States in the event of war. Section A of this document indicates one of the objectives in the event of general war to be the reduction of "the capabilities of the [USSR and Communist China] to the point where they have lost their will and ability to wage war against the United States and its allies". However, another objective stresses restraint by stating, "So far as consistent with the above objectives to avoid destruction and casualties in all countries not

* Enclosure to JCS 2101/339

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/220

- 1956 -

Enclosure

921118-165
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

involvement
involved in the war." Paragraph 7 of this section, which is footnoted to indicate the paragraph to be the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the objectives, provides that "The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR -- and as necessary in Communist China, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -- to attain the above objectives. [REDACTED]

the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary.

(NOTE: It is assumed that the peoples of the Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.)"

*Now about
SU & C*

X (2) In spite of these provisions for flexibility in NSC 5904/1,* the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy,** which is referenced in the original terms of reference for General Power,*** makes no such distinction among the USSR, Communist China [REDACTED] and apparently dictates that the NSTL/SIOP provide for the attack of a single list of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets.]

(3) It is noted that a certain amount of flexibility has been written into JCS SIOP-62. The Procedures for Execution provide for the withholding of "strikes scheduled against Sino-Soviet Bloc countries as required" except that strikes against certain defensive targets in the Bloc countries "are not subject to being withheld unless directed by JCS prior to E-Hour". It is apparent, however, that no

* Enclosure to J.S 2101/339
** Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165
*** Enclosure "C" to JCS 2056/165

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/220

- 1957 -

Enclosure

921118-166

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

X provision is made for withholding strikes [redacted]
[redacted] nor for a routine withholding of strikes against
defensive targets [redacted]

(4) It is believed that greater flexibility should be
provided within the NSTL/SIOP, and that such flexibility
could be provided within the framework of NSC 5904/1.
Specifically, precise provisions should be made for a
routine withholding of strikes against targets in the
[redacted]

Such additional flexibility could be in
consonance with NSC 5904/1, since the SIOP would still
contain alternatives for the attack of targets throughout
the Sino-Soviet Bloc to achieve the maximum national
objectives, if required.

3. It is recommended that the Joint Staff be directed to
examine our National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy in
connection with NSC 5904/1* to determine how the NSTL/SIOP may
be revised to provide for the desired flexibility, and what
revision of the NSTAP is required.

4. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be for-
warded to commanders of unified and specified commands.

5. In consonance with the provisions of JCS Memorandum of
Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT
be forwarded to U.S. officers in NATO activities.

* Enclosure to JCS 2101/339

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/220

- 1958 -

Enclosure

921118-167

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
COPY

JCS 2056/230

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION I

53

17 March 1961

Pages 2020 - 2024, incl.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING (U)

Reference: JCS 2056/208-3205 (17 Aug 59), sec 9

CSAFM 85-61

16 March 1961

1. I have reviewed the extract* from the memorandum for the President from the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960, in which Dr. Kistiakowsky reported to the President on the methodology employed in the preparation of the MSTL and SIOP.

2. In view of Dr. Kistiakowsky's position at the time of authorship, his comments could have significant impact on strategic planning. It would appear that they merit special attention in that they were brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense at the request of the President.

3. I have recommended that Dr. Kistiakowsky's memorandum be forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for detailed study insofar as it relates to SIOP. Such action would respond to the expressed** wishes of the Secretary of Defense, and would assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their own study of the memorandum.

4. Insofar as it relates to Study 2009, I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should comment directly to the Secretary of Defense. In this connection there are statements in

* Annex to JCS 2056/208
** Enclosure to JCS 2056/208

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Burke (CNO)
Gen. White (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)
Gen. Hamlett (DC/S, OPS)
Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&F)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S, P&F)
Gen. Wieseman (DC/S-P, MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JS)

Adm. Wellings (DD/JS)
Gen. Breitweiser (J-2)
Gen. Dean (J-3)
Adm. Ferrail (J-5)
Gen. Campbell (NSC Rep)
Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)
Secys, J-2
Secys, J-3
Secys, J-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/230

2020

~~TOP SECRET~~

001118-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
COPY

JCS 2056/230

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION I

52

17 March 1961

Pages 2020 - 2024, incl.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING (U)

Reference: JCS 2056/208-3205 (17 Aug 59) sec 9

USAFM 85-61

16 March 1961

1. I have reviewed the extract* from the memorandum for the President from the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960, in which Dr. Kistiakowsky reported to the President on the methodology employed in the preparation of the LSTL and SIOP.

2. In view of Dr. Kistiakowsky's position at the time of authorship, his comments could have significant impact on strategic planning. It would appear that they merit special attention in that they were brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense at the request of the President.

3. I have recommended that Dr. Kistiakowsky's memorandum be forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for detailed study insofar as it relates to SIOP. Such action would respond to the expressed** wishes of the Secretary of Defense, and would assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their own study of the memorandum.

4. Insofar as it relates to Study 2009, I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should comment directly to the Secretary of Defense. In this connection there are statements in

* Annex to JCS 2056/208
** Enclosure to JCS 2056/208

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (C/JCS)
Gen. Decker (CSA)
Adm. Burke (CNO)
Gen. White (CSAF)
Gen. Shoup (CMC)
Gen. Hamlett (DC/S, OPS)
Adm. Sharp (DCNO-P&F)
Gen. Gerhart (DC/S, P&F)
Gen. Wieseman (DC/S-P, MC)
Gen. Wheeler (D/JCS)

Adm. Wellings (DD/JS)
Gen. Breitweiser (J-2)
Gen. Dean (J-3)
Adm. Ferrall (J-5)
Gen. Campbell (NSC Rep)
Adm. Blouin (S/JCS)
Col. Ingelido (DS/JCS)
Secys, J-2
Secys, J-3
Secys, J-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/230

2020

~~TOP SECRET~~

001112-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

the report with regard to Study 2009 which are not substantiated ' 1
in that Study. I consider that these should be brought to the 2
attention of the Secretary of Defense. 3

5. In the Enclosure hereto is a draft memorandum for the 4
Secretary of Defense which advises him of our action in response 5
to his request,* and points out discrepancies in the report 6
with regard to Study 2009. 7

6. It is recommended that: 8

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded to the 9
Secretary of Defense. 10

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of 11
unified or specified commands. 12

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers in NATO 13
activities. 14

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US 15
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 16

* Enclosure to JCS 2056/208

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2056/230

2021

~~TOP SECRET~~

921118-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Strategic Target Planning (U)

1. On 20 January 1961, the Secretary of Defense forwarded 1
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum from the then Special 2
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. 3
Kistiakowsky. This memorandum comprised a report to the Presi- 4
dent on the methodology employed in the preparation of the 5
National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and Single Integrated 6
Operational Plan (SIOP). It was the suggestion of Mr. Gates 7
that the report be studied, both by the Director of Strategic 8
Target Planning and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 9

2. In compliance with the desires of the former Secretary 10
of Defense, and in order to facilitate their own assessment 11
of the Kistiakowsky report as it relates to SIOP, the Joint 12
Chiefs of Staff are forwarding the report to the Director of 13
Strategic Target Planning for comment. You will be advised 14
if further action is indicated. 15

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the references 16
to Study 2009 in the report are misleading. In order to 17
preclude misunderstanding regarding comparison between SIOP-62 18
and Study 2009, the following comments are pertinent: 19

a. The report states: "A comparison of the present SIOP 20
for the alert force with the plans worked out in the '2009 21
Study' is informative. The latter used [REDACTED] 22
[REDACTED] 23
[REDACTED] in the USSR. The SIOP for the 24
alert force alone uses some [REDACTED] 25
[REDACTED] 26
[REDACTED] in the Sino-Soviet Bloc." 27
[REDACTED] 28

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/230

2022

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

021118-73

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Actually, Study 2009 reflects considerably more than [REDACTED] in the alert force. Study 2009 considers weapon and force requirements for each of a number of situations and assumptions, such as using aircraft only, missiles only, combinations of the two, 75% assurance of weapon delivery, 90% assurance, and various conditions of warning or alert. For example, in the case of an alert force consisting of aircraft only [REDACTED], and assuming 75% assurance of delivery, the number of weapons in the alert force as reflected in the Study 2009 is [REDACTED]. This very closely approximates the [REDACTED] in the initial SIOP-62 alert force. This has been confirmed by a recent comparison of Study 2009 and SIOP alert forces, conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

c. As quoted above, the report states that Study 2009 used these alert weapons against [REDACTED]. Actually, the figure [REDACTED]

d. The "Estimate of Damage" reflected in Study 2009 shows that [REDACTED] of the USSR, rather than [REDACTED] respectively, as shown above in the quote from the Kistiakowsky report. Of more importance, even the lower figures in the Study 2009 were based on the admittedly unrealistic assumption that 100% of the weapons programmed for each DGZ would arrive at the bomb release line. In view of this the figures were qualified in Study 2009 as follows: "The expected damage would be somewhat less depending on the programmed assurance of delivering a weapon to each bomb release line."

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/230

2023

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

001118-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Since the Essential National Task defined by the 1
National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy includes the 2
requirement to attain damage levels as specified in Study 2009, 3
that Study is a criterion for formulation of the NSTL/SIOP. 4
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the comments of 5
Dr. Kistiakowsky are misleading, as illustrated above, in 6
that they imply that SIOP-62 is not in conformance with Study 7
2009. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that SIOP-62 8
does conform to this criterion and that Dr. Kistiakowsky's 9
report is erroneous in this respect. 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2056/230

2024

Enclosure

921118 JS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 921178

MR/lt

10/16/85

~~TOP SECRET~~ 55

24 March 1961

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS on a Memorandum by the COFS USAF to be considered at the JCS meeting, 27 March 1961

Subject: JCS 2056/230 - Strategic Target Planning (U)

Background - On 20 Jan 61 - TAB B - SECDEF (Mr. Gates) forwarded to the Chairman, JCS a memo on Strategic Target Planning which expressed the view that incident to further actions to improve such planning there should be included a detailed study by the DSTP and the JCS of an attached memo for the President from Dr. Kistiakowsky

- On 25 Nov 60 - TAB B - Dr. Kistiakowsky reported to the President the results of a study of the methodology used in preparation of NSTL/SIOP-62. The report concluded that the JSTPS was following JCS directives and that the SIOP was the best possible under the circumstances. Included was recommendation that directive to and procedures used by the DSTP be reviewed toward improving subsequent SIOPs. Also included was a summary of detailed observations covering methodology. In the final paragraph there was made a comparison of SIOP-62 alert force weapons and targets with similar data for Study 2009.

- On 9 Mar 61 - TAB C - the COFS USAF recommended that the DSTP be afforded opportunity to respond to the Dr. Kistiakowsky comments cited above. On 24 March, the JCS acted to send the Kistiakowsky memo to the DSTP for comment.

Current Paper - TAB A - Contains a memo for the SECDEF which points out errors in the comparison of SIOP-62 and Study 2009 statistics made by Dr. Kistiakowsky in the final paragraph of his report to the President. Included is the statement that the JCS consider that Dr. Kistiakowsky's comments are misleading, in that they imply that SIOP-62 is not in conformance with Study 2009, whereas in fact SIOP-62 does conform with that criterion for the NSTL/SIOP which is expressed in terms of Study 2009.

Service Comments - Army, Navy and Marine Corps are expected to recommend deferral of consideration of any such memo to the SECDEF as proposed by the Air Force until receipt of and consideration by the JCS of the DSTP comments on the entire Kistiakowsky memo.

Comment and Recommendation - The statistical comparison of SIOP-62 and Study 2009 made by Dr. Kistiakowsky in his report is in error, as pointed out by the Air Force. However, the error is minor and not likely to disturb the SECDEF. Nor will a report of correction at this time serve any great purpose.

- The prime thrust of the Kistiakowsky report is directed at methodology of preparation of the plan - a matter of importance far greater than the statistical comparison highlighted by the Air Force. The J-3 Report now in buff provides for a DSTP study of methodology, including the points made by Kistiakowsky. At time of review of that report the JCS appropriately would consider the merits of reporting to the SECDEF the action taken on the Kistiakowsky report.

- The Employment Branch, Atomic Ops Div, recommends that the Chairman, JCS support the Army, Navy and Marine Corps position that consideration of sending any such memo to the SECDEF as is proposed by the Air Force be deferred until receipt of and consideration by the JCS of the DSTP comments on the entire Kistiakowsky report.

Approved by J. C. M. Director, J-3

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Capt G. E. Nelson, USN
Employment Branch
Atomic Ops Div, J-3
Extension 53031

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 Mar 82

by JCS

71-20-22 101-24-22 101-24-22

Copy No. 101-24-22
Case No. 92-75-2241
TS No. 92-75-2241
Doc No. 9

file #2 NSTL/SIOP message
DECLASSIFIED Other than Exclusion

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

AF IN : 36553 (29 Apr 61) PR/pr

ACTION: JCS (4-38) ADDED DIST: ARMY (39-53), CNO (54-73), CMC (74-81),
XPD (82-85), XDC (86), ODC (87),
OOP (88), OOP-CF (89), CIN(90-91)

FROM : JCSLG OFFUTT AFB NEBRASKA

TO : JCS WASHINGTON, D.C.

NR : 61-27

JCS MONITOR

282318Z Apr 61

For Director Joint Staff and info J-3. This the 34th Weekly Activity Report. This msg in 1 part.

PART I. JSTPS Activity:

(A) The 30th Policy Committee meeting was held on 25 April. Minutes of this meeting will be forwarded when available. The NSTL Division gave a presentation on assurance of delivery in regard to amendment number 1. It was pointed out that contributing reasons for the amendment were force changes (SAC and SACEUR), intelligence changes (updating and January conference), and concept of employment (SAC 50 per cent alert). Guidelines for determining assurance of delivery of the LHE SIOP-62 original plan were reviewed and examined for possible changes in preparing amendment number 1. In amendment number 1 it was shown that there will be less than one percent change in the total number of DGZ's. The SIOP-62 original plan was based on about 3200 weapons. This figure in amendment number 1 will be approximately 3240 weapons. Consequently, the NSTL sees no appreciable change in the ration of weapons to DGZ's. There is essentially no change caused by recategorization or shift in relative worth. In the ALPHA list, while the points are different, the point spread is comparable. In handling the changes caused by the increased ground alert force, the NSTL proposes to follow the same procedure as in the original plan. They will cover the whole spectrum, with emphasis on the top DGZ's, and optimize for weight versus worth. It is estimated that amendment number 1 for the alert force application will have an average overall assurance of 80 percent for 684 objective DGZ's plus 41 defenses for 725 total alert force DGZ's. The recommendation of the NSTL was:

- (1) Approve proposed assurance for the alert force.
- (2) Recognize the proposal as being within current guide-

lines.

The policy committee agreed with the recommendation with the exception

Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

59

AFHQ FORM 0-309
22 JUN 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED

COPY NO.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

page 2 of

AF IN : 36553 (29 Apr 61) STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

NR : 61-27 fr JCSIG OFFUTT AFB NEBRASKA

(CONT'D)

that the CINCLANT representative maintained for the record the position he had taken in the original laydown of the plan, that 97 percent assurance is too high and that 90 percent should be the maximum figure. This is not registered as a formal dissent. The CINCPAC representative did not object. But stated that he could not indicate complete concurrence until he could check with CINCPAC, who had evidenced considerable interest in assurance figures. For the purpose of proceedings with the work on the amendment, the recommendation can be considered approved. A second presentation concerned the optimum-mix DGZ list and how it is served. It was pointed out that it consists of an ALPHA list, a separate BRAVO list, the identification of co-located installations as either ALPHA or BRAVO, and the manual merging of the two lists to form the single DGZ list. After the list was manually merged, the CINC representatives coordination was sought, and the list shapes up as follows:

- (1) For the alert force 684 ALPHA and BRAVO merged, 20 ALPHA defenses, 21 pure defenses, for a total of 725 DGZ's using 1706 weapons.
- (2) For the total force 953 ALPHA and BRAVO mixed, 82 other BRAVO DGZ's, and 25 pure defenses, for a total of 1060 DGZ's. (1035 without defenses).

(B) A volume of minor changes has made it more efficient to revise certain documents at the present time than to make extensive pen and ink changes. A decision has been reached to revise appendix I to Annex C by the week of 8 May, but to make no changes to or revise appendix II to that annex at this time. Appendix II is useful only in planning and analysis, ACD amendment number 1 will result in a completely new set of documents not later than 1 July.

(C) On 27 April the DSTP signed and sent to the JCS his proposed JTD, which is his 9 January submission revised to incorporate guidance received from the JCS on 22 March.

BT

This JTD now being worked on by Joint Staff services. Probably up for consideration about 10 June. V. Kelly

NOTE : Advance copy delivered to JCS
Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

COPY NO.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

AFHQ FORM 0-309

22 JUN 66

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED

~~TOP SECRET~~

882767

HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:

BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION OF SIOP-62

HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Copy 2A

~~TOP SECRET~~

Doc 1

Preface

This document is the initial installment in the continued History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. It is concerned first with the development of problems in strategic target planning during the 1950s and the evolution of plans for the integration of the activities of the various commands into one plan; second with the organization of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Headquarters SAC; and third with the preparation of the first Single Integrated Operational Plan. In the preparation of this history the historian did research in JSTPS files at Headquarters SAC and in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Documents indicated as exhibits (Ex) are on file in the History & Research Division, Directorate of Information, Headquarters SAC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background.	1
The Search for More Effective Coordination.	5
Organization.	11
Preparation of SIOP-62.	18
Summary	28
Footnotes	30

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Background

Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates' decision of 16 August 1960 to establish a joint staff at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) under the direction of Commander in Chief, SAC, brought together for the first time all elements of the armed services with a strategic nuclear capability into one integrated operational plan.¹ Secretary Gates considered the decision the most important he had made in seven years in the Pentagon.² Perhaps the magnitude of this action can be better appreciated after a review of the history of planning and coordination activities for the strategic nuclear offensive between 1952 and 1960. (U)

Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, SAC had a virtual monopoly on the means of delivering atomic weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drew SAC forces under its direct operational control in 1946 and strengthened these bonds in subsequent years by preventing usurpation of control of SAC forces by theater commanders.³ Therefore, during these years no coordination problems existed in planning and executing the atomic offensive, but by the early 1950s the situation was changing because of a proliferation of weapons and delivery vehicles. (S)

The United States Navy announced in 1952 that all of its new attack planes were capable of carrying tactical atomic bombs, and that it had on hand aircraft capable of delivering large bombs. Newly

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

2

activated tactical units in Europe and the Far East also became able to deliver small weapons. Indeed, the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, announced that "nearly all" USAF combat aircraft were being modified to carry them.⁴ The time was also rapidly approaching when the Soviet Union would become a major atomic power. It exploded an atomic device in 1949, and a year later USAF credited Russia with already having a "formidable long range air force" which by 1952 could cover all of the United States.⁵ (U)

To meet this increased Soviet threat the JCS acted to gain more direct control of the nation's expanding atomic force. In March 1952 an ad hoc committee of that group examined existing procedures for control and coordination of atomic operations and recommended centralizing them for maximum bombing effect and minimum interference between forces. The JCS agreed and established facilities for lateral coordination of planning called Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) in Europe and the Far East.* They were war room facilities for receipt, compilation, display, review, coordination, and relay of information concerning the plans and operations of atomic forces for the benefit of the unified and specified commanders concerned and the JCS.**⁶ This was operational coordination, that is, it took place after hostilities began. (S)

* Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom, and Pershing Heights, Tokyo, Japan.

** In Europe, Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), Commander in Chief United States Forces Europe (CINCEur), and Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), and in the Far East, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINOPac), Commander in Chief Alaska (CINCAL), and CINCSAC.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

UNCLASSIFIED

Early exercises of the Joint Coordination Centers disclosed a requirement for pre-hostilities coordination of commanders' atomic plans. Accordingly, in 1954, the JCS asked each appropriate commander to submit an atomic annex, i.e., a target list, to his war plan and to coordinate it with theater commanders and CINCSAC. In 1955 SAC was directed to act as host for a conference of appropriate commanders to determine a methodology or "modus operandi" for defeat of communist air power. This conference failed to agree on anything except the requirement for periodic coordination of atomic war plans. With JCS approval these conclaves became known as World-Wide Coordination Conferences (WWCC). They were held each subsequent year through 1958. Plans coordinated at these conferences and approved by the JCS were prepositioned with the Joint Coordination Centers for operational coordination required by an exercise or the initiation of hostilities. The total coordination activity pre- and post-hostility, was known as the atomic coordination machinery.⁷

~~(TS)~~

How successful was this machinery? The magnitude of the problem probably can be appreciated best by recalling the complex problems of generation, launch, mutual support, and maximum bombing involved in preparing a single command's strike plan. These factors were manageable because the work went on within the framework of a common doctrine. When coordination between commands with different concepts, doctrines, traditions, and techniques was attempted, the problems became formidable. On the positive side, world-wide conferences did enable commanders

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

UNCLASSIFIED

to appreciate more fully each others capabilities, tasks, objectives, and plans. Target lists, forces, and strike timing were discussed and compared. Some conflicts were avoided. Yet the defects of the program were clearly more evident than its successes, at least to SAC. The conferences did not solve targeting conflicts; for example, in the 1957 and 1958 meetings duplications and triplications (two or more commands delivering weapons to the same target) were not significantly reduced. Neither did they achieve mutual support or unity of strategic effort among the JCS commanders. At the JCCs, operational coordination procedures depended upon a highly sophisticated communications system. During peacetime exercises the communications time lag between sending and receipt of messages tended to increase causing a backlog; under combat conditions the system's efficiency would be greatly reduced. In each of the exercises of the JCC machinery from 1958 through 1960 over 200 time over target (TOT) conflicts highlighted the degree of conflict in existing execution plans. In wartime, with disrupted communications, this could result in needless loss of aircraft and crews. A comparison of target lists and some conflict resolution were the net gains in four years of coordination effort.⁸ General N. F. Twining, Chairman of the JCS, believed one fundamental principle had evolved from these coordination activities: ". . . atomic operations must be pre-planned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance on post-H-Hour communications."⁹ (PS)

WWS

Single Target List?

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

UNCLASSIFIED

The Search for More Effective Coordination

of 58
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), passed ✓
by Congress on 23 July 1958, seemed to open new vistas for better coordination of the strategic offensive. President Eisenhower, in outlining his plan to the Congress, emphasized ". . . the vital necessity of complete unity in our strategic planning and basic operational direction."¹⁰ It was necessary that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have the authority to take action in these matters. The Air Force, traditionally in favor of integration along functional lines, supported the President's program, as did the Army.¹¹ The Navy was less enthusiastic.¹² (U)

Armed with increased authority over the development and operation of new weapon systems given him by the reorganization act,¹³ the Secretary of Defense, then Neil McElroy, examined plans for the new Fleet Ballistic Missile or Polaris, then in development. In December 1958 he asked the Joint Chiefs for their views on the future employment of the system.¹⁴ (U)

As spokesman for the Air Force, General Thomas D. White advocated ✓
creation of a unified US Strategic Command, to encompass subordinate units from the Air Force (heavy and medium bombers and intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles) and the Navy Polaris. With approval of the JCS, the CINCSAC would develop the organization so it could be functional by the time Polaris became operational. Strategic

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Air Command personnel would be integrated with those of the participating services and assigned to the new headquarters. General White believed a unified strategic command provided the organizational structure best suited for developing maximum effective atomic offensive plans.¹⁵ (PS)

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were in general opposition to the Air Force plan. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, objected to integrating all strategic weapon systems into a single command and recommended rejection of the Air Force position.¹⁶ The Navy had earlier asked that Polaris be assigned to Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) and eventually to United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEur) and Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPac).¹⁷ Admiral Burke saw little need for change: in his opinion coordination had been working well since the 1958 Reorganization Act and integration of Polaris into the fleet would pose no targeting problems. Assignment of all weapon systems to a single command, on the other hand, ". . . would disrupt and alter the U.S. defense organization."¹⁸ Authority already existed in the JCS to prevent undesirable duplications in strategic targeting, planning, and weapons employment and the CNO believed it should remain there.¹⁹ The Army generally agreed with the Navy, but it believed the entire investigation was premature. It would assign Polaris to the fleet and examine its command structure later when it had become a proven system.²⁰ The Marine Corps favored making the JCS responsible for selection of targets, after which the unified commanders would

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

assign them to attack forces. It feared assignment of targets to one commander would create a "monolithic" structure to control aircraft and land and fleet missiles which would have great coordination problems and be vulnerable if communications were destroyed.²¹ (TS)

As a result of this disagreement, a split decision paper was presented to the SecDef.²² Although General White reported Mr. McElroy did not believe a decision on command arrangements was urgent because the system would not become operational until late in 1960,²³ there was no doubt that the Secretary intended to press for improvement of target coordination procedures. In late July, following an EWO briefing at Headquarters SAC for the SecDef and members of the JCS, he requested the Chairman present his views on this problem.²⁴ (TS)

In his reply, General Twining reviewed the history of coordination to date and concluded ". . . not much more progress can be achieved under the present arrangements" ²⁵ He rejected modifications to the existing machinery, advocating instead "fundamental changes" to the system. The problem divided into three categories: (1) targeting policy, (2) development of integrated operational plans, and (3) control of strike forces. Regarding the first, he inclined toward the Air Force counter force philosophy, believing the target system should include (in order of priority) long range nuclear delivery capability, government and military control ^{DECAP} centers, war making resources, and population centers. After adoption of a targeting policy, in the

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Chairman's opinion the commander responsible for the strategic mission should develop a national strategic targeting system or list subject to review by J-2 (Intelligence). On the second question, he believed an integrated operational plan was definitely needed. He would charge CINCSAC with its development. Naval carriers would not be assigned any pre-planned strategic targets, but when Polaris developed a significant operational capability it would be brought into the integrated plan. On the third issue, the Chairman reasoned that if the above actions were taken the question of operational control and problems of mutual interference would be "simplified." The promulgation of a national strategic target list (NSTL) and a single integrated operational plan (SICP) would, in General Twining's words, "... provide a sound basis for necessary coordination of operational plans of local commanders with CINCSAC's plan."²⁶ Only after decisions on these issues were made, in the form of a command decision, and enforced, would there be progress in the area of target coordination.²⁷ (75)

At the time he presented his views to the SecDef, the Chairman sought the positions of the services on the issues of targeting coordination by requesting answers to 18 questions.²⁸ Initially, an inter-service ad hoc committee prepared a reply to the questions.²⁹ Later, each service individually prepared their answers.³⁰ As in the issue of command and control of Polaris, a wide divergence of opinion existed between the services. But no further action was taken on the matter

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

during 1959, awaiting the completion of Study 2009, an optimum target system for general war being prepared for Presidential approval.³¹ (TS)

Secretary McElroy also left office in December 1959; and the task of resolving the target coordination problem fell to his successor, Thomas S. Gates. The new SecDef gave early indications that he intended to take action. On 20 January he told the Joint Chiefs that he wished to discuss SM-171-59 (the split decision Polaris paper) at their convenience.³² Events during early spring provided fresh evidence that action was needed. Representatives to a coordination conference at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) agreed that targeting of a wide variety of weapons without a waste of resources was ". . . far beyond the capability of coordination conferences."³³ The senior representative of CINCEur and CINCSAC stated in their memo to the JCS: "With the increased number of weapons and their diversified utilization, it appears that an efficient application of the force can only be accomplished by a single authority."³⁴ (TS)

Meanwhile, the issue remained stalled at the roadblock of conflicting service positions. On 6 May General Twining advised the Secretary that the Chiefs could not agree on a response to the 18 questions; their individual views were forwarded.³⁵ After a two-day discussion in the middle of June in which the service positions were freely discussed with the new Secretary,³⁶ the Joint Staff prepared a paper expanding on differences in the areas of policy, target detection, and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

planning and coordination.³⁷ The Joint Chiefs were in agreement that a basic targeting policy was needed to translate guidance contained in Study 2009 and the President's decision on the study into workable instructions for unified and specified commanders, and that guidance was needed for selection of targets in a national target list,³⁸ but they differed on what that policy should be.³⁹ General Twining felt the elements of this diversity arose, partially at least, from endemic conceptual differences. He urged that the JCS not wait for a "perfect solution." To fit action to the word, he proposed a national strategic targeting policy.⁴⁰ Service positions went to the SecDef as SM-696-60 on 20 July 1960. (TS)

On 16 August 1960, after over a year of consideration by the JCS and two Secretaries of Defense, the issues of command and control of strategic systems and strategic targeting became the subject of a SecDef decision. It was a clear compromise, indorsing neither the Air Force position favoring a unified command, nor the Navy position that existing JCS machinery could do the work. Recognized by Secretary Gates was CINCSAC's extensive experience in strategic planning. The individual designated as CINCSAC, acting as the agent of the JCS, would collect at Headquarters SAC a team of experts from all services to prepare a plan for all U.S. forces committed to the initial strategic strike effort. CINCSAC's duties as Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) were an additional and separate responsibility.⁴¹ On 18 August Secretary Gates assigned as General Power's deputy Rear Admiral (subsequently

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

promoted to Vice Admiral) Edward N. Parker, an expert in nuclear weapons and former head of the Defense Atomic Support Agency.⁴² (TS)

Organization

General Power began immediately to gather his inter-service staff at Headquarters SAC. Actions to bring in new people and organize and train them in SAC methods proceeded at a brisk pace and they constituted the organization's main problems during the early formulative months. Time for preparation of the first plan was short; the SecDef wanted it done by early December.⁴³ (U)

The organization was kept as small as possible, with maximum participation of the existing SAC staff, but all services participated in all aspects of planning. Commands involved (SACEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPac, CINCAL, and CINCNELM) were requested to send representatives to a 24 August meeting at Offutt AFB to discuss organization and manning.⁴⁴ Three days later a proposed organizational structure to perform the main work assigned, i.e., preparation of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), was prepared and forwarded to the JCS.⁴⁵ (U)


The organization was divided into two general categories (see Chart next page). The first was the Office of the Director. General Power, in his capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning, had as his mission to:⁴⁶ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA



UNCLASSIFIED

JCS Publication No. 4, "Organization and Functions of the JCS," 1 Dec 60.

UNCLASSIFIED

- a. Organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions. (U)
- b. Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL. (U)
- c. Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, highlighting points of difference which he resolved during the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP. (U)

Also assigned to this office was a deputy, who assumed the responsibilities of the Director in his absence and acted as his principal assistant and advisor on JSTPS activities, and one representative each from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These service representatives served as a personal staff for the director and his deputy, represented their services in policy matters, and performed a liaison function. They were not in the command channel. Representatives from unified and specified commands supplying forces to the SIOP and a JCS liaison group were also attached to the staff. The CINC representatives (the number assigned was at the discretion of their commander) participated in the preparation of the SIOP and NSTL. They were not integrated into the staff, but were directly responsible to their respective commanders. A JCS liaison group, an integral part of the Joint Staff, JCS, assisted the DSTP in interpreting JCS guidance and informed the JCS and the services of progress in the preparation of the NSTL and SIOP. The CINC and service representatives served as a Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the deputy director. This committee reviewed and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

14

approved policy; disagreements went to the director for final decision. Also part of the Office of the Director was the Secretariat, responsible for administration and personnel supervision. The second category consisted of the two production units of the Target Staff--the National Strategic Target List Division and the Single Integrated Operational Plan Division--which took their names from the work they performed.⁴⁷ (U)

The initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 269 spaces requested for the above organization was divided as follows: SAC resources - 140 officers, 57 airmen, and 22 civilians; Army - 10 officers; Navy - 29 officers; Air Force - 8 officers; and Marine Corps - 3 officers.⁴⁸ (S)

On 1 September 1960 the JCS approved the proposed organization, officially designating it the Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency (JSTPA),* and the initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) consisting of 50 military spaces to be added to the 197 SAC military personnel working in related areas. In one change, the JCS stipulated that the deputy chief of the SIOP Division be a Navy officer in the grade of rear admiral or captain.⁴⁹ (S)

Subsequently, as a result of the survey made of the NSTL Division's intelligence structure and the intelligence support agencies of SAC

* On 29 September 1960 the JCS redesignated the organization as the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. (SM-957-60, "Strategic Target Planning," 29 Sep 60.)

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarters, at the Chief of Naval Operation's request, the Deputy Director of JSTPS requested 69 additional military spaces, which with the exception of 5 airmen from the Air Force were to be furnished by the Navy and Army. Forty of these were to be assigned to Headquarters SAC Intelligence functions and 29 to the JSTPS.⁵⁰ After review, the JCS approved the interim augmentation of 29 military personnel and 3 civilian spaces, but disapproved the additional 40.⁵¹ (e)

The organization to prepare the first NSTL and SIOP was assembled in haste because the SecDef had ordered the two documents completed by 14 December 1960. Emphasis had been placed on acquiring the best people from the services to do the job; not much analysis had been made of existing capability within the SAC staff. But with completion of the initial NSTL and SIOP* the organization could be adapted for the future, i.e., the work of keeping the documents current. General Power recommended a reduction; the non-SAC authorization would be reduced from 83 to 75 spaces and SAC personnel in a dual function status would be cut from 219 to 111. He also asked that the number of permanent representatives of the CINCs be held to a minimum.⁵² (e)

The Army and Navy did not agree. The Chief of Naval Operations did not think it adequately represented all services at all levels, but favored the Air Force. Because the duties of the NSTL Division concerned primarily intelligence and target selection, in the Navy's opinion all

* The preparation of these documents will be treated later in this history.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

services should be equally represented. Neither did Admiral Burke favor the proposal to reduce the number of the CINC representatives, preferring instead to leave their appointment to the discretion of the commander concerned. Injecting a new feature, the CNO recommended creation of an intelligence panel, with representatives from the CINCs, the services, the Joint Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, ". . . to provide the broadest and most expert intelligence base which can be achieved to support the SIOP."⁵³ NA The Army did not think the proposed manning met the criteria of a joint staff, nor did it agree with maintaining SAC officers with two jobs in key positions, except for the DSIP. It recommended equal representation among services in the NSTL Division and proportional representation (based on committed forces) in the SIOP Division.⁵⁴ (s)

The DSIP argued that existing JCS guidance for creation of joint ✓ staffs did not provide precedent for assignment of joint staff responsibilities to a specified command. He defended the JTD as representing his interpretation of JCS guidance: it was the most economical, made the most efficient use of space and technical equipment, and most adhered to the composition of forces and weapons assigned to the plan. He had not used forces submitted to the plan as a basis for representation; if he had the Navy and Marine Corps would have been reduced by one-half. In the document 14 key positions out of 34 were identified as Army, Navy, or Marine Corps (41 per cent). Although the DSIP had

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

no requirement for an intelligence panel, he welcomed the addition of one intelligence officer from each of the CINCs to monitor SIOP intelligence, and he agreed to the addition of 10 personnel to provide "confidence" and coordination of intelligence by unified and specified commanders. ⁵⁵ (u)

After considering the new proposal and the above comments by the services, the new SecDef, Robert S. McNamara, notified General Power that he had "complied fully" with directives issued by Secretary Gates, ⁵⁶ but that he should realign the JTD using the following guidance: (u)

- A. Persons occupying key positions in the NSPL Division of JSTPS will be assigned no other duties. (S)
- ✓ B. Key positions in the NSPL Division will be filled by the best qualified officers regardless of their service affiliation. (S)
- ✓ C. Key positions in the SIOP Division will be filled by service representatives essentially in proportion to the forces each service provides for the execution of the SIOP. (S)
- D. The JSTPS should be organized so as to receive, evaluate and utilize pertinent intelligence from all available resources. However, no 'Joint Intelligence Review Panel' appears necessary. (S)

The revised JTD submitted 27 April 1961 was essentially the same basic organization as proposed in January: 34 key positions and a total of 136 military and civilian personnel. Sixteen positions in the NSPL Division, however, were identified as "no service specified";

~~TOP SECRET~~

the best qualified would be chosen for these posts irrespective of service.⁵⁷ In the DSTP's opinion, the guiding principle of the JSTPS organization was ". . . that of service representation proportional to the service forces involved."⁵⁸ The organization as submitted was approved by the JCS on 14 June.⁵⁹ (S)(u)

Preparation of SIOP-62

General Power, in his capacity as DSTP, was guided by the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), a JCS document which formed the core of this nation's strategic strike planning. [Specific objectives of this policy were to destroy or neutralize Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic strike forces and major military and government control centers, and to strike urban-industrial centers to achieve the level of destruction indicated in Study 2009.] These objectives were to be accomplished by integrating strategic forces and directing them against a minimum list of targets.⁶⁰ (TS) *intend attack*

The first task of the JSTPS after its organization was to determine what targets were to be attacked. On 18 August General Power directed his Directorate of Intelligence to prepare a preliminary target list. At the initial meeting of the Staff six days later Intelligence presented a working list, known as the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) of about [4,000 targets.* A Steering Committee headed by Admiral]

[* From this list a team of experts from NSIL Division and the CINCs eventually prepared the final list.]

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Parker insured that the targeting needs of all the CINCs were satisfied.

General Power wanted the final list to include only targets which had been positively identified and located. 61 (TS) ICENS?

Basic to the preparation of the NSTL was the NSTDB, a compilation of Sino-Soviet targets of strategic significance representing the combined knowledge of U.S. intelligence sources. By a process of refinement the highest priority targets in this target data base eventually comprised the NSTL. After assigning a relative worth to the targets in the base by means of a target weighing system (*) the process of developing desired ground zeros (DGZs) began.

considering the number of

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

20

weapons available, which would accomplish objectives set down in the NSTAP, was thus developed.⁶² Upon completion of the SIOP this list contained

63 (TS)

Concurrent with work on the target system, personnel of the SIOP Division and CINC representatives analyzed capabilities of forces submitted by the CINCs preparatory to applying these forces to the target system.* Only forces and capabilities existing in December 1960 were considered in the SIOP-62. Reliability planning factors for each weapon system were also determined and submitted to the Policy Committee for approval.⁶⁴ (S)

In the middle of September 1960 work began on applying weapon systems gathered by SIOP Division to the DGZs prepared by NSTL Division.

The target system was divided into two parts--

~~TOP SECRET~~

Coordinating

(Sec V to JSTPS Rpt 1, "JCS Constraints," to Memo for JCS, "Fallout Constraint Policy," from DSIP, B-78376.)

** This was a force of 874 delivery systems (1447 weapons)


(Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, Vol II, B-77671.) (TS)

*** Consisting of 1464 aircraft and missiles and 1976 weapons (Ibid.). (TS)

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JSTPS TARGETING TEAM



strikes was difficult because of the great variety of delivery systems and weapons targeted. For example, forces available consisted of such divergent systems as the B-52, the F-100, and the ATLAS and the Mace;

(IS)

Detailed source data sheets were prepared on each sortie. They contained information on

After further detailed flight planning, the complete source data program was run through SAC's 704 computer to

Task force commanders received only those sheets directly related to their mission. At the tactical unit, strike timing for individual sorties was extracted from the timing sheets and integrated into the individual combat mission folders. 67 (S)

After the work of applying committed forces to targets was completed, damage assessed, and necessary refinements and adjustments made,

the NSTL was produced. It was a list of all National Strategic Target Data Base installations to be attacked in the SIOP. These targets fell into []

On 1 December 1960 the SecDef, JCS, commanders of unified and specified commands committing forces to the SIOP, and other high ranking military and civilian leaders, 32 in all, gathered at Headquarters SAC for briefings on SIOP-62.⁶⁹ Presented were the NSTL; operational concepts; enemy defenses; force application; assessment of sortie success, damage, and casualties; and dissents to the plan.⁷⁰ (S)

The complete SIOP-62 was a detailed plan of what targets were to be attacked, by what forces, and in what manner during the initial strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It superseded any conflicting guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Eight annexes represented the key portions of the plan: intelligence, responsibilities and command relationships, atomic, concept of operations,

~~TOP SECRET~~

25

coordinating instructions, strike timing, communications, and administrative procedures.⁷¹ [The JCS, acting under orders from the President, reserved the prerogative of putting the plan into effect. Its mission was to:⁷² (TS)]

- deep*
- a. Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear capability and primary military and government controls of major importance. (TS)
 - b. Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent necessary to paralyze the economy and render the Sino-Soviet Bloc incapable of continuing war. (TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

26

Dec. 1, 1960

Disagreements with certain SIOP-62 planning factors were presented at the briefing by CINCLANT's senior representative to the JCS, Rear Admiral J. J. Hyland. Although they had earlier been resolved by the DSIP,⁷⁵ by JCS direction they were presented as part of the SecDef briefing.⁷⁶ First, Admiral Hyland objected to what he called the [X

X

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

27

~~TOP SECRET~~

The DSIP's decision of 31 October 1960 had placed the [] (TS) []

The SIOP-62 was approved without major change by the JCS, SecDef, and the President on 2 December to be effective 1 April 1961.⁸⁴ The plan went into effect on that date.⁸⁵ (S)

Summary

The Single Integrated Operational Plan for 1962 represented a unique advancement in war planning. Prior to its development, atomic targeting was coordinated after the fact, handicapping mutual support and economy of force. After lengthy consideration of the issue by the JCS produced no unanimity of opinion, the Chairman proposed a national strategic targeting policy. The Secretary of Defense accepted this plan and directed it be used as guidance by CINCSAC in his new capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning. In his decision of 16 August 1960, the Secretary decided a strategic command was not needed, but neither did he think target planning could be done within existing JCS capabilities. He created the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, responsible to the JCS, but located at Headquarters SAC. The JSTPS replaced the World-Wide Coordination Conference method of planning coordination, although operational coordination was still required in the [] S

~~SECRET~~

29

[] Working with a short deadline, a nucleus of SAC officers, assisted by officers of other services assigned to the new organization, produced the first NSFL and SIOP in less than four months. As expected, the process was not completed without differences arising from diverse service concepts, but they did not interfere with submission of the final plan to the SecDef on 1 December and its acceptance at that time. The JSTPS was not a panacea for all the problems of nuclear strike coordination, but it was a beginning, a foundation for future development. (S)

* See JCS 2056/251, "Coordination of Atomic Operations," 11 May 61 [Decision on study by J-3], B-79820. The total effect of SIOP on the atomic coordination system could not be accurately evaluated until after completion of the world-wide atomic exercise scheduled for September 1961. (S)

~~SECRET~~

FOOTNOTES

1. JCS SM-810-60, 19 Aug 60 (B-76643); TAB B, JCS SM-810-60, 19 Aug 60, Memo for Gen T. S. Power, USAF, "Director of Strategic Target Planning," to SM-373-60, 22 Aug 60, Memo for the SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," (B-76643).
2. N.Y. Herald Tribune, 18 Aug 60.
3. Robert D. Little, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol III, Part 2, p 333.
4. Fred Hamlin, et al., Eds., The Aircraft Yearbook for 1952, (Lincoln Press, Inc., Washington, D. C.) pp 194, 188.
5. Richard E. Stockwell, Soviet Air Power (Pageant Press, Inc., N.Y.), p 1; Robert D. Little, History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol III, Part 2, pp 299-300.
6. Ibid., p 335; History of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59, Vol. I, p 23.
7. Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 57, pp 50-52; Hist of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59, pp 33-47.
8. Hist of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59, pp 33-48; Interview (on taperecorder), Mr. E. R. Caywood, Historian, with Col E. C. Unger, Ch, Policy Br, DPL, Hq SAC, 12-14 Jul 61.
9. CM-380-59, Memo for SecDef, from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 17 Aug 59, enclosure to JCS 2056/131, 20 Aug 59.
10. President's message to the Congress (Copy), 3 Apr 58, Ex 18, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59.
11. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, "Reorganization of DOD," No. 83, pp 6427, 6279 (Testimony of Gen T. D. White, USAF, and Gen Maxwell Taylor, CofS, USA).
12. Ibid., pp 6344-6391 (Testimony of Adm Arleigh H. Burke, CNO, USN).
13. Public Law 85-599, 6 Aug 58.
14. Memo for Chairman, JCS, from Hon D. A. Quarles, Actg SecDef, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for POLARIS Weapon System," 24 Dec 58. This document became JCS 1620/209, 5 Jan 59.

15. JCS 1620/250, Memo, CofS USAF to JCS, "Command and Control of Strategic Forces," 28 Apr 59; Memo for SecDef, from CofS USAF, AFM 182-59, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for Polaris System," 5 May 59, Ex 12, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 59.
- ✓16. JCS 1620/254, Memo, CNO, USN, to JCS, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris Weapon System," 20 Apr 59. The Navy position was supported by Representative Daniel Flood (Dem, Pa.), influential member of the House Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations (See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations, 86th Cong, 2nd Sess, Part 2, pp 118-125).
- ✓17. JCS 1620/223, Memo, CNO, USN, to JCS, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for Polaris Weapon System," 22 Jan 59.
- ✓18. JCS 1620/254, Memo, CNO, USN, to JCS, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris Weapon System," 20 Apr 59.
- ✓19. Ibid.
20. Appendix A to JCS 1620/257, "View of CofS, USA, on Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris Weapon System," 8 May 59.
21. Appendix D to JCS 1620/257, "Commandant of the Marine Corps Views on Concepts of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris Weapon System," 8 May 59.
22. The positions of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force went to the SecDef as JCSM-171-59, 8 May 59.
23. Ltr, Gen T. D. White, CofS USAF, to Gen T. S. Power, CINCSAC, 8 Jul 59, Ex 16, Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 59, Vol IV.
24. Memo, Brig Gen C. A. Randall, Mil Asst to SecDef, for Chairman, JCS, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris," 30 Jul 59.
25. CM-380-59, Memo for SecDef from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 17 Aug 59, Enclosure to JCS 2056/131, 20 Aug 59.
- ↓
✓26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. CM-386-59, Memo for JCS, from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 24 Aug 59. Also JCS 2056/134.

29. Enclosure, Memo for JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," to JCS 2056/137, 3 Oct 59. Members of the ad hoc committee were Maj Gen G. W. Martin, USAF; Brig Gen J. K. Woolnough, USA; RAdm C. V. Rickets, USN; and Brig Gen W. J. VanRyzin, USMC.
30. JCS 2056/143, 22 Dec 59.
31. SM-340-60, Memo for Dir, Joint Staff, from Brig Gen H. L. Hillyard, Sec, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 11 Apr 60.
32. Note to Control Div, JCS, from Brig Gen H. L. Hillyard, Sec, JCS, "JCSM-171-59, 8 May 59, subject 'Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the POLARIS Weapon System,'" 20 Jan 60.
33. Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, CINCSAC, to Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, 1 Jun 60, Ex 21, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 60.
34. Memo for the JCS, from Brig Gen C. M. Eisenhart, CINCSAC Rep, and Maj Gen R. T. Coiner, CINCEur Rep, "NATO Coordination Procedures," 14 Apr 60, Ex 19, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 60.
35. JCSM 193-60, Memo, JCS (signed by Chairman) to SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 6 May 60.
36. Memo for Gen Power, from Col L. D. Clay, Ch, DPLB, SAC, "Strategic Command," 16 Jun 60.
37. JCS 2056/161, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 29 Jun 60, forwarded to SecDef as enclosure to Memo, Twining to SecDef, same subject, as JCSM 273-60.
38. Ibid.
39. JCSM 280-60, Memo, JCS (signed by the Chairman) to SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 7 Jul 60. The Air Force would designate CINCSAC as national strategic targeting authority, but the Navy and the Marine Corps favored designating the Joint Staff to do the job assisted by the unified and specified commands and other agencies.
40. Memo, Chairman, JCS for JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," enclosure to SM-682-60, 15 Jul 60.
41. Memo for the Chairman, JCS, from SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 16 Aug 60 (B-76590); SM-809-60, Memo for Gen T. S. Power, USAF, from JCS, "Director of Strategic Target Planning," 19 Aug 60.
42. USN Bureau of Personnel Order 051664, 17 Aug 60.

43. Interview (tape recorded), Robert M. Kipp, and E. R. Caywood, Historians, with VAdm E. N. Parker, DDSTP, 29 Dec 61.
44. Memo for the Record, "Staff Meeting 18 Aug 60," Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, JSTPS (B-78391).
45. Memo for the JCS, "Proposed Organization and Manning Requirements for Strategic Target Planning," 27 Aug 60, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, Ex 1.
46. Tab A, "National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy," to Memo, Thomas S. Gates, SecDef, to Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 16 Aug 60 (B-76590).
47. JCS SM-372-60, Memo for the SecDef from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60, Tab A (B-76643); Memo for JCS from SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 16 Aug 60 (B-76590); Memo for the Record, "Daily Progress Rpt on JSEP Activities," Part I, Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, 24 Aug 60 (B-77010); Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Proposed Organizational Manning Requirements . . . , " 27 Aug 60, Ex 1; Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Statement of Functions and Job Specifications for Key Positions in JSTPS," 25 Jul 61, Ex 2; JCS SM-963-60, "Terms of Reference for JCSLG," 27 Sep 60; Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Briefing to SecDef," by JSTPS, 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).
48. Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Proposed Organizational Manning Requirements . . . , " 27 Aug 60, Ex 1.
49. Msg, 982265, JCS to DSTP, 1 Sep 60.
50. Msg, 2161, DJSTPA to JCS, 27 Sep 60, Ex 3.
51. Msg, 984249, JCS to DSTP, 13 Oct 60.
52. Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, to JCS, "JSTPS Manpower Requirements and Organization," 9 Jan 61, with 2 Atch, Ex 4; Memo for the Record, "Daily Progress Report on JSEP Activities," Part I, Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Secretary, DSTP, 24 Aug 60 (B-77010).
53. Msg, JCS 989341, 26 Jan 61, Ex 5.
54. Msg, JCS 989342, JCS to DSTP, 26 Jan 61, Ex 6; JCS 2056/223, Memo, JCS to SecDef, 3 Mar 61, forwarded as JCSM 120-61, 3 Mar 61. The Air Force approved of DSTP's manning without change.
55. Msg, DSTP 0997, DSTP to JCS, n.s., 8 Feb 61, enclosure to JCS 2056/219, 9 Feb 61.

56. Msg, JCS 992409, JCS to DSIP, n.s., 22 Mar 61, Ex 7.
57. Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, DSIP, to JCS, "JSTPS Manpower Requirements and Organization," 27 Apr 61, with 1 Atch, Ex 8.
58. Memo for Admiral Parker, from Gen Power, "JSTPS Organization and Table of Distribution Recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 10 Jan 61, Ex 9.
59. SM-654-61, Memo from JCS to DSIP, "Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Manpower Requirements and Organization," 14 Jun 61; See also Memo for JCS from Gen T. S. Power, DSIP, "Statement of Functions and Job Specifications for Key Positions in JSTPS," 25 Jul 61, Ex 2.
60. JCS SM-372-60, Memo for the SecDef, from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60, Tab A (B-76643).
61. Memo for the Record, "Staff Meeting of 18 Aug 61," Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, JSTPS, 18 Aug 60 (B-78391); Memo for the Record, "Daily Progress Report on Joint Strategic Target Planning Activities," Part I, Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, 24 Aug 60 (B-77010).
62. Manual, "JSTPS Planning Manual," 1 Apr 61, pp 8-18; Interview, R. Kipp, Historian, with Col W. A. Hussey, USA, Dep Ch, NSTL Div, 11 Sep 61.
63. Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, by JSTPS, Vol I (B-77659).
64. Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, Vol I (B-77659), and Vol II (B-77671).
65. Manual, "JSTPS Planning Manual," 1 Apr 61, pp 77-97; Interview, R. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, DSIPPMF, 6 Sep 61.
66. "JSTPS Planning Manual," 1 Apr 61.
67. Interview, R. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, DSIPPMF, 6 Sep 61; SIOP-62, Annex F (B-77620), description only, not actual Annex F.
68. JSTPS Planning Manual, 1 Apr 61, p 11.
69. Records in Presentations and Protocol Sec, Office CofS, SAC. See Ex 10 for a complete list of participants.
70. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DDSIP, to DSIP, "JSTPS Progress Report Week Ending 2 Dec 60," 6 Dec 60, Ex 11.

71. SIOP-62, 2 Dec 60 (B-77620).
72. Change 1 to SIOP-62, 7 Jun 61 (B-77620-A). Complete SIOP filed in SIOP Division, JSTPS, Hq SAC.
73. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DDSIP, to Ch, SIOP Div and CINC Reps, "Integration of SACEUR Coordinated Forces in SIOP-63," 24 Mar 61, w/1 Atch.
74. Msg, B-79315, DSIP to JCS, n.s., 31 Jun 61.
75. JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of the Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60," 7 Nov 60, Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Oct 60.
76. SM-810-60, 19 Aug 60, Tab C to SM-372-60, Memo for SecDef, from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60.
77. NSTL and SIOP Presentation to the SecDef, 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).
78. Memo for DSIP, from RAdm J. J. Hyland, CINCLant/NELM Representative to JSTPS, "NSTL and SIOP," 21 Oct 60 (B-77246); JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of the Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60, Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Oct 60.
79. Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).
80. Memo, Gen T. S. Power, DSIP, to CINCLant Senior Representative to JSTPS, "Weather Factor, Method of Application," 22 Oct 60; Manual, "JSTPS Planning Manual," 1 Apr 60, Appendix V to Chap 7, pp 40-41.
81. Briefing, "NSTL-SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 61, Vol II (B-77671).
82. Ibid., Vol I (B-77659).
83. Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Dec 60, to JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60," 7 Nov 60.
84. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DDSIP, to DSIP, "JSTPS Progress Report Week Ending 2 Dec 60," 6 Dec 60, Ex 11; Memo, Gen T. S. Power, DSIP, to JCS, "JCS NSTL/SIOP-63," 16 Jan 61, Ex 12; Msg, JCS to Chairman, JCS et al., JCS 987018, 9 Dec 60 (B-77712).
85. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DDSIP, to DSIP, "JSTPS Progress Report for Week Ending 31 Mar 61," 4 Apr 61.